Commonwealth v. Weiss

• Decision Date: 05 January 1891
• Docket Number: 68
• Citation: 139 Pa. 247,21 A. 10
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. MATTHIAS WEISS
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

21 A. 10

139 Pa. 247

COMMONWEALTH v. MATTHIAS WEISS

No. 68

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

January 5, 1891

Argued November 5, 1890

APPEAL BY DEFENDANT FROM THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS NO. 1 OF ALLEGHENY COUNTY.

No. 68 October Term 1890, Sup. Ct.; court below, No. 106 June Term 1889, C.P. No. 1.

On March 19, 1889, Matthias Weiss entered in the court below an appeal from the judgment of an alderman, in an action brought against him by the commonwealth of Pennsylvania, for use of the county of Allegheny and A. L. Best, to recover the penalty of $100 imposed by § 3, act of May 21, 1885 P.L. 22, upon every person, etc., "who shall manufacture, sell, or offer or expose for sale, or have in his . . . possession with intent to sell" oleomargarine etc. Issue.

At the trial, on February 28, 1890, the testimony for the plaintiff tended to prove that on February 4, 1889, George Spence ordered and ate a meal at a restaurant kept by the defendant paying therefor fifty cents; that he was served, as a part of said meal, with a substance resembling butter, which he retained and carried away with him, and that, upon an analysis thereof, the "substance" proved to be oleomargarine, with evidence of cotton seed oil. One of the witnesses for the plaintiff testified that one day, prior to February 4, 1889, he saw a waiter in the employ of the defendant throw out of the doorway of the restaurant an empty oleomargarine package.

The defendant's case consisted of the admission that the defendant, if in court, would testify that he did not knowingly furnish, or authorize to be furnished, to any of his customers any oleomargarine, but, so far as he knew, furnished genuine butter; this fact to be regarded, for the purposes of this case, as having been testified to by him before the jury.

The testimony being closed the court, COLLIER, J., charge the jury as follows:

The defendant requests the court to instruct the jury:

1. That if they believe from the evidence that the defendant did not knowingly furnish, or authorize to be furnished, or know of being furnished, to any of his customers, any oleomargarine, but, so far as he knew, furnished genuine butter, then the verdict must be for the defendant.

Answer: Refused.

No matter what we may think of this question, as individuals, the Supreme Court of our state and the Supreme Court of the United States have decided this oleomargarine law to be constitutional. Our Supreme Court has decided that the man who sells it in his business, whether he knows it or not, is liable. It does not make any difference; he must look out and must not sell it as butter; must not use it as butter. If you choose to buy oleomargarine as lard, that is another question. There is nothing in the evidence in this case, under the law of our land, under the late decision of our Supreme Court, that will prevent the plaintiff from recovering. We therefore direct you to find a verdict for the plaintiff for the amount claimed.

The jury accordingly returned a verdict for the plaintiff for $100. Judgment having been entered, the defendant took this appeal, specifying that the court erred:

1. In refusing the defendant's point.

2. "In directing the jury to find a verdict for the plaintiff for the amount claimed."

Affirmed.

Mr. John S. Ferguson, for the appellant:

While the word "knowingly" is not used in § 3 of the act upon which this suit is brought, the title of the act shows beyond doubt that the court was in error in holding that it made no difference whether the defendant knew he was furnishing oleomargarine or not. The title reads: "An Act for the protection of the public health, and to prevent adulteration of dairy products and fraud in the sale thereof." Manifestly, it did not intend to punish a person so defrauded, unless, being aware of the fraudulent character of the article imposed upon him, he sells it to some one else. The fraud referred to is actual, not constructive fraud. This is a penal statute, and the construction should be equitable: Commonwealth v. Shopp, 1 Woodw. 123; Irish v. Elliott, Add. 238. The doctrine that when a statute plainly forbids an act to be done, the law conclusively implies a guilty intent, although the offender may have been honestly mistaken as to the meaning of the law, has no application to this case. Commonwealth v. Miller, 131 Pa. 118, does not rule our case, though supposed to do so by the court below.

Mr. William Yost, for the appellee:

The testimony which the defendant would have given was too vague and general. He did not propose to show any care to avoid violating the law, or to explain that the open violation of it, shown by the testimony for the plaintiff, could have occurred without his knowledge or authority. But the act of May 21, 1885, P.L. 22, does not require, as an ingredient of the offence, that the sale must be with knowledge or wilful, and want of guilty knowledge or intent is no defence: Wharton Cr. Ev., 725; 3 Greenl. Ev., § 21; Carlson's License, 127 Pa. 330; Commonwealth v. Goodman, 97 Mass. 117; Commonwealth v. Farren, 9 Allen 489; Halsted v. State, 41 N.J.L. 552 (32 Am. Rep. 247); Morris v. People, 3 Denio 403; Commonwealth v. Raymond, 97 Mass. 569; Farrell v. State, 32 Ohio St. 456 (30 Am. Rep. 617). The act of 1885 is in the nature of a police regulation: Powell v. Commonwealth, 114 Pa. 265; S.C. 127 U.S. 678.

Before PAXSON, C.J., STERRETT, GREEN, CLARK, WILLIAMS, McCOLLUM and MITCHELL, JJ.

OPINION

JUSTICE CLARK:

This was an action brought to recover the penalty of $100, provided for in the third section of the act of May 21, 1885, P.L. 22, commonly known as the Oleomargarine Act. At the trial, the defendant submitted a point requesting the court to instruct the jury "that, if they (the jury) believe, from the evidence, that the defendant did not knowingly furnish, or authorize to be furnished, or know of being furnished, to any of his customers, any oleomargarine, but, so far as he knew, furnished genuine butter, then the verdict must be for the defendant." The point was refused, and whether the court was right in refusing it, as we understand the case, is the only question upon which a decision is desired. The argument contained in the paperbook, as well as the oral argument in this court, was directed to this question only, and we assume that the parties intended to raise no other. That portion of the charge in which binding instructions were given to find for the plaintiff, is not quoted in totidem verbis, in the assignments of error, according to our rules; it would seem, therefore, that the appellant's intention is to confine our deliberations to the single question referred to.

The first and third sections of the act of 1885 provide as follows:

"1. That no person, firm, or corporate body shall manufacture, out of any oleaginous substance or any compound of the same, other than that produced from unadulterated milk or of cream from the same, any article designed to take the place of butter or cheese produced from pure unadulterated milk, or cream from the same, or of any imitation or adulterated butter or cheese, nor shall sell, or offer for sale, or have in his, her, or their possession with intent to sell the same as an article of food."

"3. Every person, company, firm, or corporate body who shall manufacture, sell, or offer or expose for sale, or have in his, her, or their possession with intent to sell, any substance, the manufacture and sale of which is prohibited by the first section of this act, shall, for every such offence, forfeit and pay the sum of one hundred dollars, which shall be recoverable, with costs, by any person suing in the name of the commonwealth, as debts of like amount are by law recoverable," etc.

Guilty knowledge or guilty intent is, in general, an essential element in crimes at the common law, but statutes providing police regulations, in many cases make certain acts penal where this element is wholly disregarded. The distinction is thus...