Compart v. Wolfstellar

• Decision Date: 16 January 2018
• Docket Number: A17-0705
• Parties: James A. COMPART, et al., Appellants, v. Justin J. WOLFSTELLAR, et al., Respondents, Bank of West, Defendant.
• Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals

906 N.W.2d 598

James A. COMPART, et al., Appellants,

v.Justin J. WOLFSTELLAR, et al., Respondents,Bank of West, Defendant.

A17-0705

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

Filed January 16, 2018

Matthew C. Berger, Dean M. Zimmerli, Gislason & Hunter, LLP, New Ulm, Minnesota (for appellants)

Jeffrey A. Scott, Brian W. Varland, Heley, Duncan & Melander, PLLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondents)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Hooten, Judge; and Smith, T., Judge.

HOOTEN, Judge

Appellants contend that the district court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of respondents on appellants' adverse possession claim and on respondents' quiet title counterclaim. Appellants argue that their possession of the disputed real property was hostile for the required 15 years, and that their interest is superior to respondents' interest. We reverse and remand.

FACTS

This case focuses on real property in Sherburne County, Minnesota, which is divided into four parcels: A, B, C, and D.

Parcels A and B are each square-shaped and approximately 5 acres, with Parcel A immediately north of Parcel B. Parcel C is approximately 12 acres and is immediately east of Parcels A and B, with the same northern boundary as Parcel A and the same southern boundary as Parcel B. Parcel D is the disputed parcel. It is an approximately 3-acre L-shaped parcel running along the western boundary of Parcels A and B and along the southern boundary of Parcels B and C. Parcels A and B are separate tax parcels, but Parcels C and D together form one tax parcel.

Appellants James Compart and Diana Compart own Parcels A and B, and respondents Justin Wolfsteller¹ and Janeen Wolfsteller own Parcel C.² Both the Comparts and the Wolfstellers claim an ownership interest in Parcel D.

For the purpose of this summary judgment appeal, the following facts are not disputed. In 1992, Philip and Donna Larson acquired an interest in Parcels A, B, C, and D by entering into a contract for deed for the purchase of the parcels with Berlinson Associates, the title owners of the parcels. Five years later, the Comparts entered into a purchase agreement to buy "13.03+/-acres" from the Larsons for $71,775. On September 15, 1997, the Larsons delivered a quitclaim deed, and Berlinson Associates delivered a warranty deed, to James Compart for Parcels A and B, which included the grant of "an easement for ingress and egress and utility purposes" over Parcel D. The Comparts argue the deeds were in error because their purchase from the Larsons also included Parcel D and the deeds should have conveyed title to the Comparts for Parcel D, with an easement granted in favor of the Larsons. Before September 15, 1997, the Comparts leased Parcels A, B, and D for farming purposes, and they farmed these parcels since the 1997 purchase.

The Larsons fully paid their contract for deed for Parcels C and D, and Berlinson Associates conveyed a warranty deed to the Larsons for those parcels on August 16, 2000. In 2008, the Larsons granted a mortgage encumbering Parcels C and D. Then, on March 5, 2012, the Comparts granted the Larsons an easement over Parcels B and D in a Road Agreement and Easement.³ The agreement, signed by the Comparts and the Larsons, recognized the Comparts as owners of Parcel D, and the Larsons as owners of only Parcel C. Nine days later, on March 14, the Larsons conveyed Parcel D by quitclaim deed to the Comparts. The deed states it was "given to correct an error in the legal description set forth in" the August 16, 2000 warranty deed.

The Wolfstellers claim ownership of Parcels C and D through a chain of title going back to the Larsons' 2008 mortgage. In 2012, that mortgage was foreclosed, Parcels C and D were sold at a sheriff's sale, and, after a conveyance between financial institutions, the Wolfstellers purchased Parcels C and D from Wells Fargo.

The Comparts brought this lawsuit in 2016, alleging adverse possession of Parcel D and two boundary-line claims. In their answer, the Wolfstellers filed a quiet title counterclaim. The Wolfstellers moved for summary judgment on all claims, and the district court granted the motion in favor of the Wolfstellers on all three of the Comparts' claims, but set the Wolfstellers' quiet title counterclaim for trial. Both parties filed motions for reconsideration. The district court denied the Comparts' reconsideration motion, granted the Wolfstellers' reconsideration motion, declared that the Comparts "have no right, title, or interest in Parcel D," and granted summary judgment to the Wolfstellers on their quiet title counterclaim. The Comparts appeal the summary judgment decisions on their adverse possession claim and the Wolfstellers' quiet title counterclaim.

ISSUES

I. Did the district court err in determining that the Comparts' possession of Parcel D was not hostile for the 15-year statutory period and, on that basis, granting summary judgment to the Wolfstellers on the Comparts' adverse possession claim?

II. Did the district court err in granting summary judgment to the Wolfstellers on their quiet title counterclaim?

ANALYSIS

I. Adverse Possession

The Comparts contend that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the Wolfstellers because their possession of Parcel D was hostile for the required 15-year period. "On appeal from summary judgment, [appellate courts review] de novo whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court erred in its application of the law to the facts." Harmon v. Comm'r of Revenue , 894 N.W.2d 155, 159 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). In doing so, appellate courts "view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was granted," Lubbers v. Anderson , 539 N.W.2d 398, 401 (Minn. 1995), and resolve all doubts and factual inferences against the moving party, Rochester City Lines, Co. v. City of Rochester , 868 N.W.2d 655, 661 (Minn. 2015). But, "a 'metaphysical doubt' as to a factual issue will not defeat a summary judgment motion." DLH, Inc. v. Russ , 566 N.W.2d 60, 71 (Minn. 1997).

To succeed on an adverse possession claim, a plaintiff must prove, "by clear and convincing evidence, an actual, open, hostile, continuous, and exclusive possession for the requisite period of time which, under our statute, is 15 years." Ehle v. Prosser , 293 Minn. 183, 189, 197 N.W.2d 458, 462 (1972) ; see also Minn. Stat. § 541.02 (2016) (providing that statutory period is 15 years). It is the adverse claimant's burden "to come forward with the essential facts establishing the elements of adverse possession. The evidence must be strictly construed and amount to clear and positive proof before title by adverse possession will be granted." Stanard v. Urban , 453 N.W.2d 733, 735 (Minn. App. 1990) (citation omitted), review denied (Minn. June 15, 1990). There is also a statutory requirement that, in certain instances, the adverse possessor must pay property taxes on the disputed parcel for "at least five consecutive years" during the period of adverse possession. Minn. Stat. § 541.02.

The district court determined that the Comparts did not have hostile possession of Parcel D for the required 15 years. It reasoned that because the Comparts had a permissive easement from 1997 until March 2012, and held title via a quitclaim deed granted by the Larsons from March 2012 until the July 26, 2012 mortgage foreclosure, any possession during that timeframe was not hostile and therefore did not count toward the period of adverse possession. For the purposes of this appeal, the Wolfstellers do not dispute that the Comparts' possession was actual, open, and exclusive or that the Comparts were in possession of Parcel D for the required 15 years.⁴ But, the Wolfstellers argue that the Comparts' possession of Parcel D was not continuously hostile for the required 15 years and that, as an alternative ground to defeat the their adverse possession claim, the Comparts failed to pay property taxes as required by Minn. Stat. § 541.02.

Hostile possession "does not refer to personal animosity or physical overt acts against the record owner of the property." Ehle , 293 Minn. at 190, 197 N.W.2d at 462. Rather, hostility only requires that one "enter and take possession of the lands as if they were his own, and with the intention of holding for himself to the exclusion of all others." Thomas v. Mrkonich , 247 Minn. 481, 484, 78 N.W.2d 386, 388 (1956) (quotation omitted).

On appeal, the Wolfstellers do not defend the district court's reasoning that the grant of an easement interrupted the period of hostility. The Comparts' use of Parcel D was hostile because their use exceeded the express grant of the easement, which was "for ingress and egress and utility purposes over, under and across" Parcel D. "It is well settled that the extent of an easement should not be enlarged by legal construction beyond the objects originally contemplated or expressly agreed upon by the parties." Minneapolis Athletic Club v. Cohler , 287 Minn. 254, 258, 177 N.W.2d 786, 789–90 (1970). Here, the Comparts argue that they have farmed the property consistently since purchasing the property in 1997. Because farming is a use other than entering and exiting property, and is not a "utility purpose," the Comparts' farming of Parcel D was hostile.⁵ See Ebenhoh , 642 N.W.2d at 111–12 (holding that cultivating crops and grazing cattle was hostile because it constituted entering "the disputed tract and [taking] possession as if the tract was their own"); cf. Nordin v. Kuno , 287 N.W.2d 923, 927 (Minn. 1980) (noting that "an easement for ingress and egress ... is not an easement for parking or picnicking"). Moreover, there is nothing in Ganje v. Schuler , 659 N.W.2d 261 (Minn. App. 2003), the case relied upon by the district court, which suggests that an easement for ingress, egress, and utility purposes makes the Comparts' farming of the land a permissive use.

Instead, the Wolfstellers argue that the 2012 quitclaim...