Community Design Corp. v. Antonell

• Decision Date: 23 October 1984
• Docket Number: Nos. 83-2279,84-326,s. 83-2279
• Citation: 459 So.2d 343
• Parties: COMMUNITY DESIGN CORPORATION, Appellant, v. Joseph D. ANTONELL, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 343

459 So.2d 343

COMMUNITY DESIGN CORPORATION, Appellant, v. Joseph D. ANTONELL, Appellee.

Nos. 83-2279, 84-326.

District Court of Appeal of Florida Third District.

Oct. 23, 1984.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 17, 1984.

William A. Friedlander, Miami, for appellant.

Douglas D. Stratton and Franklin J. Siegel, Miami, for appellee.

Before NESBITT and DANIEL S. PEARSON, JJ., and DELL, JOHN W., Associate Judge.

NESBITT, Judge.

Community Design Corporation (CDC) appeals a final judgment against it in a contract case and the award of attorney's fees and costs. Antonell cross-appeals the amount of attorney's fees. We affirm in all respects.

Joseph Antonell was hired by CDC to work as an architectural draftsman on the Brickell Key project. He worked on a weekly basis at $10.00 per hour, with time and one-half for overtime.

Sometime in the fall of 1980, Charles Cheezum, the then-president of CDC, promised a bonus to any employee still working at Christmastime of 1980, if the drawings were complete by that time. ¹ The amount each employee was to receive was apparently to be determined by the recommendation of Shirley Wooster, CDC's vice president. Wooster, Antonell's supervisor, promised a one-week paid vacation if the drawings were completed on time. After these promises were made, Antonell worked overtime in an effort to complete the drawings by the specified date.

On December 24, 1980, with Antonell still in CDC's employ, the draftsmen's drawings were collected and blueprints were made. After Christmas, and through much of 1981, changes were made to the drawings, some of which were necessitated by a February 23, 1981 contract which required CDC to coordinate the drawings of various subcontractors. Final acceptance of the drawings for construction purposes occurred by March of 1982.

When Antonell received neither the bonus nor the paid vacation, he sued to recover both. The jury found for him on both claims, finding for CDC on a third claim for a promised raise.

CDC makes two arguments on the contract issue which are worthy of discussion. It contends, first, that the contract is too indefinite and uncertain to be enforced because there was no agreement as to the amount of the bonus, the degree of completion required and the division among the employees. We disagree.

Courts are reluctant to hold contracts unenforceable on grounds of uncertainty, especially where, as here, one party has received the benefit of the other's performance. Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Data Lease Financial Corp., 302 So.2d 404, 408 (Fla.1974); Burton v. Keaton, 60 So.2d 770 (Fla.1952). When the existence of a contract is clear, the jury may properly determine the exact terms of an oral contract, Pan American Bancshares, Inc. v. Trask, 278 So.2d 313 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973), which often depend on the credibility of the witnesses. While the exact amount of the bonus ² and the degree of completion required ³ were disputed, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find an oral contract between the parties with terms which support the award in this case. Goetz v. Brialmont, 287 So.2d 361 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973).

CDC asserts that there was no agreement as to exactly how much each employee would receive. While this is true, it is necessarily so because the bonus was to be divided among those still employed at Christmastime and in amounts recommended by Ms. Wooster. Once the drawings were completed, CDC's contractual duty to act in good faith in recommending a bonus for those who qualified arose. It was Wooster's failure to recommend a bonus, and CDC's subsequent failure to pay one, which constituted the breach. ⁴ It was appropriate for the jury to resolve the compensation question, Gulf Solar, Inc. v. Westfall, 447 So.2d 363, 365 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984), and the amount awarded is reasonable based on Antonell's efforts in completing the drawings. Cf. Robinson v. Pinsker, 303 So.2d 706 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974).

CDC's second argument is that Antonell did not substantially perform the conditions precedent to receipt of the bonus. Whether Antonell substantially performed was a proper question for the jury to decide. Oven Development Corp. v. Molisky, 278 So.2d 299, 302 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973); Ocean Ridge Development Corp. v. Quality Plastering, Inc., 247 So.2d 72, 75 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971). We find substantial, competent evidence to support the jury's verdict. Bermil Corp. v. Sawyer, 353 So.2d 579, 583 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).

CDC also challenges the award of attorney's fees pursuant to section 448.08, Florida Statutes (1981) on two theories: (a) a bonus is not a wage within the meaning of the statute; and (b) Antonell was not a prevailing party because he did not prevail on all his claims and was awarded only part of what he sought on one of his claims. We reject both theories.

The first district noted in Doyal v. School Board of Liberty County, 415 So.2d 791, 793 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) that the legislative intent in enacting section 448.08 was to avoid the inequity resulting from an employee being required to pay an attorney in actions for unpaid...