Communications Workers v. Ohio Bell Telephone Co.

• Decision Date: 11 April 1958
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 34049.
• Parties: COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, Plaintiff, v. The OHIO BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio

160 F. Supp. 822

COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, Plaintiff, v. The OHIO BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY, Defendant.

Civ. A. No. 34049.

United States District Court N. D. Ohio, E. D.

April 11, 1958.

Howard M. Metzenbaum, of Metzenbaum & Schwartz, Cleveland, Ohio, for plaintiff.

Ashley M. Van Duzer and Fred J. Perkins, of Arter, Hadden, Wykoff & Van Duzer, Cleveland, Ohio, for defendant.

WEICK, District Judge.

The complaint sets forth a claim for specific performance of a collective bargaining agreement alleged to have been entered into on or about September 30, 1957, which the defendant failed and refused to perform.

The prayer was for a declaratory judgment determining the validity of the agreement and ordering the defendant to carry out its terms and provisions including payment of wage increases which, on the date the action was commenced, amounted to over $360,000.

Jurisdiction was based on the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act (28 U.S. C.A. § 2201) and Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act (29 U. S.C.A. § 185).

The defendant, in its answer, challenged the jurisdiction of the Court on the ground that the plaintiff did not seek to enforce any right asserted by plaintiff as a labor organization, but on the contrary sought to enforce claims belonging to the individual employees.

Defendant denied that it entered into a collective bargaining agreement with plaintiff on September 30, 1957, but alleged that it made an offer to plaintiff which plaintiff did not accept.

Plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction to restrain defendant from violating the collective bargaining agreement of September 30, 1957, which motion was heard on the evidence. At the hearing, it developed that the alleged collective bargaining agreement was an oral one and was disputed by the defendant. To have granted the relief requested would have put an agreement into effect which the Court on final hearing might determine did not exist. The motion was therefore denied and the case was later tried on its merits.

A written collective bargaining agreement had been entered into by the parties on September 9, 1956 for a period ending on September 7, 1957. It was to remain in effect until terminated by either party on sixty days notice. Neither party gave notice of termination.

On July 2, 1957 the Union notified the Company by letter that it desired to negotiate modifications of the existing agreement. Pursuant to the notice, bargaining committees were selected by each party and the bargaining commenced on July 31, 1957 in the Carter Hotel in Cleveland.

The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service entered the case and, with the consent of the parties, Commissioner Thomas W. Robertson took an active part assisting in the negotiations.

On September 8th defendant's employees, in some localities, left their jobs and on September 16 an official strike was declared.

During the course of the bargaining the company submitted in writing so-called package offers.

The Union claims that it accepted the package offer designated as Plaintiff's Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 4a, 4b, 4c and 4d; that it communicated its acceptance verbally to Commissioner Robertson and authorized him to notify the Company's bargaining committee thereof which it claims Robertson did near midnight on September 30th or early in the morning on October 1, 1957.

The Company denied receiving notice of acceptance of its offer from Commissioner Robertson or anyone else. It further claimed that its offer was tied in with and conditioned upon the execution by both parties of a back to work agreement which it submitted to the Union through Commissioner Robertson and that the Union refused to execute the back to work agreement.

In the back to work agreement were provisions for the orderly return to work of the employees, without discipline or discrimination of either party, on account of participation or non-participation in the strike.

The back to work agreement further provided for an adjustment of the net credited service of the striking employees, so as not to allow them credit for working on the seventeen days they were absent on strike, with respect to the Company's non-contributing pension fund, vacation allowances, termination allowances and sickness and death benefits.

The Union claimed that the adjustment of net credited service was a discrimination against striking employees and a penalty against them for their participation in the strike.

The Company's position was that "an unpredictable number of persons would be affected by the adjustment" and that it "was merely asking to be relieved from part of the burden of paying indirectly for time not worked during the strike."

This created a dispute between the parties over a matter of principle and neither party has been willing to recede from its original position.

The parties continued joint bargaining sessions on October 1, 1957 and thereafter until October 22, 1957. On October 3, 1957 the Union ordered the employees to return to work.

On December 19, 1957, during the trial, the parties entered into a written agreement whereby they put into effect the package offer of the Company which the Union claimed it had accepted on September 30, 1957. The new collective bargaining agreement was to be effective December 1, 1957 for a period of fifteen months. In all respects the new agreement was identical with the agreement sued on except its effective date was two months later.

The parties expressly provided that the final judgment in this case would control with respect to the controversy over the adjustment of net credited service.

The agreement provided that if the Union prevails in this case then the final decree of the Court determining the agreement of September 30, 1957 shall supersede the agreement effective December 1, 1957 in which event there will be no adjustment of net credited service.

If the final judgment herein is adverse to the Union then the provisions for adjusted net credited service shall become operative as part of the agreement effective December 1, 1957.

Pending the decision, the Company was authorized to treat the adjustment of net credited service as being in effect and to administer it. The Company would be required to make refunds in the event of a final adverse decision to it. It was claimed that if the right to make the adjustment of net credited service were deferred until the final outcome of the case, it would be practically impossible for the Company to recover the money equal to the adjustments.

The Union also agreed not to question the legality of the agreement.

While it is laudable that the parties agreed at least to a partial settlement, they have attempted to reserve for determination by the Court the disputed issue of fact whether an oral agreement was reached on September 30, 1957 or in the early morning of October 1, 1957 and, if so, the terms and conditions of such agreement.

At the threshold of the case we are met with the claim that the Court has no jurisdiction.

The Federal Declaratory Judgment Act (28 U.S.C. § 2201) "enlarged the range of remedies available in the federal courts but did not extend their jurisdiction." Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Company, 1950, 339 U.S. 667, 671, 70 S.Ct. 876, 879, 94 L.Ed. 1194.

Since it was not claimed that there was a diversity of citizenship in this case, resort for jurisdiction must be made to Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act which provides:

"Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce * * * may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties."

Section 301(b) of the Act provides:

"* * * Any such Labor organization may sue * * * as an entity and in behalf of the employees whom it represents in the courts of the United States. * * *"

The Supreme Court, in Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 1955, 348 U.S. 437, 75 S.Ct. 489, 99 L.Ed. 510, held that § 301(b) of the Labor Management Relations Act did not confer jurisdiction on the district court to interpret collective bargaining contracts, declare the rights of the parties, compel the employer to make an...