Commonwealth v. Wideman
| Decision Date | 18 March 1975 |
| Citation | 460 Pa. 699,334 A.2d 594 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Julius WIDEMAN, Appellant. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Nolan N. Atkinson, Jr., Zack, Myers & Atkinson Philadelphia, for appellant.
Arlen Specter, Dist. Atty., Richard A. Sprague, First Asst. Dist Atty., Milton M. Stein, Asst. Dist. Atty., Chief, Appeals Div., John H. Isom, Philadelphia, for appellee.
Before JONES C.J., and EAGEN, O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX and MANDERINO, JJ.
This is a direct appeal from a judgment of sentence following a jury verdict of murder in the second degree entered against appellant, Julius Wideman, in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia.
Appellant argues that the trial court committed reversible error when, over objection, it allowed Police Detective John Smith to testify concerning a certain oral inculpatory statement made in his presence by the appellant. Appellant contends that this statement should have been excluded because the prosecution failed to demonstrate that appellant's police interrogators had afforded him an opportunity to exercise his Miranda rights At the point in time when he made the inculpatory statement. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). There is no dispute that the appellant was twice afforded such an opportunity twelve hours prior to that point in time when he made his inculpatory statement. Relying on Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 444 Pa. 478, 282 A.2d 378 (1971), appellant argues that the Change in circumstances which took place over the twelve hour period between the last Miranda warning and his confession required his police interrogators to afford him a new opportunity to exercise his Miranda rights. He contends that the twelve hour time lapse, the change of physical location between the place where warnings were given and the place where the inculpatory statement was made, the break in the continuity of interrogation, the change of interrogators, and the material difference between the statements given following the initial Miranda warnings and those given twelve hours later, combine to compel the conclusion that the waiver given after the initial warnings was ineffective as to the statement given twelve hours later. We agree, and reverse appellant's conviction and grant a new trial.
At 1:10 a.m., February 28, 1971, one James Allen was shot and fatally wounded. Because an automobile registration card bearing appellant's name was found on the victim's tody, the police went to appellant's home several hours later and told him that he could help them by coming to the Police Administration Building to answer some general questions regarding the decedent. At 5:15 a.m., appellant and his wife appeared at the Police Administration Building. Appellant was not taken into an interrogation room, but was questioned in a large office which houses the Homicide Division.
During questioning, police suspicion was aroused by appellant's statement that he owned a car identical to one that had been reported at the scene of the shooting earlier that morning. At this point, about 5:45 a.m., appellant was given Miranda warnings by Detective Bacher. No further questions were asked, and appellant remained with his wife in the Homicide Division office until 6:45 a.m. At that time Detective Basmajian rewarned the appellant, and questioned him for about one-half hour. Appellant was not isolated at this time or taken to any interrogation room. He then remained in the Homicide Division Office until 10:30 a.m. He was provided with food and questioned further, but he continued to deny any involvement in the shooting of James Allen.
At 10:30 a.m., appellant was taken from the Homicide Division Office into an interrogation room. His wife did not go with him. He was not given Miranda warnings in this interrogation room. From 10:45 a.m., until 12:00 appellant was given a polygraph test by Detective McCauley; he was alone from 12:00 to 12:30; and was interrogated by Detective Melfi from 12:30 until 12:45 p.m. At 12:45 p.m., this interrogation was interrupted. Appellant had made no inculpatory statements during this questioning.
From 12:45 p.m., until 2:05 p.m., appellant was allowed to speak with his wife, but they were never alone. A detective remained in the room. No further interrogation took place during this time period.
At 2:05 p.m., appellant was taken to yet another interrogation room and left alone. He was allowed to sleep for the next three and one-half hours. At 5:30 p.m., a Detective Kuestner, who had not proviously been involved in appellant's questioning, entered this interrogation room and began a new interrogation session. No Miranda warnings were give. Appellant was interrogated by this detective from 5:30 to 6:00 p.m. He was alone from 6:00 to 6:20 p.m., and interrogated again from 6:20 to 6:45 p.m. At 6:45 p.m., Detective Smith entered the room. Shortly thereafter appellant gave a statement admitting the shooting. Neither Detective Smith nor Detective Kuestner were the detectives who had given Miranda warnings to the appellant twelve hours earlier in the Homicide Division Office. Appellant's statement was reduced to writing by Detective Smith. At 9:45 p.m., appellant was given Miranda warnings and the taking of a formal written statement began.
Initially, we note that 'a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel.' Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at 475, 86 S.Ct. at 1628, 16 L.Ed.2d at 724. This 'high standard of proof' must be met before a waiver of constitutional rights will be declared effective. Id. at 475, 86 S.Ct. at 1628, 16 L.Ed.2d at 724. Furthermore, we must 'scrupulously honor' a person's right to the exercise of his right to remain silent. The accused's fifth and sixth amendment rights are so fundamental that utmost care must be taken to assure that they are preserved. Id. at 479, 86 S.Ct. at 1630, 16 L.Ed.2d at 726.
Miranda also recognized the importance of guaranteeing the accused that he will be able to freely avail himself of his constitutional rights Throughout the interrogation process.
'The circumstances surrounding incustody interrogation can operate very quickly to overbear the will of one merely made aware of his privilege by his interrogators. . . . Our aim is to assure that the individual's right to choose between silence and speech Remains unfettered throughout the interrogation process. A once-stated warning, delivered by those who will conduct the interrogation, cannot itself suffice to that end among those who most require knowledge of their rights. A mere warning given by the interrogators is not alone sufficient to accomplish that end. (Emphasis added.)
Id. at 469--470, 86 S.Ct. at 1625, 16 L.Ed.2d at 721.
Opportunity to exercise these rights must be afforded to him Throughout the interrogation. After such warnings have been given, and such opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer questions or make a statement.' (Emphasis added.)
Id. at 479, 86 S.Ct. at 1630, 16 L.Ed.2d at 726.
The purpose of the procedural safeguards prescribed by Miranda therefore 'is To assure that the individual's right to choose between silence and speech remains unfettered throughout the interrogation process.' (Emphasis added.) Id. at 469, 86 S.Ct. at 1625, 16 L.Ed.2d at 721. All that a warning given at the outset of the interrogation can do is 'to insure that the individual knows he is free to exercise the privilege At that point in time.' (Emphasis added.) Id. at 469, 86 S.Ct. at 1625, 16 L.Ed.2d at 720. It follows, however, that at some point in time during the interrogation process, the pressures of that process will have seriously eroded the accused's awareness of his constitutional rights. ...
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