Commonwealth v. Young

• Decision Date: 25 March 1974
• Citation: 317 A.2d 258,456 Pa. 102
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. James L. YOUNG, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

317 A.2d 258

456 Pa. 102

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. James L. YOUNG, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

March 25, 1974.

Jerome E. Furman, Anthoney, J. Caiazzo Philadelphia, for appellant.

Arlen Specter, Dist. Atty., Richard A. Sprague, 1st Asst. Dist. Atty., David Richman, Asst. Dist. Atty., Chief Appeals Division, James J. Wilson, Asst. Dist. Atty., F Emmett Fitzpatrick, Dist. Atty., Philadelphia, for appellee.

Before JONES, C.J., and EAGEN, O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX and MANDERINO, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

ROBERTS, Justice.

James Young appeals from his convictions of murder in the second degree, aggravated robbery, and burglary with intent to commit a felony. ^[1] We reverse and grant a new trial.

The crimes with which appellant was charged grew out of the killing of Martin Snader. On November 22, 1968, at 10:40 a.m., Snader was found lying on the floor of his jewelry store with a bullet in the left side of his head. He died a few hours later.

A Philadelphia police officer on November 30, 1968, stopped the automobile appellant was driving because he thought appellant was driving too slowly. The officer testified that when asked for his driver's license, appellant responded that he did not have one. At this time, the officer, according to his testimony, spotted a revolver on the floor of appellant's automobile. He then arrested appellant for violating the Motor Vehicle Code. Subsequently, appellant was arraigned for violating both the Motor Vehicle Code and the Uniform Firearms Act. Appellant could not raise his $300 bail, so he was imprisoned pending trial.

The revolver seized from appellant was turned over to a firearms examiner for the Philadelphia police. His conclusion that the bullet found in Snader's head matched bullets which he fired from the seized revolver prompted the police to interrogate appellant.

On December 2, 1968, the police obtained a 'bring-up' order, signed 'as best as (the district attorney's office) can decipher,' by Edward J. Blake, who at the time was serving as Court Administrator of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia. At 5:15 p.m. that day, three officers, acting under the authority of the 'bring-up' order, transferred appellant from the detention center to the Police Administration Building.

Appellant arrived there at 6:00 p.m. Five minutes later police read appellant his Miranda ^[1] rights, which the Commonwealth claims appellant waived. The first questioning session lasted from 6:25 to 7:10 p.m. Appellant was then left alone. At 7:30 a polygraph examination was administered which ended at 8:48 p.m. From then until 10:30 that evening, appellant was questioned continuously by three officers. After appellant briefly used the restroom, his interrogation again commenced at 11:05. An officer present at this questioning testified that appellant made his first inculpatory statement at 12:30 a.m. Not until 1:30 a.m. were the police satisfied and appellant allowed to return to the detention center. Appellant made no written statement at this time and signed nothing.

About an hour later at 2:40 in the morning of December 3, appellant arrived at the detention center. One of the interrogating officers directed that appellant be separated from all inmates. Accordingly, appellant was placed in an 'isolation cell,' which had no windows, lights, blankets, or pillows. The isolation cell contained a steel block hanging from the wall which served as a bed. Appellant remained there for over thirty-two hours until 11:30 in the morning of December 4. He testified that during this time he was fed a single meal.

At 11:30, appellant was retrieved from the detention center by two officers, pursuant to a second 'bring-up' order. The officers informed appellant for the first time that he was under arrest for the murder of Martin Snader. Appellant was not arraigned. He was taken to be interrogated at the Police Administration Building and arrived there at approximately noon. From noon until 3:55 p.m., a formal statement was taken. All questioning terminated at 4:25 p.m. Appellant read and signed his statement.

The first official record of appellant's arrest for murder was made at 5:30 p.m., December 4, when he was 'slated.' Appellant was later arraigned.

Young came to trial on June 26, 1970. The jury was unable to agree on a verdict, and on July 13, a mistrial was declared. His second trial began November 3, 1971. The Commonwealth's case was built largely around appellant's December 4, 1968 statement. On November 16, 1971, the jury returned a verdict of guilty.

Appellant presents several assignments of error. ^[3] We hold that appellant was denied a fair trial, guaranteed by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, because the trial court failed to instruct the jury with a full and adequate charge on reasonable doubt.

The defense submitted a point for charge which clearly tracked the language in the 'standard and approved' charge given in Commonwealth v. Kluska, 333 Pa. 65, 3 A.2d 398 (1939). ^[4] The defense objected to the charge on reasonable doubt and directed the trial court's attention to the defense's points for charge covering reasonable doubt. ^[5] After rejecting the properlysubmitted point for charge, the court charged the jury on reasonable doubt in the following language.

'The burden, as I say, is on the Commonwealth to prove defendants (sic) guilt, and that burden rests on the Commonwealth from the start to the finish of the case.

'Furthermore, the Commonwealth must prove the defendant's guilt and all of the factors upon which guilt may depend beyond a reasonable doubt, before you can find defendant guilty.

'Now, what is a reasonable doubt. It must arise out of the evidence and not out of any extraneous matter. It must be more than a merely possible doubt, because you can have a possible doubt about almost anything in life. And if it was the burden on the Commonwealth to remove every possible doubt which you might have about whether or not these crimes occurred, and whether or not the defendant committed those crimes, if that were the Commonwealth's burden, why, it would be an impossible burden for it to sustain.

'If you feel a reasonable doubt, as I have defined it, as to the guilt of the defendant, or as to any of the factors upon which his guilt may depend, it will be your duty to acquit him.

'If two conclusions can be reasonably drawn from the evidence, one of innocence and one of guilt, the jury must adopt the one of innocence and find the defendant not guilty.'

This charge is plainly inadequate. ^[6] The trial judge only told the jury that reasonable doubt was not 'a merely possible doubt,' and that the Commonwealth did not have 'to remove every possible doubt.' He also told the jury that if a conclusion of both guilt and of innocence could be reached, the jury must acquit appellant. Aside from this stark narrative, the trial court gave the jury no guidance on the meaning of 'beyond a reasonable doubt.' ^[7]

It is true that this Court has never required a single standard charge on reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Williams, 432 Pa. 557, 561, 248 A.2d 301, 303 (1968). However, we also have never stated that a jury may be given a reasonable doubt charge that fails to define reasonable doubt.

Moreover, we have repeatedly placed our imprimatur on the charge expressed in Commonwealth v. Donough, 377 Pa. 46, 51--52, 103 A.2d 694, 697 (1954). ^[8]

'A standard and approved form of charge on this point would be: 'The defendant comes before you presumed to be innocent and the burden is upon the Commonwealth to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt cannot be a doubt fancied or conjured up in the minds of the jury to escape an unpleasant verdict; it must be an honest doubt arising out of the evidence itself, the kind of doubt that would restrain a reasonable man (or woman) from acting in a matter of importance to himself (or herself).''

We have many times approved of the charge recommended in Commonwealth v. Kluska, 333 Pa. 65, 74, 3 A.2d 398, 403 (1939). ^[9]

'As a standard and approved form of charge, however, we are of opinion that the jury should be told either . . . that they should not condemn unless so convinced by the evidence that they would venture to act upon that conviction in matters Of the highest importance to their own interests, or . . . that a reasonable doubt was one that would cause them to hesitate to act in any of the Important affirs of their own lives.'

The ideas contained in these 'standard and approved' charges are essential to a complete, accurate, and proper charge on reasonable doubt.

The Commonwealth argues that '(t)he court's instruction concerning reasonable doubt sufficiently defined that concept.' Its argument jumps from the premise that no 'magic words' need be used to the conclusion that the lack of any words giving meaning to the standard of reasonable doubt is satisfactory. But the reasonable doubt standard is too fundamental to our jurisprudence to permit such a miserly reading. ^[10] Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has unequivocally held that the reasonable doubt standard is constitutionally compelled. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361--365, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1071--1073, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). After a lengthy discussion of the reasons in history, policy, and justice for the reasonable doubt test, the Court stated:

'Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reasonabledoubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the...