Compton v. State

• Decision Date: 11 June 1913
• Citation: 158 S.W. 515
• Parties: COMPTON v. STATE.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

158 S.W. 515

COMPTON v. STATE.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

June 11, 1913.

Appeal from Williamson County Court; Richard Critz, Judge.

C. V. Compton was convicted of crime, and he appeals. Reversed and remanded.

Nunn & Love, of Georgetown, and W. A. Barlow, of Taylor, for appellant. C. E. Lane, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

HARPER, J.

Appellant was prosecuted and convicted under an information containing two counts.

As there is no complaint in the record upon which to base an information, it would be our duty to reverse and dismiss the case, for, as said in Branch's Criminal Law, "There is no authority for the presentment of an information if it is not based upon a complaint, and on appeal from a judgment of conviction where an information was presented, the complaint as well as the information must appear in the transcript." Thornberry v. State, 3 Tex. App. 37; Turner v. State, 3 Tex. App. 551; Casey v. State, 5 Tex. App. 462; Lackey v. State, 14 Tex. App. 164; Rose v. State, 19 Tex. App. 470; Wadgymar v. State, 21 Tex. App. 459, 2 S. W. 768; McVea v. State, 35 Tex. Cr. R. 1, 26 S. W. 834, 28 S. W. 469; Dickinson v. State, 38 Tex. Cr. R. 472, 41 S. W. 759, 43 S. W. 520; Diltz v. State, 56 Tex. Cr. R. 128, 119 S. W. 92. But inasmuch as it will be necessary to reverse and remand the case on other grounds, we have decided to reverse and remand, with instructions to the county judge, if no complaint was in fact filed, to dismiss the case from the docket.

As stated before, the information contains two counts, but the court in his charge submitted to the jury only the second count in the information, and correctly so, for the evidence would not sustain a conviction on the first count, and shows that if appellant is guilty, if guilty of any offense, only of leasing the house for immoral purposes, there is no evidence that he was interested in the business carried on in the house as charged in the first count. There was a sharp conflict in the evidence as to whether he leased or sold the premises to Dollie Steed. If he sold the premises he would be guilty of no offense, as the law places no limitation as to whom a person shall sell his property. If he leased the house to Dollie Steed, knowing the purposes for which she intended to use it, and permitted her to so use it, he would violate the law. But as this case will be reversed, we think it would be improper for us to comment upon the testimony. Consequently, several questions are raised which we will not discuss, but will say that the deed from appellant to Ida Collins, dated November 12, 1906, would shed no light on the transaction with Dollie Steed in March, 1911, and on another trial it should not be admitted.

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