Commonwealth v. Woelz

Decision Date23 October 1914
Citation219 Mass. 37,106 N.E. 560
PartiesCOMMONWEALTH v. WOELZ.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
COUNSEL

Jas A. Stiles, Dist. Atty., of Gardner, and Edwd. T. Esty, Asst Dist. Atty., of Worcester, for the Commonwealth.

John H Meagher, Emil Zaeder, and Chas. F. Boyle, all of Worcester for defendant.

OPINION

DE COURCY, J.

The complaint alleged that the defendant 'did expose and keep for sale intoxicating liquors with intent to unlawfully sell the same.' He was the steward of the Worcester Social Turner Society, which was a club incorporated under the laws of Massachusetts, and without any license for the distribution or dispensing of intoxicating liquor. On the occasion in question, in return for money delivered to him in the club house by one of its members, he delivered to him eight bottles of beer, for the use of a party of eight. The case from which this beer was taken, and also some of the other liquors found in the refrigerator, were tagged in the name of the club. Other liquors in the ice chest and in lockers bore tags with names of individual members. The question intended to be raised by the requests for rulings and argued on the briefs is, whether the facts disclose a keeping for sale of intoxicating liquors contrary to law.

The complaint is based on R. L. c. 100, § 1, which provides that:

'No person shall sell, or expose or keep for sale, spirituous or intoxicating liquor, except as authorized in this chapter.'

By the terms of section 64 of the same chapter, the delivery of the beer in the club house was prima facie evidence of a sale. This with the other facts, including the payment of money, warranted, if it did not compel, the inference that a sale took place, and that the beer was kept for the purpose of sale. Com. v. Cleary, 105 Mass. 384; Com. v. Hoar, 121 Mass. 375. Clearly the fact that the defendant was acting as an employé would not constitute a defense. Com. v. Ryan, 160 Mass. 172, 35 N.E. 673.

The defendant does not bring himself within cases like Com. v. Smith, 102 Mass. 144, and Com. v. Pomphret, 137 Mass. 564, 50 Am. Rep. 340, which recognized the right of two or more persons to unite in buying intoxicating liquor and then to distribute it among themselves. In those cases the members of a voluntary association owned the liquor in common; and the distribution of it in severalty among the owners was not construed as a sale within the meaning of the statute. In the present case the beer was owned not by the members but by the corporation, which is a distinct legal entity. The record is meager as to the amount and the details of the liquor business carried on by the society, and as to the rights of a member in the use of its property; but clearly he had no individual right or interest in the liquors owned by the corporation, and was obliged to pay the fixed price for any of it that he might order. In short the transaction in question discloses the transfer of property from one person to another for a consideration of value, or a 'sale' in the ordinary meaning of the word. We do not assume that the Legislature used the word in any narrow or artificial sense. Com. v. Ramsdell, 130 Mass. 68; Howard v. Harris, 8 Allen, 297. The decisions to the contrary in some other states are generally based upon statutes that differ from ours.

The case of Com. v. Smith, ...

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