Community College Dist. v. Superior Court

• Decision Date: 22 February 2007
• Docket Number: No. S132251.,S132251.
• Citation: 54 Cal.Rptr.3d 752,40 Cal.4th 648,151 P.3d 1166
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: MT. SAN JACINTO COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Riverside County, Respondent; Azusa Pacific University, Real Party in Interest.

54 Cal.Rptr.3d 752

40 Cal.4th 648

151 P.3d 1166

MT. SAN JACINTO COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Riverside County, Respondent Azusa Pacific University, Real Party in Interest.

No. S132251.

Supreme Court of California.

February 22, 2007.

Redwine and Sherrill, Justin M. McCarthy, David F. Hubbard, Steven B. Abbott, Scott R. Heil, Riverside; Atkinson, Andelson, Loya, Rudd & Romo and John W. Dietrich, Riverside, for Petitioner.

Myers, Widders, Gibson, Jones & Schneider and Katherine E. Stone, Ventura, for League of California Cities, California State Association of Counties and Metropolitan Water District of Southern California as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.

Bruce A. Behrens, Thomas C. Fellenz and Richard B. Williams, Sacramento, for The People of the State of California, acting by and through the Department of Transportation, as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.

California Eminent Domain Law Group and Arthur J. Hazarabedian, Glendale, for Los Angeles Unified School District and The Education Alliance of the California

School Board Association as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.

No appearance for Respondent.

Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, George M. Soneff and Michael M. Berger, Los Angeles, for Real Party in Interest.

Sedgwick, Detert, Moran & Arnold, Gregory H. Halliday, Geoffrey K. Willis and Gregory E. Woodard, Irvine, for Transcan Riverside LLC as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest.

James S. Burling, Sacramento, for Pacific Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest.

CHIN, J.

When the government exercises its power of eminent domain, and condemns or damages private property for public use, it must pay "just compensation" to the owner. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 19.)¹ The just compensation is aimed at making the landowner whole for a governmental taking or damage to the owner's property. (Redevelopment Agency v. Gilmore (1985) 38 Cal.3d 790, 797, 214 Cal.Rptr. 904, 700 P.2d 794 (Gilmore); see Escondido Union School Dist. v. Casa Suenos De Oro, Inc. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 944, 958, 29 Cal. Rptr.3d 89 (Escondido).) In other words, "`the owner is entitled [to] the full and perfect equivalent of the property taken.'" (Gilmore, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 797, 214 Cal.Rptr. 904, 700 P.2d 794, quoting Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. U.S. (1923) 261 U.S. 299, 304, 43 S.Ct. 354, 67 L.Ed. 664 (Seaboard ).)

California's statutory Eminent Domain Law (Code Civ. Proc, § 1230.010 et seq.)² provides that if the compensation issue "is brought to trial within one year after commencement of the proceeding, the date of [property] valuation is the date of commencement of the proceeding." (§ 1263.120.) The condemner may, however, take early possession of the property before litigation is concluded "upon deposit in court and prompt release to the owner of money determined by the court to be the probable amount of just compensation." (Cal. Const., art. I, § 19; see § 1255.410.) The immediate possession procedure is also known as a "quick-take" eminent domain action. (Escondido, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at p. 960, 29 Cal. Rptr.3d 89.) Because compensation is immediately available to the property owner in a quick-take action, the date of valuation of the property is statutorily required to be no later than the date the condemner deposits "probable compensation" for the owner. (§ 1263.110 et. seq.) The deposit earns statutory interest until it is withdrawn. (§ 1268.310.) The property owner can immediately withdraw the funds, but by doing so waives all rights to dispute the taking other than the right to challenge the amount of just compensation. (§ 1255.260.)

This case involves a quick-take eminent domain action. We address two constitutional issues. First, does a statutory property valuation date that occurs at the time the condemner deposits the probable compensation in court under section 1263.110, et seq. deny the property owner just compensation under the California Constitution when litigation in the eminent domain action is not expected to end until several years after the deposit is made? Second, is the owner's statutory waiver of rights after withdrawing the funds an unconstitutional condition on the statutorily required "prompt release" of the deposit?

We conclude that the statutory date of valuation at the time the probable compensation is deposited is constitutional, and that the requirement of a waiver of claims and defenses for receipt of deposited probable compensation is constitutional. We therefore affirm the Court of Appeal's judgment.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The facts are summarized from the Court of Appeal opinion and the record. In October 2000, Mt. San Jacinto Community College District (the District) commenced an eminent domain action against Azusa Pacific University (the University), seeking to condemn approximately 30 acres of vacant land in Riverside County. On December 15, 2000, the District deposited $1,789 million into court as probable compensation for the property. In October 2001, the District applied for a prejudgment order for possession. The trial court granted the application effective upon the University's completion of improvements to the property.³ The District took possession of the property in January 2002. The University did not move to stay the order for possession on hardship grounds or pending the trial court's adjudication of the District's right to take the property. In addition, the University did not withdraw any portion of the deposited funds.

In February 2002, the University petitioned the court to increase the deposit of probable compensation from $1,789 million to $4.2 million. The University argued that the property was worth $4.2 million when the deposit was made in December 2000. The trial court determined that the amount of probable compensation on December 15, 2000 was $1,789 million, and denied the University's petition.

The trial court bifurcated the issues of the District's right to take possession of the property and the amount of just compensation. The court ruled in June 2002 that the District had the right to take the property.

The parties filed cross-motions in limine to determine the date of valuation before trial. The trial court recommended they seek a ruling from the appellate court, as there was a "controlling question of law as to which there are substantial grounds for difference of opinion." The University petitioned the Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate requesting the court resolve the issue. The Court of Appeal denied the petition without prejudice, stating that the question of whether the statutory date of valuation should be disregarded was dependent on the facts of the case, and that the record was "not sufficiently developed" to allow the court to rule. Following further briefing by the parties, the trial court ruled that the property should be valued as of the date trial commenced—December 6, 2004. The District then petitioned the Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order and enter a new order setting the valuation date on December 15,2000.

The Court of Appeal initially observed that "[u]pon further consideration of [the] issues, we conclude that the issues raised in [the University's] prior petition, and in [the District's] present petition, are questions of law which did not, as we previously stated, require further development of the record." The court then compared the valuation principles that apply in a quicktake proceeding with those in a straight condemnation action, in which no deposit of probable compensation is made and immediate possession is not sought. The court observed that the statutory valuation rules reflect the principle that a taking occurs when the property owner is paid. Applying this principle to a quick-take proceeding, the court reasoned that the property should be valued on the date the plaintiff makes the probable compensation available to the owner by depositing it with the court.

The Court of Appeal acknowledged, however, that the valuation must satisfy constitutional requirements. The court considered the University's contention that the principle of just compensation entitled it to the property's value as of the date of the compensation trial, not the date of the deposit. The University argued that because section 1255.260 required it to waive its right to litigate the legality of the taking if it availed itself of the deposited funds, the University was effectively precluded from withdrawing the deposited funds. Therefore, the University argued, the property should be valued at the time of the commencement of trial. The Court of Appeal found that the University received just compensation on the date of deposit, despite the requirement that it waive its statutory defenses if it withdrew the funds. The court issued an alternative writ, granting the District's petition, and directing the trial court to set the date of valuation as of December 15, 2000. The University now challenges the date of valuation (§ 1263.110) and the waiver of claims and defenses (§ 1255.260) as unconstitutional.

DISCUSSION

There is a "strong presumption in favor of the Legislature's interpretation of a provision of the Constitution." (Methodist Hospital of Sacramento v. Saylor (1971) 5 Cal.3d 685, 692, 97 Cal.Rptr. 1, 488 P.2d 161.) `"When the Constitution has a doubtful or obscure meaning or is capable of various interpretations, the construction placed thereon by the Legislature is of very persuasive significance.'" (Methodist Hospital, supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 693, 97 Cal.Rptr. 1, 488 P.2d 161.) "`For the purpose of determining constitutionality, we cannot construe a section of the Constitution as if it were a statute, and adopt our own interpretation without regard to the legislative construction.'" (Ibid., quoting Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Indus. Acc. Com. (1932) 215 Cal. 461, 464, 11 P.2d 1.) We...