Commonwealth v. Wood

• Decision Date: 21 October 1886
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. WOOD.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

142 Mass. 459

8 N.E. 432

COMMONWEALTH v. WOOD.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Worcester.

October 21, 1886

COUNSEL

H.N. Shepard, Ass't. Atty. Gen., for the Commonwealth.

The motions to quash were rightly overruled, since the reasons assigned therefor are not true in fact. In indictment No. 273 it is alleged distinctly that one draft was "bought with his, the said Peters', money, in said amount," and by its very terms it entitled Wood to receive money thereon also the said indictment alleges that "said Wood *** did receive and obtain the said goods, merchandise, chattels, and effects," words including plainly the said draft. It is actionable to represent falsely that stock is selling in the market at a given price. Manning v. Albee, 11 Allen 520.

No brief was filed for defendant.

OPINION

MORTON, C.J.

Three cases against the defendant, for obtaining money by false pretenses, were tried together in the superior court, and come before us in a single bill of exceptions. It will be convenient to consider the cases separately.

In the case numbered 274 in the superior court, the indictment charges that the defendant, at Berlin, in the county of Worcester, on the fifth day of February, 1884, falsely represented to John G. Peters that he, said Wood, was treasurer and secretary of the Western Real-estate & Improvement Company, a corporation established at Minneapolis, in the state of Minnesota; that the capital stock of said company was $500,000; that $200,000 worth of said stock had been subscribed for and paid in, in cash which was chiefly invested in real estate in Minneapolis; that the stock was worth and was selling for from fifty to sixty dollars per share at said Minneapolis; and that the defendant, on the twenty-fifth day of the following April, by a letter written by the defendant, and received by said Peters, at Berlin, on said twenty-fifth day of April, falsely represented that the amount of capital stock subscribed for, paid in, and invested as aforesaid was $192,000, instead of $200,000, as previously stated by the defendant. The government introduced evidence tending to prove the oral statements alleged to have been made at Berlin; and, to prove the modification of these statements alleged to have been made by the letter received on the twenty-fifth day of April, introduced a letter of the defendant, which we infer was dated April 20, 1884, the material parts of which are set out in the bill of exceptions. This letter, construed in connection with the previous oral statements of the defendant, substantially state that $192,000 of the capital stock had been paid in. It would naturally be understood as intended to state that the amount of capital stock paid in was $192,000, and directly tended to support the allegations of the indictment. The court, therefore, properly refused to rule, as requested by the defendant, that there was no evidence to prove the representations as alleged in the indictment, and that there was a variance between the allegations and the proof as to this letter. The instruction given by the court upon this subject was sufficiently favorable to the defendant.

The defendant also asked the court to rule "that the representations that the stock was worth and selling for from $55 to $60 per share was not such a representation as defendant could be convicted for making." The court rightly ruled "that the defendant could not be convicted for making the representations that the stock was worth from $55 to $60 per share, but could for the representation that it was selling for from $55 to $60 per share." The last-named representation is not a statement of opinion as to the value of the stock. It is a statement of a material fact, of which Peters had no knowledge or means of knowledge, and upon which he had the right to rely. Manning v. Albee, 11 Allen, 520.

The defendant's motion to quash was rightly overruled, as the reasons assigned are not true in fact, and the indictment is sufficient. It appears by the bill of exceptions that there was evidence tending to prove all the material allegations of the indictment, and the court properly refused to rule that the jury would not be warranted in convicting the defendant.

We have considered all the exceptions applicable to this case, and the result is...