Commonwealth v. Walter N. Snow.
| Decision Date | 27 November 1933 |
| Citation | 284 Mass. 426 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH v. WALTER N. SNOW. SAME v. SAME. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
October 2, 1933.
Present: RUGG, C.
J., CROSBY, PIERCE DONAHUE, & LUMMUS, JJ.
Trust, What constitutes. Larceny.
Where a company issued a certificate of deposit stating that it had received from the person to whom the certificate was issued a certain sum "to be invested" in a certain kind of property and reciting that it was a "Certificate of Deposit for investment only," the company agreed to pay interest on the deposit from its date, and the depositor gave no authority to the company to mingle the money so deposited with its other funds or to use the money for any purpose other than that stated in the certificate, it was held, that
(1) The presumption, raised by the agreement to pay interest on the deposit, that the deposit created a debtor-creditor relationship, rather than one of trust, between the company and the depositor, was not conclusive and might be controlled by other evidence;
(2) The question what was the relationship between the parties, was one of fact to be determined in view of all the circumstances;
(3) A finding was warranted that a trust relationship had been created between the parties.
Evidence of the facts above stated, together with evidence that the money so deposited with the company was used for its general purposes, warranted a finding of guilty at the trial of an indictment for larceny against one who was the executive officer in charge of the office of the company where the deposit was made.
At the trial of an indictment for larceny, there was evidence that the defendant was in charge of the eastern office of an investment company; that a certain bond was received there from a customer for the specific purpose of collection; that the defendant forwarded the bond to the western office of the company for collection and requested prompt forwarding of the money, planning to use it for the general purposes of the company; that shortly thereafter the western office notified the defendant that it was sending a sum equal to the amount of the bond; that such sum, not earmarked for any particular purpose, was received by the defendant's office in his absence; that he was informed of the receipt of such sum upon his return; and that he thereafter mingled such money with the general funds of the company and represented to the depositor that the proceeds of his bond had not been received by the defendant's office. Held, that
(1) An inference was warranted that the defendant knew that the money sent from the western to the eastern office of the company was in payment of the depositor's bond;
(2) Findings were warranted that the defendant did not intend to use such money to pay the depositor, and after its receipt fraudulently misrepresented to him that it had not been received;
(3) A finding of guilty was warranted.
TWO INDICTMENTS, found and returned on July 14, 1932. The defendant having waived trial by jury, the indictments were heard together in the Superior Court by W. A. Burns, J. The indictments, bills of particulars filed by the Commonwealth, material evidence and rulings requested by the defendant and refused are described in the opinion. The defendant was found guilty on each indictment and alleged exceptions.
D. P. Ranney, for the defendant. C. Fairhurst, Special District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.
In the first case the defendant was indicted on twenty-three counts charging him with larceny of various sums of money from certain persons. In answer to the defendant's motion for a bill of particulars the Commonwealth filed the following: "That as to Counts 1 to 23 inclusive of Indictment No. 806 -- cash, drafts, checks, savings bank deposits, bonds or stock were delivered to the Interstate Mortgage Trust Company, of which the defendant was an executive officer and in charge of the eastern office of said company, that the same was in each case deposited with the company on the express trust and understanding that the said company would invest the same in first mortgages on improved farm or city property located in Oklahoma or Kansas, and for such investment only; that notwithstanding such trust and understanding but in violation thereof said moneys were without right and authority wrongfully diverted by the said company and this defendant to other purposes, and thus were wrongfully converted." Trial by jury was waived by the defendant and the case was heard by a judge of the Superior Court who found the defendant guilty on all counts except 1 and 3, which were nolprossed.
Mrs. Gladys S.
Milkey, called by the Commonwealth, testified that she was the bookkeeper for the Interstate Mortgage Trust Company for fourteen years prior to its bankruptcy in 1931. During all this time the defendant was in charge of the eastern office and was president and cashier of that office. She and Anna O'Hara, another employee, had authority to sign the defendant's name, at his direction, to certificates of deposit, and no other person signed such certificates, these certificates being in the usual form, as follows: Kenneth N. Davis and A. G. Kaulback were salesmen or representatives of the company. They brought money and bank books into the office for which certificates of deposit were issued and no question was ever raised as to their authority to do so. All moneys which came into the office were deposited in the bank accounts of the company, and such moneys were used and paid out for general or any purposes of the company. This witness further testified that she always informed those to whom certificates of deposit were issued that they would receive interest from the time designated on the certificate of deposit. These certificates were issued on no other condition than the usual condition that interest from the date set forth in the certificates should be paid on them. She did not know what the defendant or anybody else said to any of the people when they left their money with the company.
All the persons referred to in the indictment, except those who were unable to be present, testified in substance that they deposited money with the company and received certificates therefor; that no authority was ever given to the company or its officers to mingle their money with other company funds, or to use the same for general purposes of the company; that they relied upon the agreement contained in the certificates of deposit that first mortgages were to be given and that the moneys were to be held for investment only. Some of these persons received interest on their deposits and some did not. None of them ever received a mortgage. There was evidence that on April 2, 1931, the date of the bankruptcy of the company, there were no funds with which to pay the certificates of deposit on which indictments were returned.
At the close of the evidence the defendant presented the following requests for rulings: These requests were denied and the defendant excepted.
In announcing his decision the trial judge made the following statement:
We are of opinion that the exception to the denial of the requests must be overruled. The only question is whether a trust relationship or that of debtor and creditor was proved between the company and the depositors. If the former it is plain that the defendant is guilty as charged. Commonwealth v King, 202 Mass. 379 , 391. It is the contention of the defendant that the fact that interest was to be...
To continue reading
Request your trial