United States v. Ninety-Nine Diamonds

• Decision Date: 19 August 1905
• Docket Number: 2,139.
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. NINETY-NINE DIAMONDS et al.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

139 F. 961

UNITED STATES v. NINETY-NINE DIAMONDS et al.

No. 2,139.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

August 19, 1905

Syllabus by the court.

All the words of a statute should have effect. The intention of the enacting body is not expressed by a part, but by all the statute; and, as the purpose of construction is to ascertain that intention, 'all the words of a law must have effect rather than that part should perish by construction.'

Construction and interpretation have no place or office where the language of a statute is unambiguous and its meaning is evident.

Statutes should have a rational, sensible interpretation. The object which the legislative body sought to attain and the evil which it endeavored to remedy may always be considered to ascertain its intention and to interpret its act.

None of the acts denounced by Act June 10, 1890, c. 407, Sec. 9, 26 Stat. 135 (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1895), constitute an offense thereunder unless they deprive the United States of some of its lawful duties.

The word 'false' in this section, which prescribes punishment by forfeiture, fine, and imprisonment for the use of a false statement in making an entry of imported goods means more than incorrect or erroneous. It implies wrong or culpable negligence, and signifies knowingly or negligently untrue.

The words 'false' and 'falsely,' in statutes and contracts which impose forfeitures or penalties for false acts or acts falsely done, generally imply culpable negligence or wrong. They signify more than incorrect or incorrectly, and mean knowingly or intentionally or negligently false or falsely, in the absence of express provisions in the statutes or contracts or reasonable implications from them, their subject, and the circumstances to the contrary.

One who had the right of possession of and a lien upon imported merchandise for the duties and for transportation expenses which he had paid, together with the option to purchase any of it at fixed prices, or to return it to the tentative vendors, declared in good faith in making an entry of the goods, which were invoiced to him, that he was the owner. His statement did not deprive the government of any lawful duties. Held, the use of this statement to make the entry did not constitute an offense, under Act June 10, 1890, c. 407 Sec. 9, 26 Stat. 135 (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1895).

Charles C. Houpt, for the United States.

W Wickham Smith (Edward C. Stringer and McNeil V. Seymour, on the brief), for defendants in error.

Before SANBORN and HOOK, Circuit Judges, and ADAMS, District Judge.

SANBORN Circuit Judge.

This is an action by the United States to confiscate 99 diamonds, under Act June 10, 1890, c. 407, Sec. 9, 26 Stat. 135 (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1895), for the administration of the customs, upon the ground that the claimant, Henry Bockstruck, in making his entry, declared that he was the owner and that Simon Fink was the seller of the merchandise, when the truth was that he was the consignee and Fink was the consignor. These were the facts: The diamonds had been sent and invoiced to Bockstruck from Antwerp by Simon Fink, under an agreement that he should pay the duties and the expenses of the transportation from New York and should have the option to keep and pay for, at the invoice price, or to return to Fink, Bodenheimer & Co. in New York, any or all of the diamonds. He paid the duties and the transportation charges from New York, and had a lien on the diamonds for those amounts. He had the right to the possession of the merchandise. The invoice billed the goods to him at the prices specified as the purchaser, and the deputy collector told him to sue the declaration of an owner prescribed by Act June 10, 1890, c. 407, Sec. 5, 26 Stat 132 (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1889). There was no claim or evidence in the court below that Bockstruck intended to make any statement that was not true, or to deceive the officers of the government, or that the statement he made in any way deprived or was intended to deprive the United States of any of the lawful duties upon the merchandise referred to therein. The court below held that Bockstruck was the owner of the diamonds and dismissed the action.

In the briefs and arguments of counsel these three questions have been discussed: Was the claimant the owner of the merchandise? Is one, who in making an entry of imported merchandise innocently makes an untrue statement by mistake, accident, or honestly, after the exercise of reasonable care, subject to the forfeiture and penalties imposed by section 9? Is one who makes an entry of imported merchandise by means of a false statement, which does not deprive the United States of any lawful duties, liable to this forfeiture and these penalties? These questions will be considered in their reverse order.

Section 9 reads in this way:

'That if any owner, importer, consignee, agent, or other person shall make or attempt to make any entry of imported merchandise by means of any fraudulent or false invoice, affidavit, letter, paper, or by means of any false or fraudulent practice of appliance whatsoever, or shall be guilty of any willful act or omission by means whereof the United States shall be deprived of the lawful duties, or any portion thereof, accruing upon the merchandise, or any portion thereof, embraced or referred to in such invoice, affidavit, letter, paper, or statement, or affected by such act or omission, such merchandise or the value thereof, to be recovered from the person making the entry, shall be forfeited, which forfeiture shall only apply to the whole of the merchandise or the value thereof in the case or package containing the particular article or articles or merchandise to which such fraud or false paper or statement relates; and such person shall, upon conviction, be fined for each offense a sum not exceeding five thousand dollars, or be imprisoned for a time not exceeding two years, or both, in the discretion of the court.

The contention of counsel for the government is that the clause 'by means whereof the United States shall be deprived of the lawful duties or any portion thereof' is limited in its effect to the crime of using any 'willful act or omission,' and that all the other offenses denounced by this section are complete, although they have no effect upon the collection of the duties and are not intended to, and do not deprive the government of any portion of them. In this position he is sustained by two decisions of the Circuit Court of the Southern District of New York. U.S. v. Cutajar (C.C.) 60 F. 744; U.S. v. Rosenthal (C.C.) 126 F. 766, 776. The respect and deference which the opinions of the learned judges who rendered these decisions always command have invoked a careful and deliberate consideration of the reasons they suggest for their views and of the argument of counsel; but they have not proved convincing. If we eliminate from section 9 the words that are not material to the question under discussion, it reads:

'If any owner shall make any entry by means of any false invoice, affidavit, letter, paper or statement, or shall be guilty of any willful act or omission by means whereof the United States shall be deprived of the lawful duties accruing upon the merchandise embraced or referred to in such invoice, affidavit, letter, paper or statement, or affected by such act or omission, such merchandise shall be forfeited.'

If the deprivation clause is limited in its effect to the willful act or omission, the words 'embraced or referred to in such invoice, affidavit, letter, paper or statement' have neither function nor effect. If these words were omitted and the section read:

'If any owner shall make any entry by means of any fraudulent or false invoice, affidavit, letter, paper, or by means of any false statement the merchandise shall be forfeited, and if in making any entry any owner shall be guilty of any willful act or omission by means whereof the United States shall be deprived of the lawful duties accruing upon the merchandise affected by such act or omission such merchandise shall be forfeited.'

it would have the exact effect which the construction of counsel for the government gives it. This fact is a demonstration of the proposition that the Congress intended, and by the words it used expressly declared, that the deprivation clause should have broader scope, and that it should qualify the entry by means of any fraudulent or false affidavit, letter, paper, or statement, as well as the guilt of any willful act or omission. Cardinal rules for the interpretation of the law are that the intention of the legislative body should be ascertained and given effect, and that this intention must be deduced, not from a part, but from the entire statute which expresses it, because the Legislature did not express its intention by a portion, but by all of the law upon the subject. An interpretation which restricts this deprivation clause to the guilt of 'any willful act or omission' flies in the teeth of the maxim that 'all the words of a law must have effect, rather than that part should perish by construction. ' City of St. Louis v. Lane, 110 Mo. 254, 258, 19 S.W. 533; Knox Co. v. Morton, 15 C.C.A. 671, 675, 68 F. 787, 790; Wrightman v. Boone Co., 31 C.C.A. 570, 572, 88 F. 435, 437; Paving Co. v. Ward, 28 C.C.A. 667, 674, 85 F. 27, 34.

The section expresses the intention to create and punish several offenses. If all its language is carefully analyzed and separated into its component parts applicable to the various offenses, it clearly reads that, if any owner makes an entry (1) 'by means of any fraudulent or false invoice' whereby the government is deprived of the lawful duties 'accruing upon the merchandise embraced or...