Commonwealth v. Weiner
| Decision Date | 01 June 1926 |
| Citation | 255 Mass. 506,152 N.E. 359 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH v. WEINER. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Exceptions and Appeal from Superior Criminal Court, Suffolk County; D. Lourie, Judge.
Louis Weiner, alias, was convicted of robbery, and he excepts and appeals. Exceptions overruled. Order offirmed.
Since essence of ‘robbery,’ in view of G. L. c. 277, ss 39, 79, and chapter 265, s 19, is exertion of force, actual or constructive, against another, to take personal property of value, with intention of stealing it, from protection which the person of that other affords, it is not affected by state of legal title to good taken.
[Ed. Note.-For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Robbery.]
In prosecution for robbery, fact that force was exerted within a store or building, rather than on a highway or out of doors, was immaterial.
3. Robbery k17(5)-Defendant, intending to steal goods, having assaulted servant having their custody, was properly convicted on indictment laying ownership in true owner, and not in person attacked (G. L. c. 277, ss 39, 79, and chapter 265, s 19).
In view of G. L. c. 277, ss 39, 79, and chapter 265. s 19, where defendant, having intended to steal goods which happened to belong to S., assaulted his servant and forcibly took them from his custody, act was robbery, and defendant was properly convicted on indictment laying ownership of goods in S.
M. Caro, Asst. Dist. Atty., of Boston, for the Commonwealth.
J. P. Feeney and Robert Gallagher, both of Boston, for defendant.
Frederick W. Ives was store manager and clerk at the jewelry store of Carl H. Skinner, in Boston. On the morning of August 20, 1924, in the absence of Skinner, he had taken a case containing jewelry belonging to Skinner from the store safe, placed it upon a table near the show windows, had opened the case and was about to remove a tray of jewelry from the case to the window, when the defendant with three other men entered the store. He was knocked down by one of the men, and, while the others took and carried away the jewelry, was held covered by a pistol in the hand of the defendant.
The defendant was indicted for the crime, and was placed on trial on the first count of the indictment which charged that he, ‘being then and there armed with a dangerous weapon, to wit, a pistol, did assault and beat Frederick W. Ives, with intent to rob him, and thereby did rob and steal from the person of said Frederick W. Ives' various specified articles of valuable jewelry ‘of the property of Carl H. Skinner.’
There was evidence in support of the facts as stated above; but no evidence of other facts in regard to the ownership, possession or custody of the jewelry was introduced. At the close of the evidence the defendant moved that a verdict of not guilty be ordered, because (1) upon all the evidence the defendant is not guilty, and (2) upon all the evidence no robbery has been proved as set forth in the indictment. He also requested that the jury be instructed:
‘You cannot find the defendant guilty of the major offense charged in this indictment.’
He duly excepted to the refusal of the judge to direct and instruct as requested. After a verdict of guilty, he moved for a new trial on the grounds that (1) the verdict was against the evidence and the weight of the evidence, and (2) the verdict is against the law; and moved in arrest of judgment for the reasons that (1) the indictment states no offense known to the law; (2) it does not state the offense of which he was convicted; and (3) the court has no jurisdiction of the defendant. He saved exceptions to the denial of both these motions, and claimed an appeal from the order overruling the motion in arrest of judgment.
The case is before us on the exceptions and appeal. The single contention which underlies the request and motions is that in the absence of Carl H. Skinner no robbery could be made out upon the evidence, or, stated in another way, that an indictment which charges that, by violence and with intent to rob, the property of Skinner was taken feloniously from Ives, does not charge robbery.
The defendant relies chiefly upon the language of G. L. c. 277, §§ 39, 79, and upon the cases of State v. Lawler, 130 Mo. 366, 32 S. W. 979,51 Am. St. Rep. 575, and State v. Morledge, 164 Mo. 522, 65 S. W. 226....
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Com. v. Dominico
...order to take personal property . . .. It is not affected by the state of the legal title to the goods taken.' Commonwealth v. Weiner, 255 Mass. 506, 509, 152 N.E. 359, 360 (1926); Commonwealth v. Novicki, 324 Mass. 461, 464, 87 N.E.2d 1 (1949). In the case before us, Brink's was in possess......
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Com. v. Moran
...v. Rego, 360 Mass. 385, 274 N.E.2d 795 (1971); Commonwealth v. Novicki, 324 Mass. 461, 464, 87 N.E.2d 1 (1949); Commonwealth v. Weiner, 255 Mass. 506, 509, 152 N.E. 359 (1926). We hold, however, that there was sufficient evidence to warrant a finding that the intent to steal was not an Evid......
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...In construing the armed robbery statute, this court has previously stressed the assault aspect of the crime. In Commonwealth v. Weiner, 255 Mass. 506, 152 N.E. 359 (1926), the defendant claimed that no robbery had been committed where the property taken did not belong to the person against ......
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Tarrant v. Ponte, 84-1392
...another in other to take personal property ... from the protection which the person of that other affords." Commonwealth v. Weiner, 255 Mass. 506, 509, 152 N.E. 359 (1926). Commonwealth v. Levia, 385 Mass. at 348, 431 N.E.2d 928. These two offenses are not "so closely related in fact as to ......