Conagra Inc. v. Strother

• Decision Date: 23 March 2000
• Docket Number: 99-1413
• Citation: 13 S.W.3d 150
• Parties: CONAGRA, INC v. Vida STROTHER 99-1413 ___ S.W.3d ___ Opinion delivered
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

CONAGRA, INC v Vida STROTHER

99-1413 ___ S.W.3d ___

Opinion delivered March 23, 2000

Supreme Court of Arkansas

Appeal from Independence Circuit Court; John Dan Kemp, Judge; affirmed.

1. Motions -- directed verdict -- standard of review. -- In addressing the sufficiency issue, the supreme court must first view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the verdict was sought and give that evidence the highest probative value, taking into account all reasonable inferences that can be derived from it; a motion for a directed verdict should be granted only when the evidence viewed is so insubstantial as to require the jury's verdict for the party to be set aside; a motion for a directed verdict should be denied when there is a conflict in the evidence or when the evidence is such that fair-minded people might reach different conclusions; under those circumstances, a jury question is presented, and a directed verdict is inappropriate.

2. Evidence -- substantial evidence defined. -- It is not the supreme court's province to try issues of fact; it simply examines the record to determine if there is substantial evidence to support the jury verdict; substantial evidence is defined as evidence of sufficient force and character to compel a conclusion one way or another with reasonable certainty; it must force the mind to pass beyond suspicion or conjecture.

3. Judgment -- judgment notwithstanding verdict -- when entered. -- A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is technically only a renewal of the motion for a directed verdict made at the close of the evidence; a trial court may enter judgment notwithstanding the verdict only if there is no substantial evidence to support the jury verdict, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

4. Negligence -- slip-&-fall -- principles governing. -- The principles that govern slip-and-fall cases are set against the general backdrop that an owner has a duty to exercise ordinary care to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition for the benefit of invitees; to establish a violation of that duty, the plaintiff must prove either (1) that the presence of a substance upon the floor was the result of the defendant's negligence or (2) that the substance had been on the floor for such a length of time that the defendant knew or reasonably should have known of its presence and failed to use ordinary care to remove it; the mere fact that a person slips and falls does not give rise to an inference of negligence.

5. Negligence -- slip-&-fall -- substantial evidence supported first basis for liability. -- Where appellant had complete control of the building where appellee worked; where the floor in the hallway leading to the break room on the second floor was tile; where, due to the nature of the chicken processing business, it was a common everyday occurrence for greasy water to get on the floor in the second-floor hallway and make it slick; and where, in response to this condition, appellant had placed safety mats in the hallways and established a policy that safety mats were not to be removed until all employees and inspectors had left the building; yet when appellee slipped and fell outside the break room, the mats had been removed and the tile floor was wet, there was substantial evidence under the first basis for liability in a slip-and-fall case; the jury could readily infer that greasy water was present on the tile floor in the hallway outside the break room and that its presence was the result of appellant's negligence; that is, as a result of the removal of the safety mats before all employees had left the building, in violation of company policy, the tile floor became wet and slick.

6. Negligence -- elements of proof needed under second basis for liability not addressed -- proof sufficient under first basis for liability. -- The fact that appellee may not have proven how long the substance had been on the floor related to the elements of proof under the second basis for liability in a slip-and-fall case, that the defendant either knew a substance had been on the floor, or should have known of its presence due to the length of time it was there, and failed to use ordinary care to remove it; there are two separate and distinct bases for liability and the plaintiff in a slip-and-fall case need only prove one of those bases in order to prevail; here, there was substantial evidence to support the jury verdict under the first basis for liability, that the presence of the greasy water on the tile floor was the result of appellant's negligence; thus, the supreme court did not address the sufficiency of the evidence under an alternative basis for liability.

7. Appeal & error -- right conclusion reached based on wrong reason -- not reversible error. -- If a trial court reaches the proper conclusion by way of improper reasoning, that action does not become reversible error simply because the trial court gave the wrong reason for taking it.

8. Appeal & error -- erroneous application of hidden-danger analysis not reversible error. -- Where no prejudice resulted from the trial court's erroneous application of the hidden-danger analysis, and where sufficient evidence existed to allow the case to proceed to the jury on a traditional slip-and-fall theory of recovery, the trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

9. Evidence -- ruling on admission of -- when reversed. -- The supreme court will not reverse a trial court's ruling on the admission of evidence absent an abuse of discretion.

10. Motions -- motion in limine a threshold motion -- prior ruling may be reconsidered. -- A motion in limine is a threshold motion, and a trial judge is at liberty to reconsider his or her prior rulings during the course of a single trial.

11. Motions -- ruling on motion in limine changed during course of trial -- no abuse of discretion found. -- The trial court's initial ruling on appellant's motion in limine was a threshold ruling subject to reconsideration and change as the evidence was more fully developed at trial; clearly, the trial court was convinced by the presentation of evidence to modify its earlier ruling and allow testimony about the daily presence of greasy water on the floor and the presence of safety mats for the limited purpose of establishing that appellant had prior notice that such a condition existed; the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the testimony for the limited purpose of establishing that appellant had prior notice that the floor outside the break room would become wet and slick upon removal of the safety mats. [cme]

Walmsley & Weaver, by: Tim Weaver, for appellant.

Comer Boyett, Jr., for appellee.

Annabelle Clinton Imber, Justice.

This is a slip-and-fall case. Vida Strother worked for more than twenty years as a poultry inspector for the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) at Conagra's processing plant in Batesville, Arkansas. On March 24, 1994, Ms. Strother had just completed her shift when she went upstairs to the break room provided by Conagra for USDA employees, changed into her civilian clothing, stepped "two or three steps" outside the break room, and slipped and fell. She fractured her left elbow and injured her lower back and hips as a result of the fall.

Ms. Strother filed a complaint against Conagra in which she alleged that she slipped and fell on the wet tile floor at Conagra and sustained injuries as a result of Conagra's negligence. Following a jury trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Ms. Strother for $125,000 in damages. Conagra appealed the jury's verdict to the Arkansas Court of Appeals and raised two points of error for reversal: (1) the trial court erred in failing to grant Conagra's motion for a directed verdict at the close of trial and motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) after the verdict was returned; and (2) the trial court erred in failing to grant Conagra's motion for a new trial.

The Court of Appeals found no reversible error and affirmed. Conagra , Inc. v. Strother, 68 Ark. App. 120, ___ S.W.3d ___ (1999). In doing so, the Court of Appeals held that this case did not require analysis under a traditional slip-and-fall theory of recovery. Id. In a petition for review filed in this court pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 2-4, Conagra now challenges the decision by the Court of Appeals. Specifically, Conagra contends that the Court of Appeals incorrectly analyzed this case as a hidden-danger case by citing Heigle v. Miller, 332 Ark. 315, 965 S.W.2d 116 (1998), instead of applying a traditional slip-and-fall theory of recovery upon which the case was submitted to the jury. We granted Conagra's petition for review. When this court grants a petition to review a case decided by the Court of Appeals, we review it as if it was originally filed in this court. McKay v. McKay, 340 Ark. 171, 8 S.W.3d 525 (2000); Youngman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 334 Ark. 73, 971 S.W.2d 248 (1998).

For its first point on appeal, Conagra contends that the trial court erred in failing to grant its motion for a directed verdict at the close of the trial and its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict after the verdict was returned. In its directed verdict motion and JNOV motion, Conagra raised questions about the sufficiency of the evidence.

In addressing the sufficiency issue, we must first view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the verdict is sought and give that evidence the highest probative value, taking into account all reasonable inferences that can be derived from it. Morehart v. Dillard Dep't Stores, 322 Ark. 290, 908 S.W.2d 331 (1995); Lytle v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 309 Ark. 139, 827 S.W.2d 652 (1992). A motion for a directed verdict should be granted only when the evidence viewed is so insubstantial as to require the jury's...