Conde-Shenery v. Rodick
| Decision Date | 28 August 2020 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL NO: 3:18-CV-02338 |
| Parties | AQUILES CONDE-SHENERY, Plaintiff, v. DETECTIVE DAVID RODICK, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
(Chief Magistrate Judge Schwab)
The remaining claim in this case is a malicious prosecution claim by the plaintiff Aquiles Conde-Shenery. Both the defendants and Conde-Shenery have filed motions for summary judgment. Because there was probable cause for the charges against Conde-Shenery, his malicious prosecution claim fails. Thus, we will grant the defendants' motion for summary judgment and deny Conde-Shenery's motion for summary judgment.
Conde-Shenery began this action by filing a complaint on December 7, 2018. After we granted his motion to amend/correct his complaint, he filed an amended complaint on March 15, 2019. The amended complaint names as defendants Hazleton City/Borough ("Hazleton City") and detective David Rodick. Conde-Shenery presents claims based on his arrest and prosecution for the robbery of a bakery. Although Conde-Shenery spend some time in prison on the charges regarding the robbery, the charges were eventually dropped.
As a result of a motion to dismiss filed by the defendants, all of Conde-Shenery's claims were dismissed except a malicious prosecution claim against the defendants. The defendants then filed an answer, and the parties engaged in discovery.
An amended case management order set a deadline of February 12, 2020, for dispositive motions. On February 12, 2020, the defendants file a motion for summary judgment. On March 5, 2020, Conde-Shenery filed his own motion for summary judgment.1 Although Conde-Shenery's motion for summary judgmentwas not timely filed, given that he is proceeding pro se and that the defendants have not been prejudiced by his brief delay in filing the motion, we will address Conde-Shenery's motion on the merits rather than dismissing it as untimely. Both the defendants' motion for summary judgment and Conde-Shenery's motion for summary judgment have been fully briefed.
Because we conclude that there was probable cause for the charges against Conde-Shenery, we will grant the defendants' motion for summary judgment and deny Conde-Shenery's motion for summary judgment.
The parties move for summary judgment under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that "[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "Through summary adjudication the court may dispose of those claims that do not present a 'genuine dispute as to any material fact' and for which a jury trial would be an empty and unnecessary formality." Goudy-Bachman v. U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Services, 811 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1091 (M.D. Pa. 2011) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).
The moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). With respect to an issue on which the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof, the moving party may discharge that burden by "'showing'—that is, pointing out to the district court—that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Id. at 325.
Once the moving party has met its burden, the nonmoving party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleading; rather, the nonmoving party must show a genuine dispute by "citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials" or "showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence . . . of a genuine dispute." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). If the nonmoving party "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden at trial," summary judgment is appropriate. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
Summary judgment is also appropriate if the nonmoving party provides merely colorable, conclusory, or speculative evidence. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). There must be more than a scintilla of evidence supporting the nonmoving party and more than some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Id. at 252. "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no 'genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
The substantive law identifies which facts are material, and "[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A dispute about a material fact is genuine only if there is enough evidence to allow a reasonable factfinder to return a verdict for the non-moving party. Id. at 248-49. When "faced with a summary judgment motion, the court must view the facts 'in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.'" N.A.A.C.P. v. N. Hudson Reg'l Fire & Rescue, 665 F.3d 464, 475 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007)).
At the summary judgment stage, the judge's function is not to weigh the evidence or to determine the truth of the matter; rather it is to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. The proper inquiry ofthe court "is the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is the need for a trial—whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Id. at 250.
Summary judgment is warranted, after adequate time for discovery, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. "Under such circumstances, 'there can be no genuine issue as to any material fact, since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.'" Anderson v. Consol. Rail Corp., 297 F.3d 242, 247 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). "[S]ummary judgment is essentially 'put up or shut up' time for the non-moving party: the non-moving party must rebut the motion with facts in the record and cannot rest solely on assertions made in the pleadings, legal memoranda, or oral argument." Berckeley Inv. Group, Ltd. v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 201 (3d Cir. 2006).
Further, a party that moves for summary judgment on an issue for which he bears the ultimate burden of proof faces a difficult road. United States v. Donovan, 661 F.3d 174, 185 (3d Cir. 2011). "[I]t is inappropriate to grant summary judgment in favor of a moving party who bears the burden of proof at trial unless areasonable juror would be compelled to find its way on the facts needed to rule in its favor on the law." El v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 479 F.3d 232, 238 (3d Cir. 2007) (footnote omitted). A party who has the burden of proof must persuade the factfinder that his propositions of fact are true, and "if there is a chance that a reasonable factfinder would not accept a moving party's necessary propositions of fact, pre-trial judgment cannot be granted." Id. "Specious objections will not, of course, defeat a motion for summary judgment, but real questions about credibility, gaps in the evidence, and doubts as to the sufficiency of the movant's proof, will." Id.
"Courts are permitted to resolve cross-motions for summary judgment concurrently." UHS of Delaware, Inc. v. United Health Servs., Inc., 227 F. Supp. 3d 381, 390 (M.D. Pa. 2016). But "[w]hen doing so, the court is bound to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party with respect to each motion." Id.
Local Rule 56.1 requires a party moving for summary judgment to file "a separate, short and concise statement of the material facts, in numbered paragraphs, as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue to betried." M.D. Pa. L.R. 56.1. The Rule, in turn, requires the non-moving party to file "a separate, short and concise statement of the material facts, responding to the numbered paragraphs set forth in the statement required [by the moving party], as to which it is contended that there exists a genuine issue to be tried." Id. The "[s]tatements of material facts in support of, or in opposition to, a motion shall include references to the parts of the record that support the statements," and "[a]ll material facts set forth in the statement required to be served by the moving party will be deemed admitted unless controverted by the statement required to be served by the opposing party." Id.
Here, the defendants filed a statement of material facts in support of their motion for summary judgment, and Conde-Shenery filed a response to that statement of material facts. See docs. 42, 49. In his response, Conde-Shenery purports to deny many of the facts set forth by the defendants. See doc. 49. He does not, however, point to evidence to support his denials. Id. Rather, Conde-Shenery responds to many of the facts set forth by the defendants merely by asserting that the defendants have set forth their version of the facts and by asserting that the defendants must prove the facts by convincing evidence at trial. Id. But as ...
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