Commonwealth v. Wright
Decision Date | 26 January 2018 |
Docket Number | No. 3597 EDA 2016,3597 EDA 2016 |
Citation | 178 A.3d 884 |
Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. James David WRIGHT |
Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Katayoun M. Copeland, Assistant District Attorney, Michelle P. Hutton, Assistant District Attorney, and John F. X. Reilly, Assistant District Attorney, Media, for Commonwealth, appellant.
Hillary R. Sheridan, West Chester, and Holly K. Sheridan, Chadds Ford, for appellee.
This is a Commonwealth appeal from the order entered October 19, 2016, in the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, which granted James David Wright's motion to dismiss the charges filed against him in July of 1990, based on a violation of Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 600. On appeal, the Commonwealth argues the trial court abused its discretion in granting Wright's motion to dismiss. For the reasons below, we are compelled to reverse the order dismissing the charges, and remand for further proceedings.
The pertinent facts and procedural history are summarized by the trial court as follows:
Trial Court Opinion, 4/26/2017, at 1–3. This timely appeal followed.1
The sole issue raised by the Commonwealth on appeal is that the trial court abused its discretion in granting Wright's motion to dismiss the charges when Wright admitted he had notice of the November 26, 1990, court proceeding, but willfully failed to appear. See Commonwealth's Brief at 10.
Our standard of review of an order granting a Rule 600 motion is abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Baird , 601 Pa. 625, 975 A.2d 1113, 1118 (2009). "The proper application of discretion requires adherence to the law, and we exercise plenary review of legal questions." Id. (internal citation omitted). Moreover, when considering an order granting a motion to dismiss based upon Pennsylvania's speedy trial rule, we must bear in mind the following:
Commonwealth v. Dixon , 140 A.3d 718, 722 (Pa. Super. 2016), appeal denied , 639 Pa. 170, 159 A.3d 938 (2016).
In the present case, there is no dispute the mechanical run date for Wright's trial expired in 1991. Rather, the question presented on appeal is whether the ensuing 25 years, between the time Wright failed to appear in November of 1990 and when he surrendered with counsel in October of 2016, is excludable time attributed solely to Wright or whether the Commonwealth had the burden to demonstrate it exercised due diligence in bringing him to trial. Relying on Baird , supra , the Commonwealth insists it "had no requirement to seek out [Wright during that 25–year period] where all the excludable time resulted from [Wright's] failure to appear." Commonwealth's Brief at 14. We agree.
In Baird , supra , defense counsel signed a notice of the arraignment date, but neither the defendant, nor counsel, appeared on that day, and a bench warrant was issued. It was not until more than a year later, when the defendant was stopped for a motor vehicle violation in another county, that he was arrested on the outstanding warrant. See Baird , supra , 975 A.2d at 1114–1115. Moreover, during part of that time, the defendant was incarcerated in another county, and cooperating with a joint county task force. See id. The trial court subsequently granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the charges based on a violation of Rule 600.
On appeal, a divided en banc Superior Court reversed, concluding that the defendant's failure to appear, when counsel received proper notice, excused the Commonwealth from having to demonstrate due diligence. See id. at 1115–1116. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed, explaining:
[T]he general rule is that, where a period of delay is caused by the defendant's willful failure to appear at a court proceeding of which he has notice, exclusion is warranted. Further, if a defendant is deemed to have had reasonable notice of court proceedings, but fails to appear, the Commonwealth's due diligence in attempting to locate him need not be assessed .
Id. at 1118 (emphasis supplied and citations omitted).
Nevertheless, the Baird Court noted the "more discrete question" on appeal was whether notice to counsel of a court date could be "fairly attributed" as notice to the defendant. Id. It then adopted the general rule, set forth in federal speedy trial cases, which attributed notice to counsel as notice to a defendant. The rule also recognized limited "exceptional circumstances," such as a "breakdown in [a] public defender system[.]" Id. at 1119. Because the defendant in Baird did not provide notice of his whereabouts to the bail authority, clerk of courts, or the district attorney, as required by Pa.R.Crim.P. 526,2 the Baird Court found the defendant willfully failed to appear, and "the burden did not shift to the Commonwealth to establish its own due diligence." Id. at 1119. See also Commonwealth v. Vesel , 751 A.2d 676, 680 (Pa. Super. 2000) (, )appeal denied , 563 Pa. 686, 760 A.2d 854 (2000).
In the present case, Wright admitted during the Rule 600 hearing that he had reasonable notice of the November 26, 1990, trial date. See N.T., 10/1/2016, at 13. He further claimed h...
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