Concord General Mut. Ins. Co. v. McCarty

Citation135 N.H. 316,604 A.2d 573
Decision Date13 March 1992
Docket NumberNo. 91-056,91-056
PartiesCONCORD GENERAL MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. John McCARTY and another.
CourtSupreme Court of New Hampshire

Wiggin & Nourie, Manchester (Doreen F. Connor on the brief and orally), for plaintiff.

McLane, Graf, Raulerson & Middleton P.A., Portsmouth (J. Kirk Trombley on the brief and orally), for defendant John McCarty.

Cullity, Kelley and McDowell, Manchester, for defendant M. Bryan Lanehart, joined in the brief of defendant John McCarty.

JOHNSON, Justice.

The defendant, John McCarty, appeals from the Superior Court's (Nadeau, J.) order granting summary judgment to Concord General Mutual Insurance Company (Concord General) on its petition for declaratory judgment. The trial court denied McCarty liability coverage for an accident in which Bryan Lanehart was injured. McCarty claims that he is entitled to coverage for a claim made by Lanehart under McCarty's homeowner's and automobile policies, issued by Concord General, because relevant portions of both policies are ambiguous. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

On September 3, 1987, while in the course of his employment, McCarty was operating an Ackerman excavator owned by his employer. The bucket arm of the excavator struck and injured a fellow employee, Bryan Lanehart. Lanehart sued McCarty, who sought coverage from Concord General under his family combination automobile policy and his homeowner's policy. The excavator weighs 61,000 pounds and has caterpillar-type tracks. Its top speed is 1.9 miles per hour. It is not suitable, because of its weight and caterpillar-type tracks, for use on public roads; it is transported from site to site by a flatbed trailer. It is neither inspected nor registered with the State of New Hampshire, and has no front or rear lights.

McCarty alleges that the term "automobile" is ambiguous because it is not specifically defined in the policy to exclude heavy equipment of the type he was operating at the time of the accident. He also alleges that the definition of "business" in his homeowner's policy is ambiguous as to whether off-premises business activities, as opposed to on-premises business activities, are excluded from coverage.

McCarty relies on our holding in Trombly v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 120 N.H. 764, 771, 423 A.2d 980, 985 (1980), for the assertion that both policies must be construed against the insurer as a matter of law where there is ambiguity, which "include[s] all terms about the meaning or application of which reasonable disagreement between the contracting parties is possible." Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 130 N.H. 117, 122, 536 A.2d 164, 166 (1987). If the language is not ambiguous, we will interpret it "as would a reasonable person in the position of the insured based on a more than casual reading of the policy as a whole." Haley v. Allstate Ins. Co., 129 N.H. 512, 514, 529 A.2d 394, 396 (1987).

The Haley test encourages insurers to write clear and unambiguous policies that are intelligible to the layperson who purchases insurance. Former Chief Justice Kenison noted that "[i]n light of the inherently ambiguous nature of words themselves, the ascertainment of a plain meaning [in a contract] may be at best an elusive goal." Spectrum Enterprises, Inc. v. Helm Corp., 114 N.H. 773, 776, 329 A.2d 144, 146 (1974). Nevertheless, there are many cases in which the plain meaning of an insurance contract can be ascertained. This case is one. We conclude that Concord General's automobile and homeowner's policies unambiguously exclude this accident from coverage.

We consider first the automobile policy. Concord General's policy gives coverage to the insured for accidents that occur while the insured is operating a "non-owned automobile." The policy defines a "non-owned automobile" as "an automobile or trailer not owned by ... the named insured...." McCarty alleges that the policy is ambiguous because the term "automobile" is undefined in the policy. However, the term "owned automobile" is defined as "a private passenger, farm or utility automobile" or "a trailer" owned by the named insured. It is both logical and reasonable to conclude that the interpretation of the word "automobile" in the policy is synonymous with the definition of "owned automobile," minus the incident of ownership.

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2 cases
  • Union Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Hatch
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of New Hampshire
    • October 26, 1993
    ..."not force an ambiguity where none is apparent merely to resolve coverage in favor of the insured." Concord Gen. Mut. Ins. Co. v. McCarty, 135 N.H. 316, 319, 604 A.2d 573, 575 (1992) (quoting Cutter v. Maine Bonding & Casualty Co., 133 N.H. 569, 576, 579 A.2d 804, 808 (1990)). Instead, the ......
  • Pawtucket Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hartford Ins. Co.
    • United States
    • New Hampshire Supreme Court
    • December 24, 2001
    ...the contracting parties is possible with regard to the meaning or application of the policy's terms. Concord Gen. Mut. Ins. Co. v. McCarty , 135 N.H. 316, 318, 604 A.2d 573 (1992).II We turn first to whether the Hartford policy affords any coverage to the May 1997 accident. Hartford argues ......

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