Computer Network, Inc. v. AM General Corp.

• Decision Date: 15 April 2005
• Docket Number: Docket No. 248966.
• Citation: 265 Mich. App. 309,696 N.W.2d 49
• Parties: COMPUTER NETWORK, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AM GENERAL CORPORATION and Pfeiffer Infiniti, Inc., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

696 N.W.2d 49

265 Mich. App. 309

COMPUTER NETWORK, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AM GENERAL CORPORATION and Pfeiffer Infiniti, Inc., Defendants-Appellees.

Docket No. 248966.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted December 7, 2004, at Grand Rapids.

Decided February 24, 2005, at 9:05 a.m.

Released for Publication April 15, 2005.

Consumer Legal Services, Inc (by Mark Romano, Matthew W. Delezenne, and Christopher A. Winkler), Garden City, for Computer Network, Inc.

Boveri Murphy Rice Ryan & Ladue, LLP (by John D. LaDue), South Bend, IN, for AM General Corporation.

Before: HOEKSTRA, P.J., and GRIFFIN and BORRELLO, JJ.

GRIFFIN, J.

Plaintiff appeals as of right an order granting defendants' motions for summary disposition. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

I

On June 29, 2000, plaintiff, through action of its president John Deskovitz, leased a 2000 Hummer vehicle manufactured by defendant AM General Corporation. Plaintiff obtained a thirty-month lease expiring in December 2002 through defendant Pfeiffer Infiniti, Inc. But, before expiration of the lease, plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit alleging that the vehicle required repairs on at least fourteen¹ occasions during the lease period and that it was out of service for an unreasonable amount of time. Plaintiff asserts that the documentary evidence submitted in opposition to defendants' motions established that the vehicle was out of service for repairs for 199 days during the thirty-month lease.² Plaintiff claimed that problems with the vehicle necessitating repairs included engine problems, starting problems, malfunctioning turn signals, power steering fluid leaks, excessive vibration, defective steering, malfunctioning gauges, defective air conditioning, odometer and speedometer malfunctions, defective heating, malfunctioning cruise control, inoperable CD player, excessive rust, and defective painting. Following a hearing on motions for summary disposition brought by both defendants under MCR 2.116(C)(10), the trial court granted summary disposition in favor of defendants on eight claims under MCR 2.116(C)(8), and one claim under MCR 2.116(C)(10).

II

Plaintiff initially argues that the trial court erroneously granted summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8), where defendants moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). Plaintiff argues that the trial court lacked the authority to grant sua sponte summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8), and that summary disposition under this subrule was also improper because it was not given an opportunity to oppose such a motion. We disagree.

A trial court is not necessarily constrained by the subrule under which a party moves for summary disposition. It is well settled that, where a party brings a motion for summary disposition under the wrong subrule, a trial court may proceed under the appropriate subrule if neither party is misled. Blair v. Checker Cab Co., 219 Mich.App. 667, 670-671, 558 N.W.2d 439 (1996); Ruggeri Electrical Contracting Co., Inc. v. Algonac, 196 Mich.App. 12, 18, 492 N.W.2d 469 (1992). In this case, plaintiff was neither misled nor prejudiced by the trial court's consideration of defendants' motions under MCR 2.116(C)(8).

"`A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint.'" Adair v. Michigan, 470 Mich. 105, 119, 680 N.W.2d 386 (2004) (citation deleted). The pleadings alone are considered. Corley v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 470 Mich. 274, 277, 681 N.W.2d 342 (2004). "`All well-pleaded factual allegations are accepted as true and construed in a light most favorable to the nonmovant.'" Adair, supra at 119, 680 N.W.2d 386 (citation deleted). The motion should be granted where the claims are "`so clearly unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual development could possibly justify recovery.'" Id., quoting Maiden v. Rozwood, 461 Mich. 109, 119, 597 N.W.2d 817 (1999). Because a grant of summary disposition rests on a review of the pleadings alone, the lack of argument from plaintiff with respect to the legal sufficiency of the claims is not necessarily an impediment to a grant of summary disposition under that subrule. Plaintiff formulated its own pleadings. Further, it was aware of the legal arguments offered by defendants and had a full opportunity to respond to those arguments. In ruling on the motions for summary disposition, the trial court believed that the arguments offered by defendants, to which plaintiff responded, required summary disposition under subrule C(8), not subrule C(10). While the propriety of the underlying ruling is subject to challenge, the fact that the trial court granted the motion under subrule C(8), standing alone, is insufficient to warrant reversal.

In reaching our decision, we emphasize that our review of summary disposition decisions is done de novo. Quality Products & Concepts Co. v. Nagel Precision, Inc., 469 Mich. 362, 369, 666 N.W.2d 251 (2003). Moreover, even if a trial court errs in granting summary disposition under the wrong subrule, this Court may review the issue under the correct subrule. See Spiek v. Dep't of Transportation, 456 Mich. 331, 338 n. 9, 572 N.W.2d 201 (1998). Also, it is axiomatic that this Court will not reverse a trial court's decision if the correct result is reached for the wrong reason. Lane v. KinderCare Learning Centers, Inc., 231 Mich.App. 689, 697, 588 N.W.2d 715 (1998).

III

With respect to plaintiff's claims for breach of express warranty, plaintiff concedes that the language of the lease for the 2000 Hummer contained express language disclaiming any warranty by defendant Pfeiffer Infiniti. Because Pfeiffer Infiniti did not provide an express warranty, summary disposition of plaintiff's express warranty claim against Pfeiffer Infiniti was warranted.

AM General offered an express warranty. However, no material question of fact existed with respect to breach of that warranty. John Deskovitz, plaintiff's principal, testified at his deposition that repairs were never refused. The record revealed that warranty repairs were made each of the seventeen times the vehicle was presented for service. Because there was no question of material fact with respect to a breach, summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) was proper.

Plaintiff nevertheless argues that if the time taken for repairs was unreasonable, there may be a claim for breach of express warranty, regardless of the fact that all repairs were actually made. Plaintiff argues that there is a question of fact whether the repairs were made in a reasonably timely fashion. In Kelynack v. Yamaha Motor Corp., USA, 152 Mich.App. 105, 111, 394 N.W.2d 17 (1986), this Court held that, where a limited express warranty fails of its essential purpose or deprives either party of the value of the bargain, the parties may pursue other remedies under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), MCL 440.1101 et seq. Further, "[w]here a manufacturer or dealer has limited its obligation ... to repair or replace defective parts, the seller does not have an unlimited time to make the repairs, but rather must repair or replace the parts within a reasonable time." Kelynack, supra at 112, 394 N.W.2d 17. "[A] warranty fails of its essential purpose where unanticipated circumstances preclude the seller from providing the buyer with the remedy to which the parties agreed, in which event the buyer is entitled to seek remedies under the standard UCC warranty provisions." Severn v. Sperry Corp., 212 Mich.App. 406, 413-414, 538 N.W.2d 50 (1995). In this case, there was no evidence indicating that the manufacturer's limited express warranty failed of its essential purpose. To the contrary, every time plaintiff presented the vehicle, repairs were made. In this respect, the present case is distinguishable from most defective vehicle cases. See Durfee v. Rod Baxter Imports, Inc., 262 N.W.2d 349 (Minn., 1977), and cases cited therein. Additionally, there was no evidence that the time allotted for the presented repairs was unreasonable under the particular circumstances. There were numerous different repairs to the vehicle over a lengthy period, most of which were not repeat repairs. Plaintiff relies on the aggregate number of repair days to argue that there is a question of fact whether the time for repairs was unreasonable. However, it offers no evidence that the time to perform the numerous, individual repairs was unreasonable for this specific vehicle. This case is not like Kelynack, supra at 112, 394 N.W.2d 17, in which the plaintiff presented his vehicle for repair because of a tapping noise and the vehicle was not returned for more than three months. Nor is this case similar to Severn, in which the defendant was unable to repair the machinery. Here, the vehicle was always repaired, returned, accepted, and used. Because there was no question of material fact, summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) was appropriate.

IV

With respect to plaintiff's claim for breach of implied warranty of merchantability, summary disposition was appropriate for defendant Pfeiffer Infiniti because it properly disclaimed conspicuously and in writing any implied warranty of merchantability. MCL 440.2864. The disclaimer was not invalid under 15 USC 2308, which precludes a supplier that has offered an express warranty from disclaiming or modifying a limited warranty in any respect other than duration. Pfeiffer Infiniti did not provide an express warranty. Thus, there is no question of material fact with respect to plaintiff's claim against Pfeiffer Infiniti for breach of an implied warranty of merchantability. Summary disposition was appropriate.

V

However, defendant AM General was obligated under an implied warranty of merchantability. While it attempted to modify the implied warranty by limiting remedies to those offered under the written warranty, this disclaimer was invalid under 15 USC 2308. On this issue, this Court has stated:

The warranty of merchantability requires that the goods

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