Commonwealth v. Windom
| Decision Date | 11 July 2022 |
| Docket Number | 1942 EDA 2021,J-S12042-22 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. ROY WINDOM Appellant |
| Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Appellant Roy Windom, appeals pro se from the August 30, 2021 Order, entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, dismissing his Petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-46. After careful review, we affirm.
We adopt the facts as set forth by the PCRA court. See PCRA Ct. Op., 11/9/21, at 1-3. In summary, on May 17, 2017, police arrested Appellant after his younger sister, D.J., reported that Appellant had been physically and sexually abusing her for years. At the time the abuse began, D.J. was 9 years old and Appellant was 24 years old.
The Commonwealth charged Appellant with numerous offenses arising from these allegations. On June 7, 2019, a jury convicted Appellant of Rape of a Child, Unlawful Contact with a Minor, Endangering the Welfare of a Child, and Indecent Assault of a Person Less than 13.
On January 13, 2020, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of 12½ to 25 years of incarceration followed by 12 years of probation. This Court affirmed Appellant's Judgment of Sentence. Commonwealth v. Windom, 256 A.3d 31 (Pa. Super. filed May 13, 2021) (unpublished memorandum). Appellant did not seek further review.
On May 7, 2021, Appellant pro se filed the instant PCRA petition raising claims that his trial counsel, Richard J. Giuliani, Esquire, had been ineffective by, inter alia, failing to investigate the victim's alleged motive to fabricate the allegations against him. Appellant further asserted that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the Commonwealth's closing arguments, which Appellant characterized as constituting prosecutorial misconduct, and by not ensuring that Appellant was in the courtroom for the presentation of the jury's questions to the court during the jury's deliberation. The PCRA court appointed counsel, who, on June 23, 2021, filed a Letter of No Merit pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988) and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc), and a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel.
On July 6, 2021, in response to counsel's "no-merit" letter, Appellant pro se filed an Amended PCRA Petition.
On July 29, 2021, the PCRA court notified Appellant of its intent to dismiss his Petition without a hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. Appellant did not file a response to the court's Rule 907 Notice.
On August 30, 2021, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant's Petition as meritless.[1] Appellant filed a timely pro se appeal from the court's dismissal order and complied with the court's order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement. In addition to asserting that the PCRA court had erred in its determination that the issues Appellant raised in his PCRA Petition lacked merit, in the Rule 1925(b) Statement, Appellant also claimed that his PCRA counsel had been ineffective in reaching the same conclusion and in filing a "no-merit" letter. The PCRA court filed a responsive Rule 1925(a) Opinion.
Appellant raises the following issues on appeal:
We review an order denying a petition for collateral relief to determine whether the PCRA court's decision is supported by the evidence of record and free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Jarosz, 152 A.3d 344, 350 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citing Commonwealth v. Fears, 86 A.3d 795, 803 (Pa. 2014)). "This Court grants great deference to the findings of the PCRA court if the record contains any support for those findings." Commonwealth v. Anderson, 995 A.2d 1184, 1189 (Pa. Super. 2010). "Further, the PCRA court's credibility determinations are binding on this Court, where there is record support for those determinations." Id.
To be eligible for relief under the PCRA, a petitioner must establish that his conviction or sentence resulted from one or more of the enumerated errors or defects found in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2): a constitutional violation; ineffective assistance of counsel; an unlawfully induced plea; improper obstruction by governmental officials; a case where exculpatory evidence has been discovered; an illegal sentence has been imposed; or the tribunal conducting the proceeding lacked jurisdiction. See 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9543(a)(2)(i)-(viii). In addition, a petitioner must establish that the issues raised in the PCRA petition have not been previously litigated or waived, and that "the failure to litigate the issue prior to or during trial, during unitary review or on direct appeal could not have been the result of any rational, strategic or tactical decision by counsel." Id. at § 9543(a)(3), (a)(4).
We presume that counsel has rendered effective assistance. Commonwealth v. Bickerstaff, 204 A.3d 988, 992 (Pa. Super. 2019). In order to overcome the presumption that counsel has provided effective assistance, a petitioner must establish that: (1) the underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) counsel lacked a reasonable basis for his act or omission; and (3) petitioner suffered actual prejudice. Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381, 390 (Pa. 2021). A petitioner must plead and prove by a preponderance of the evidence each of these elements. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a). A claim will be denied if the petitioner fails to meet any one of these prongs. See Jarosz, 152 A.3d at 350 (citing Commonwealth v. Daniels, 963 A.2d 409, 419 (Pa. 2009)).
In his Brief, Appellant argues that his PCRA counsel was ineffective for filing a "no-merit" letter because his underlying claims of trial counsel's ineffectiveness are meritorious.[2] In particular, Appellant emphasizes the meritoriousness of the claims he raised in his PCRA Petition, i.e., that his trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the Commonwealth's statements during closing argument, which he characterizes as prosecutorial misconduct, and for not insisting that Appellant be present in the courtroom during the presentation of the jury's questions to the court.
The Honorable Timika R. Lane, who presided over Appellant's trial and PCRA proceedings, has authored a comprehensive, thorough, and well-reasoned opinion, citing to the record and relevant case law in addressing Appellant's challenge to the effectiveness of both his PCRA and trial counsel. After a careful review of the parties' arguments and the record, we affirm on the basis of the PCRA court's Opinion. See PCRA Ct. Op at 7-15 ().
Order affirmed. The parties are instructed to attach a copy of the PCRA court's November 9, 2021 Opinion to all future filings.
Judgment Entered.
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA TRIAL DIVISION - CRIMINAL SECTION
v.
ROY WINDOM
November 9, 2021
Roy Windom ("Appellant") appeals pro se from this court's order dismissing his petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act.[1] For the reasons discussed below no relief is due.
Appellant's convictions stem from his protracted physical and sexual abuse of his younger sister, D.J. The abuse began when D.J. was nine years old and continued until she was thirteen. (N.T. 6/5/19 at 42, 61). At trial, D.J. testified to the following facts.
D.J. grew up and lived in Philadelphia with her mother (T. Lyons, herein "Lyons"), Appellant, her younger brother ("J.J."), and two of Lyons's grandchildren. (Id. at 40,113-14). The home had three bedrooms on the second floor. (Id. at 41). D.J. and J.J. each had their own room (Id.); Lyons occupied the third bedroom, which she typically shared with her grandchildren; and Appellant, who did not have a bedroom, slept downstairs on the couch. (Id. at 41, 115).
Occasionally, D.J.'s sisters visited Lyons's home and stayed in D.J.'s room, but D.J. generally did not share her room with anyone. (Id. at 41, 63, 115).
D.J. testified that when she was seven years old, Appellant started to physically abuse several members of her household. (Id. at 42,117-18). Both D.J. and Lyons testified that Appellant frequently "hit" Lyons, D.J., and D.J.'s siblings. (Id. at 45, 117-18). Lyons further testified that Appellant often had violent fits of rage and that the members of her household were "afraid" of him. (Id. at 124, 126).
D.J also described several incidents of sexual abuse by Appellant. One night when D.J. was nine years old, he entered the minor's bedroom and touched her breasts and "private area" under her clothes. (N.T. 6/5/19 at 43). Appellant digitally penetrated D.J.'s vagina and moved his fingers in a "circular" motion. (Id. at 43-44). ...
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