Compton v. Subaru of America, Inc., 94-3429
| Decision Date | 30 April 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 94-3429,94-3429 |
| Citation | 82 F.3d 1513 |
| Parties | 44 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 312, Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 14,649 Steven D. COMPTON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SUBARU OF AMERICA, INC.; Fuji Heavy Industries, Inc., Defendants-Appellants. Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., Amicus Curiae. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Kansas; Monti L Belot, Judge (D.C. No. 90-CV-1088).
Richard C. Hite (Scott J. Gunderson with him on the briefs), Kahrs, Nelson, Fanning, Hite & Kellogg, Wichita, Kansas, for Defendants-Appellants.
Lynn R. Johnson (Stephen N. Six and Patrick A. Hamilton with him on the brief), Shamberg, Johnson & Bergman, Chtd., Overland Park, Kansas, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Marc R. Brosseau and Scott D. Peterson, Weller Friedrich, LLC, Denver, Colorado, and Hugh F. Young, Jr., Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., Reston, Virginia, for Amicus Curiae.
Before PORFILIO, McWILLIAMS, and ALARCON, * Circuit Judges.
Steven D. Compton brought this products liability action after sustaining severe injuries in an automobile rollover accident. Mr. Compton sued the automobile manufacturer, Fuji Heavy Industries, Ltd. (Fuji), and the distributor, Subaru of America, Inc. (Subaru), alleging the accident vehicle was defectively designed. After a jury trial, Subaru and Fuji were found 56% at fault for Mr. Compton's injuries, and judgment was entered against them in the amount of $6,574,081.
On appeal, Subaru and Fuji raise two issues. First, they contend the district court erroneously admitted the testimony of Mr. Compton's design expert and thus failed to carry out its gatekeeping function as required under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). 1 Second, Subaru and Fuji argue the district court improperly denied their renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law. We affirm.
On the evening of February 19, 1988, Mr. Compton and four other teenaged friends consumed several six-packs of beer and drove around Scott County, Kansas, in a 1982 Subaru GL Station Wagon. While traveling on U.S. Highway 83, the teenagers spotted the automobile of Mr. Compton's ex-girlfriend. Tailing behind, the Subaru weaved back and forth across the yellow line until one of the teenagers reached over and yanked on the steering wheel, causing the driver to lose control. The Subaru skidded across the highway, entered a ditch, and rolled over twice. During its first roll, Mr. Compton, seated in the rear seat behind the driver and not wearing a seatbelt, suffered a spinal cord injury resulting in quadriplegia.
Mr. Compton filed this action against Subaru and Fuji in February 1990. In his complaint, Mr. Compton alleged the accident vehicle was defectively designed because there was "excessive and extensive intrusion of the roof and side of the automobile into the passenger compartment during the rollover." According to Mr. Compton, he would have avoided serious injury during the rollover if the roof had not "collapsed inward" onto his head. Therefore, Mr. Compton asserted Subaru and Fuji were strictly liable for his injuries.
During trial, Subaru and Fuji objected to the proposed testimony of Mr. Compton's sole design expert, Larry Bihlmeyer, because they contended Mr. Bihlmeyer's background and experience did not qualify him as an expert on the design of automobile roofs or roof support structures. Furthermore, Subaru and Fuji urged Mr. Bihlmeyer failed to meet the requirements for expert testimony set out in Daubert, 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469. After a Rule 104(a) hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury, however, the district court ultimately concluded Mr. Bihlmeyer was sufficiently qualified and allowed him to testify.
Having survived the district court's initial scrutiny of his qualifications, Mr. Bihlmeyer, an aerospace and mechanical engineer, testified the design and roof support structures in the accident vehicle were defective because they permitted excessive roof crush. He then pinpointed areas of the roof structure where, in his expert opinion, additional support was required. To correct the alleged defects, Mr. Bihlmeyer testified he would design the vehicle to allow only 2 to 3 inches of roof crush. He also explained crush should be limited to ensure 33 inches of remaining headroom after an accident occurring at a speed of 50 m.p.h. Under this standard, the roof of the vehicle would be required to sustain average forces of between 48,000 and 71,000 pounds, which the district court remarked "seems more applicable to a Sherman tank than to any vehicle which the ordinary consumer would drive."
In arriving at his conclusion that the accident vehicle was defectively designed, Mr. Bihlmeyer relied upon his inspection of the accident vehicle and an identical, undamaged 1982 GL Subaru Station Wagon. Next, Mr. Bihlmeyer established his proposed roof crush and headroom requirements by comparing the headroom measurements in the accident vehicle with measurements compiled from hundreds of other accident vehicles he had examined during his eight-year career as a "consulting engineer." Mr. Bihlmeyer also used six other sources to support his proposed requirements: (1) a summary of a 1972 proposed, but not adopted, Ford Motor Company (Ford) standard which would have required a remaining headroom of 29.4 inches after roof crush on unnamed vehicles; (2) technical papers containing information about a Ford experimental safety vehicle which was not a production vehicle; (3) a 1966 proposed, but not adopted, federal standard for light utility vehicles with open bodies which would have required roll bars and a minimum of 33 inches remaining headroom after roof crush; (4) a Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) paper presented by an engineer at Fiat, discussing the advantages of roof crush as an energy-absorbing device for seat-belted occupants; (5) Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 216, which sets no requirements for remaining headroom after roof crush; and,(6) an SAE paper entitled "Field Studies of Rollover Performance," which studied rollover accidents involving British cars and light vans, but did not propose any headroom requirements.
At the close of Mr. Compton's case, and again at the close of all the evidence, Subaru and Fuji moved for judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a), arguing Mr. Bihlmeyer's testimony was so ludicrous no reasonable juror could conclude his testimony was more likely than not true. In both instances, the district court denied the motions after carefully examining Mr. Bihlmeyer's testimony. Subsequently, the jury returned a verdict finding Subaru and Fuji 56% at fault for Mr. Compton's injuries. After the verdict, Subaru and Fuji renewed their Rule 50 motion, which the district court denied. Subaru and Fuji now appeal.
Upon Subaru's and Fuji's motion, the district court heard argument regarding the admissibility of Mr. Bihlmeyer's testimony. Although expressing doubts about his credibility, the court ultimately determined Mr. Bihlmeyer met the qualifications for expert testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. The district court addressed Daubert's applicability and explained:
I don't think the Daubert case has a lot to do with the problem that I'm faced with.... I don't think we're dealing with [a Daubert situation] here. Really. But to the extent that you might say that we are, clearly there's some scientific knowledge involved in the testimony of Mr. Bihlmeyer and it seems to me that ... his testimony ... is being offered and will assist the jurors to understand whether or not there is a design or manufacturing defect involved in this case. So to the extent the Daubert case is applicable, it's applicable.
Thus, the district court relied, in part, on Daubert in reaching its conclusion Mr. Bihlmeyer was qualified as an expert.
Subaru and Fuji now contend the district court erred in admitting Mr. Bihlmeyer's testimony. Under Daubert's test for the admissibility of scientific evidence, Subaru and Fuji argue Mr. Bihlmeyer's testimony should have been excluded because it lacked evidentiary reliability and was not grounded in any particular reasoning or methodology. They contend Mr. Bihlmeyer's testimony was nothing more than his personal opinion the roof of the accident vehicle was not sufficiently resistant to crush. Indeed, Subaru and Fuji assert Mr. Bihlmeyer did not rely on industry data and did not refer to any scientific principles or knowledge supporting his personal standard for roof crush resistance. Accordingly, because there was no peer review, no testing, and no evidence of general acceptance of Mr. Bihlmeyer's theory, Subaru and Fuji argue Mr. Bihlmeyer's testimony should have been excluded under Daubert.
In response, Mr. Compton contends Daubert is inapplicable to Mr. Bihlmeyer's nonscientific testimony. Mr. Compton asserts Mr. Bihlmeyer reached his conclusions based upon his own expertise and experience, not the methods and procedures of science. Therefore, Mr. Compton argues the district court correctly stated "[f]actors such as rate of error, peer review and acceptance in a 'relevant scientific discipline' have little, if any, bearing on mundane, 'professional witness' engineering testimony such as [Mr.] Bihlmeyer's." Daubert aside, Mr. Compton contends the district court did not err in admitting Mr. Bihlmeyer's testimony.
The applicability of Daubert is a question of law which this court reviews de novo. See, e.g., Bradley v. Brown, 42 F.3d 434, 436 (7th Cir.1994) (). However, once we determine Daubert's relevance and application, our review of the district court's decision to admit expert testimony is limited. We may reverse the district court only for abuse of...
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