Conditioner Leasing Corp. v. Sternmor Realty Corp.

Decision Date13 January 1966
Citation266 N.Y.S.2d 801,17 N.Y.2d 1,213 N.E.2d 884
Parties, 213 N.E.2d 884 CONDITIONER LEASING CORP., Respondent, v. STERNMOR REALTY CORP., Appellant, et al., Defendants.
CourtNew York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Joseph Greenberg, Murray L. Gilman and Isidore A. Seltzer, New York City, for appellant.

Burton M. Fine, Robert L. Tofel and Meyer Maltz, New York City, for respondent.

VAN VOORHIS, Judge.

Regardless of whether appellant be deemed to have assumed the lessee's obligations under this lease of air-conditioning equipment, the cases hold that having taken possession of the leased property under the circumstances disclosed by the record, appellant became at least an assignee, and, therefore, liable for payment of the accelerated balance of rent without assumption of the lease (Gillette Bros. v. Aristocrat Rest., 239 N.Y. 87, 145 N.E. 748; Frank v. New York, L. E. & W. R. R. Co., 122 N.Y. 197, 25 N.E. 332; Mann v. Ferdinand Munch Brewery, 225 N.Y. 189, 121 N.E. 746; General Meter Serv. Corp. v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 182 Misc. 184, 48 N.Y.S.2d 721, affd. 267 App.Div. 992, 48 N.Y.S.2d 455; Tel-Hotel Corp. v. Lexnott Corp., 205 Misc. 576, 124 N.Y.S.2d 159). In this instance, to the knowledge of appellant at the time when it acquired this apartment house and took possession of the air- conditioning equipment leased from respondent, the rental for the balance of the term of the lease had already become due and payable. Consequently, by insisting upon retention of possession of this leased equipment, appellant became in law an assignee of the lease and thereby bound to payment of the rent accrued for the balance of the term. There was no illegality in the acceleration clause whereby the rent for the balance of the term became due prior to appellant's entry into possession (Belnord Realty Co. v. Levison, 204 App.Div. 415, 198 N.Y.S. 184).

The order appealed from should be affirmed, with costs.

KEATING, Judge (dissenting).

The decision of the majority seems to me to reach an inequitable result. It is not mandated by the prior decisions of this court.

Under the terms of a contract to lease 125 air-conditioning units at a stipulated monthly rental for a period of five years, appellant's predecessor in interest agreed to an acceleration clause making the entire term balance due and payable upon any monthly default after notice and demand. Default occurred for June and July, 1964, and the then outstanding balance of $29,397.42 was declared due and payable. Thereafter, on July 15, 1964, the appellant purchased the premises in which the air-conditioning units were located without assuming the leasing agreement in question. Upon plaintiff's demand that appellant pay the balance due, appellant refused and suggested that the units be removed.

Shortly thereafter, however, the Brooklyn Savings Bank which held the first mortgage on the property got wind of the transaction and served a notice on appellant that it would treat their removal as a default under the terms of the mortgage to which the lease was subordinated. Thereupon, appellant, caught in this bind, denied plaintiff access to the premises to remove the equipment. On these facts, the majority would give the plaintiff summary judgment for the full accelerated balance due under the lease.

It is nowhere suggested that defendant either explicitly or merely by purchase of the real estate assumed the obligations of his grantor under the lease of personalty. (Langel v. Betz, 250 N.Y. 159, 164 N.E. 890.) Defendant's liability, it at all, is based upon its refusal to relinquish possession of the air-conditioning units and upon its own continuing use of them. (Gillette Bros. v. Aristocrat Rest., 239 N.Y. 87, 145 N.E. 748; Frank v. New York, L. E. & W. R. R. Co., 122 N.Y. 197, 215, 25 N.E. 332, 336; Title Guar. & Trust Co. v. 457 Schenectady Ave., 260 N.Y. 119, 183 N.E. 198, 86 A.L.R. 347; Tel-Hotel Corp. v. Lexnott Corp., 205 Misc. 576, 583, 124 N.Y.S.2d 159, 165.)

The rule was succinctly stated in Frank (supra, 122 N.Y. p. 219, 25 N.E. p. 337): 'Where a person other than the lessee is shown to be in possession of leasehold premises, the law presumes that the lease has been assigned to him * * * It does not, however, presume that the assignee entered into any express covenant to pay rent, so as to make himself liable through privity of contract, or otherwise than through privity of estate.'

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    • 15 Octubre 1984
    ...States Mgt. Corp. v. Pioneer Auto Parks, 46 N.Y.2d 573, 577, 415 N.Y.S.2d 800, 389 N.E.2d 113; Conditioner Leasing Corp. v. Sternmor Realty Corp., 17 N.Y.2d 1, 266 N.Y.S.2d 801, 213 N.E.2d 884; see Mandel, The Preparation of Commercial Agreements p. 57). It is only "in rare cases" that the ......
  • Fifty States Management Corp. v. Pioneer Auto Parks, Inc.
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    ...721, 725, 237 N.E.2d 868, 871, mot. for rearg. den. 22 N.Y.2d 827, 292 N.Y.S.2d 919, Conditioner Leasing Corp. v. Sternmor Realty Corp., 17 N.Y.2d 1, 4, 266 N.Y.S.2d 801, 802, 213 N.E.2d 884, 885; 5 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (5th ed.), § 439; Rasch, New York Landlord and Tenant (2d ed.)......
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    ...Prop. Owners' Assn. v. Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank, 278 N.Y. 248, 254-255, 15 N.E.2d 793). Conditioner Leasing Corp. v. Sternmor Realty Corp. (17 N.Y.2d 1, 266 N.Y.S.2d 801, 213 N.E.2d 884), on which Special Term relied, is factually distinguishable. There the grantor entered into a co......
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