Condo. Ass'n Of Commonwealth Plaza v. The City Of Chicago
| Decision Date | 05 March 2010 |
| Docket Number | 09-0306.,No. 08-2318,08-2318 |
| Citation | 924 N.E.2d 596,399 Ill.App.3d 32,338 Ill.Dec. 390 |
| Parties | CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION OF COMMONWEALTH PLAZA, an Illinois Not-For-Profit Corporation; Suhail Al Chalabi; Virginia M. Harding; and Darren Moss, Plaintiffs-Appellants,v.The CITY OF CHICAGO, a Municipal Corporation; The Chicago Plan Commission of the City of Chicago; Lori T. Healey, Commissioner, Department of Planning and Development; Resurrection Health Care, an Illinois Not-For-Profit Corporation; and Saint Joseph Hospital, an Illinois Not-For-Profit Corporation; Defendants-Appellees.Condominium Association of Commonwealth Plaza, an Illinois Not-For-Profit Corporation; Suhail Al Chalabi; Virginia M. Harding; and Darren Moss, Plaintiffs-Appellants,v.The Chicago Plan Commission of the City of Chicago, Linda Searl, Vice Chairman and Acting Chairman; Lori T. Healey, Secretary, and Commissioner of the Department of Planning and Development; Alderman William J.P. Banks, Alderman Edward M. Burke, Allison S. Davis, Mayor Richard M. Daley, Leon D. Finney, Jr., Doris B. Holleb, Carole Brown, Amrish K. Mahajan, George W. Migala, Alderman Burton F. Natarus, John H. Nelson, Nancy A. Pacher, Alderman Mary Ann Smith, Alderman Bernard L. Stone, Alderman Regner “Ray” Suarez, members of the Commission; Resurrection Health Care, an Illinois Not-For-Profit Corporation; Saint Joseph Hospital, an Illinois Not-For-Profit Corporation; Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
Reuben L. Hedlund, Sarah J. Isaacson, Hedlund & Hanley, LLC, Chicago, IL, for Appellants.
Mara S. Georges, Benna Ruth Solomon, Myriam Zreczny Kasper, and Jennifer Erickson Baak, Chicago, IL, for Appellees, City of Chicago, Chicago Plan Commission, and Lori T. Healey.
William J. McKenna, Benjamin B. Folsom, Foley & Lardner, LLP, Chicago, IL, for Appellees, Resurrection Health Care and St. Joseph Hospital.
This case consists of the consolidation of two appeals from actions brought by the Condominium Association of Commonwealth Plaza (Commonwealth Plaza), Suhail al Chalabi, Virginia M. Harding, and Darren Moss, both alleging improper land usage by Resurrection Health Care (Resurrection) and St. Joseph Hospital (St. Joseph) (collectively, the hospital defendants) in connection with the St. Joseph campus, which is located within 250 feet of plaintiffs' property.
In the first action (docket No. 06 CH 22757), plaintiffs challenged the validity of a zoning amendment passed by the City of Chicago in favor of the hospital defendants. On July 28, 2006, the Chicago city council passed an ordinance changing the zoning classification of certain land around the St. Joseph campus to allow Resurrection to conduct further development of the campus, including the construction of a medical office building, pursuant to an Institutional Planned Development (IPD). Plaintiffs brought suit against the hospital defendants as well as against the city of Chicago, the Chicago Plan Commission (Plan Commission), and Commissioner Lori T. Healey (collectively, the city defendants), seeking a judicial declaration that the IPD ordinance was invalid. Plaintiffs contended that the IPD ordinance was in violation of the Chicago zoning ordinance, in that the proposed office building exceeded the floor plan density limitations of the preexisting zoning classification, the building was not a permitted use of the property, and the IPD ordinance failed to require that construction begin within a certain timeframe to prevent lapse of the rezoning. They also contended that they were denied procedural and substantive due process in connection with the Plan Commission's hearing on the ordinance. The trial court granted summary judgment for defendants on plaintiffs' first contention, finding that lack of conformity with Chicago zoning ordinances would not justify invalidation of the IPD. The court additionally found that there was no just reason to delay enforcement or appeal of its order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (210 Ill.2d R. 304(a)).
In the second action (docket No. 06 CH 12361), plaintiffs sought administrative review of a resolution adopted by the Plan Commission approving an application made by Resurrection under the Lake Michigan and Chicago Lakefront Protection Ordinance (Chicago Municipal Code § 16-4 et seq. (eff. October 24, 1973)) (Lakefront Protection Ordinance) to obtain permission for its planned developments on the St. Joseph campus. Plaintiffs further contended that Resurrection was operating a parking lot in violation of a 1982 special use permit which required that the parking lot be closed and locked after 8 p.m. The trial court dismissed the count concerning the operation of the parking lot and certified it for appeal as well.
Plaintiffs appeal from both of these orders, and their appeals have been consolidated. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Plaintiffs' complaint in the first of the two consolidated cases now before us, which they filed on October 24, 2006, alleged the following facts that are not in dispute. On March 12, 2004, Resurrection filed an application with the city of Chicago, requesting that the city council change the zoning classification of certain specified land around the St. Joseph campus in order to allow for implementation of an IPD on the property. Additionally, on February 18, 2004, Resurrection applied to the Plan Commission for approval of its development plans under the Lakefront Protection Ordinance (Chicago Municipal Code § 16-4 et seq. (eff. October 24, 1973)), which provides that any physical change made to property in Chicago's lakefront district must first be approved by the Plan Commission. In its proposal, Resurrection lists “ long-term master campus planning” as well as a number of short-term projects, including multiple building additions, interior renovations, and 1 1/2 additional floors of parking structure. On May 19, 2006, the Plan Commission held a public hearing on these two applications. The Plan Commission then granted approval to Resurrection's plans under the Lakefront Protection Ordinance and issued a recommendation to the city council committee on zoning that Resurrection's rezoning application be granted. Subsequently, the city council of Chicago voted to enact an ordinance that changed the zoning classification of the subject property in accordance with Resurrection's request and approved the requested IPD.
Plaintiff al Chalabi is the vice president of Commonwealth Plaza, which owns property within 250 feet of the rezoned property, and plaintiffs Harding and Moss are owners of separate properties at that same address. Together with Commonwealth Plaza itself, they brought suit under section 11-13-25 of the Illinois Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/11-13-25 (West 2006)), seeking a judicial declaration that the IPD ordinance passed by the city council was void for two reasons. First, under the heading “The Challenged IPD Ordinances are Void as Arbitrary, Capricious, and Unreasonable,” they contended that the ordinance was invalid because it did not comply with existing zoning ordinances. Specifically, they alleged that the ordinance did not substantially comply with the floor area ratio requirements set out under section 17-8-0901 of the Chicago Zoning Ordinance (Chicago Zoning Ordinance § 17-8-0901 (2006)); that it did not comply with the terms of the Lakefront Protection Ordinance; that it misstates the correct procedure for obtaining approval for subsequent construction proposals; that it did not require construction to begin within the time limits set out in section 17-13-0612 of the Chicago Zoning Ordinance (Chicago Zoning Ordinance § 17-13-0612 (2006)) so as to prevent lapse of the rezoning; and that it “does not provide any valid or reasonable justification” for the rezoning. Second, under the heading “Plaintiffs Were Deprived of Procedural and Substantive Due Process,” plaintiffs contended that they were deprived of their due process rights during the Plan Commission's hearing on May 19, 2006, because their witnesses and representatives were harassed by Commission members and they were not reasonably afforded the right of cross-examination.
Plaintiffs filed a motion styled “Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,” contending that the court should hold the IPD ordinance void as a matter of law based on its alleged noncompliance with the Chicago Zoning Ordinance. Initially, on December 14, 2007 the trial court granted plaintiffs' motion, finding that the IPD “is in violation of the Chicago zoning ordinance and is void.” In particular, it found that the IPD conflicted with the Chicago Zoning Ordinance in three ways: the timetable for construction did not satisfy the lapse provision in section 17-13-0612 of the ordinance, the proposed office building had an unacceptable floor area ratio under section 17-13-0612 of the ordinance, and the proposed office building was not a permitted use of the property under the preexisting zoning classification.
On January 14, 2008, the city and hospital defendants separately filed motions for reconsideration of the trial court's order. They contended that under Landmarks Preservation Council v. City of Chicago, 125 Ill.2d 164, 125 Ill.Dec. 830, 531 N.E.2d 9 (1988), the court lacked authority to invalidate an ordinance passed by a home rule municipality such as the city of Chicago on grounds that the municipality failed to follow its own self-imposed procedures in enacting the ordinance.1 On April 23, 2008, after hearing oral arguments by the parties, the trial court granted defendants' motions for reconsideration. Though it declined to reconsider its previous statutory analysis finding inconsistencies between the IPD and the Chicago Zoning Ordinance, it nevertheless agreed to rehear the case on the...
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