Condon v. Haitsma
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts |
| Writing for the Court | Before QUA; COUNIHAN |
| Citation | 90 N.E.2d 549,325 Mass. 371 |
| Decision Date | 10 February 1950 |
| Parties | CONDON v. HAITSMA. HAITSMA v. CONDON. |
Page 549
v.
HAITSMA.
HAITSMA
v.
CONDON.
Decided Feb. 10, 1950.
J. V. Condon, Boston, pro se.
E. T. Simoneau, Boston, for respondent, appellant.
Before QUA, C. J., and RONAN, WILKINS, SPALDING and COUNIHAN, JJ.
COUNIHAN, Justice.
This is an appeal by the administrator with the will annexed of the estate not already administered of John C. Esther from a decree of the Probate Court dated May 2, 1949, allowing in the sum of $250 a petition of an attorney, filed January 27, 1949, for services rendered and expenses incurred by him in connection with the estate of said Esther. It was stipulated by the parties and found by the judge in his report of material facts that the reasonable value of the services rendered and expenses incurred was $250, and that no services were rendered or expenses incurred subsequent to January 1, 1947. The judge further [325 Mass. 372] found that the petition was brought under G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 215, § 39A, as inserted by St. 1947, c. 536, 1 and was entered,
Page 550
heard and disposed of during the time within which the estate of the deceased was being administered under the jurisdiction of the Probate Court. The issue here for determination is whether or not the claim of the petitioner is barred by G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 260, § 11. 2 The administrator contends that it is so barred and relies on Ginzberg v. Wyman, 272 Mass. 499, 172 N.E. 614, decided before the enactment of § 39A. There it was held that an attorney's claim for services nad expenses under G.L. c. 215, § 39, 3 was barred by G.L. c. 260, § 11.[325 Mass. 373] We are of the opinion that § 39A, which differs in its terms and in its subject matter from § 39, removes this petition from the limitation of time in bringing it and that G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 260, § 11, is no bar, so that Ginzberg v. Wyman, 272 Mass. 499, 172 N.E. 614, is inapplicable. Section 39 omits any reference to the time in which petitions under it may be brought and imposes no restriction upon the class of persons who may bring such petitions so that it might be correctly held that the limitation of c. 260, § 11, would apply to petitions under § 39. Section 39A specifically extends the period in which petitions under it may be brought to any time during the administration of the estate and likewise specifically restricts such petitions to an attorney who has rendered services to the estate or to any person interested in the estate. The court is given greater power in point of time to act under § 39A than in § 39.
The administrator contends there is nothing in § 39A which shows an intention of the Legislature to exclude the matters coming...
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Opinion of the Justices to the House of Representatives
...the proposed bill. See, e.g., International Fidelity Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 387 Mass. 841, 854, 443 N.E.2d 1308 (1983); Condon v. Haitsma, 325 Mass. 371, 373, 90 N.E.2d 549 (1950). [408 Mass. 1223] Therefore, as we interpret the proposed bill, it does not purport on its face to supply titles t......
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Com. v. Lee
...statute is plain, and therefore it is to be interpreted in accordance with the usual and natural meaning of the words. Condon v. Haitsma, 325 Mass. 371, 373, 90 N.E.2d 549 (1950). Commonwealth v. Krasner, 358 Mass. 727, 729, 267 N.E.2d 208 (1971)." Commonwealth v. Thomas, 359 Mass. 386......
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International Fidelity Ins. Co. v. Wilson
...384 Mass. 676, ---, Mass.Adv.Sh. (1981) 2307, 2311, 429 N.E.2d 323. One important source is preexisting law, see Condon v. Haitsma, 325 Mass. 371, 373, 90 N.E.2d 549 (1950), since the Legislature must be presumed to be aware of the decisions of this court. In interpreting the language of § ......
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Green v. Board of Appeals of Provincetown, No. 87-568
...that "it ... must be presumed that the Legislature knew preexisting law and the decisions of [the] court." Condon v. Haitsma, 325 Mass. 371, 373, 90 N.E.2d 549 (1950). Building Inspector of Mansfield v. Curvin, 22 Mass.App.Ct. 401, 405 n. 7, 494 N.E.2d 42 (1986) (construing a prov......
-
Opinion of the Justices to the House of Representatives
...the proposed bill. See, e.g., International Fidelity Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 387 Mass. 841, 854, 443 N.E.2d 1308 (1983); Condon v. Haitsma, 325 Mass. 371, 373, 90 N.E.2d 549 (1950). [408 Mass. 1223] Therefore, as we interpret the proposed bill, it does not purport on its face to supply titles t......
-
Com. v. Lee
...statute is plain, and therefore it is to be interpreted in accordance with the usual and natural meaning of the words. Condon v. Haitsma, 325 Mass. 371, 373, 90 N.E.2d 549 (1950). Commonwealth v. Krasner, 358 Mass. 727, 729, 267 N.E.2d 208 (1971)." Commonwealth v. Thomas, 359 Mass. 386......
-
International Fidelity Ins. Co. v. Wilson
...384 Mass. 676, ---, Mass.Adv.Sh. (1981) 2307, 2311, 429 N.E.2d 323. One important source is preexisting law, see Condon v. Haitsma, 325 Mass. 371, 373, 90 N.E.2d 549 (1950), since the Legislature must be presumed to be aware of the decisions of this court. In interpreting the language of § ......
-
Green v. Board of Appeals of Provincetown, No. 87-568
...that "it ... must be presumed that the Legislature knew preexisting law and the decisions of [the] court." Condon v. Haitsma, 325 Mass. 371, 373, 90 N.E.2d 549 (1950). Building Inspector of Mansfield v. Curvin, 22 Mass.App.Ct. 401, 405 n. 7, 494 N.E.2d 42 (1986) (construing a prov......