Concannon v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety

Decision Date05 July 1949
PartiesCONCANNON v. COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC SAFETY (two cases).
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Exceptions from Superior Court, Suffolk County; Baker, Judge.

Mandamus and certiorari proceedings by James L. Concannon against the Commissioner of Public Safety. The Judge made findings of fact and ordered the petitions dismissed, and James L. Concannon brings exceptions.

Exceptions overruled.

L. V. Concannon, Boston, for petitioner.

R. Clapp, Asst. Atty. Gen. for respondents.

Before QUA, C. J., and LUMMUS, RONAN, SPALDING and WILLIAMS, JJ.

SPALDING, Justice.

On November 16, 1943, the petitioner, a patrolman in the division of State police of the department of public safety, see G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 22, § 9A, as amended, was dishonorably discharged after a hearing. Contending that the proceedings by which he was removed were not conducted in accordance with law, he brought this petition for a writ of mandamus against the respondent to compel the latter to recognize him as a member of the force depite his discharge. In an amendment to his petition the petitioner added an allegation that ‘the respondent and those in charge of the trial did not exercise good faith.’ The petitioner also sought a review of the removal proceedings by certiorari. The petitions were heard together. In each case the judge made findings of fact and ordered the petition dismissed. The cases come here on the petitioner's bills of exceptions.

The Mandamus Case.

General Laws (Ter.Ed.) c. 22, § 9A, provides that the commissioner of public safety ‘may, subject to the approval of the governor, make rules and regulations for * * * [the State police force] including matters pertaining to their discipline, organization and government.’ Section 9A also provides that ‘Any member of said force violating any of the rules or regulations for said force shall be subject to discipline or discharge in accordance with said rules and regulations.’ Pursuant to these provisions, rules and regulations for the government of the State police were drawn up by the commissioner of public safety and were approved by the Governor on May 3, 1922. Rule 21 provides that members of the force ‘shall be subject to trial, judgment and sentence of a trial court in any case when, in the opinion of the commissioner, the good of the service so requires, and for any of the following offences: * * * (d) any violation of the criminal law or of the laws or ordinances of any city or town * * *. (i) any act detrimental to the good order and repute of the patrol.’ In Rule 23 it is provided that ‘The procedure in all trials before a trial court of the patrol shall conform to the Manual of Courts Martial of the United States Army, as published and in force on January 1, 1917.’ Rule 23 establishes two types of trial courts, summary and special. Summary courts ‘shall have jurisdiction in all cases of charges against enlisted members of the patrol below the rank of second lieutenant. * * * All commissioned officers of the patrol are eligible to act as members of such summary court, except that an officer preferring charges shall not sit in the trial of such charges. A summary court shall consist of one commissioned and two non-commissioned officers, who shall be appointed to this duty by the executive officer. All judgments or sentences of a summary court shall be subject to the approval of the commissioner, and, when so approved, shall be conclusive and final.'1

On August 18, 1943, charges were preferred against the petitioner alleging a violation by him of Rule 21(d) and (i) of the State police. In specifications filed with these charges the following with respect to the petitioner was alleged as having occurred in Worcester on August 6, 1943: his arrest for drunkenness, being drunk and disorderly, engaging in an altercation with a police officer, assaulting such officer, failing to report his absence from duty, and showing an utter disrespect for his superiors in the manner in which he reported his absence and his arrest. The petitioner, who was represented by counsel, was tried on these charges by a summary court consisting of a corporal, a sergeant, and a lieutenant of the State police, and was found guilty on all of them. The summary court recommended a dishonorable discharge and this recommendation was approved by the respondent.

The judge made comprehensive findings of fact. We shall refer to them only in so far as they bear upon the exceptions argued by the petitioner.

The petitioner argues that the judge erred in refusing to rule, as requested, that the manual of courts martial by which the trial was governed was not that which was prescribed by the rules and regulations. This point is without merit. We think that it cannot be seriously contended that the manual used was not the one referred to in the rule.2 In any event the judge was warranted in finding, as in effect he did, that the proper manual was used.

In several requests, which were denied subject to his exceptions, the petitioner asked the judge to rule in substance that the conduct of Captain Shimkus was such in connection with the case as to make him an accuser and that this disqualified him from acting as a reviewing officer. In support of this contention the petitioner invokes paragraph 121 of the manual for courts martial which provides that a member of a court martial ‘will be excused when challenged upon proof of the fact as alleged: * * * (2) That he has personally investigated the charges and expressed an opinion thereon, or that he has formed a positive and definite opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused. (3) That he is the accuser.’ It appears that Shimkus was not a member of the court which tried the petitioner, and the judge found that he was not the accuser. The judge, however, found that Shimkus was ‘the reviewing officer who approved the summary court's decisions and recommended to the respondent * * * the finding of guilt and a dishonorable discharge.’ We do no pause to consider whether Shimkus, by reason of what he did in connection with the earlier phases of the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
3 cases
  • O'Hara v. Commissioner of Public Safety
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • 9 April 1975
    ...adopted trial procedure conforming to the Manual of Courts Martial of the United States Army. See Concannon v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 324 Mass. 503, 504--505, 87 N.E.2d 216 (1949). Police in general must not be too hastily assimilated to the military for disciplinary purposes, but the......
  • Manzi v. Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • 30 November 1956
    ...brief admits, does not show that these exceptions were in fact claimed. They have not been considered. Concannon v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 324 Mass. 503, 508, 87 N.E.2d 216, and cases cited. See Posell v. Herscovitz, 237 Mass. 513, 517, 130 N.E. 69; City of Quincy v. Wilson, 305 Mas......
  • Concannon v. Commissioner of Public Safety
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • 5 July 1949

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT