Condon v. Reno

• Citation: 972 F.Supp. 977
• Decision Date: 11 September 1997
• Docket Number: C.A. No. 3:96-3476-19.
• Parties: Charlie CONDON, Attorney General for the State of South Carolina; and State of South Carolina, Plaintiffs, and South Carolina Press Association; Virginia Press Association; North Carolina Press Association; West Virginia Press Association; Maryland/Delaware/District of Columbia Press Association; Newspaper Association of America; and American Society of Newspaper Editors, Intervenors, v. Janet RENO, Attorney General of the United States; and United States of America, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina

972 F.Supp. 977

Charlie CONDON, Attorney General for the State of South Carolina; and State of South Carolina, Plaintiffs and South Carolina Press Association; Virginia Press Association; North Carolina Press Association; West Virginia Press Association; Maryland/Delaware/District of Columbia Press Association; Newspaper Association of America; and American Society of Newspaper Editors, Intervenors, v. Janet RENO, Attorney General of the United States; and United States of America, Defendants.

C.A. No. 3:96-3476-19.

United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Columbia Division.

September 11, 1997.

As Amended September 16, 1997.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Charles Molony Condon, Attorney General, Treva G. Ashworth, Deputy Attorney General, Kenneth P. Woodington, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Columbia, SC, for Plaintiffs.

Jay Bender of Baker, Barwick, Ravenel & Bender, L.L.P., Columbia, SC, for Intervenors.

Vincent M. Garvey, and Gail F. Levine, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; and Frances C. Trapp, Assistant United States Attorney, Columbia, SC, for Defendants.

ORDER

SHEDD, District Judge.

In this case of first impression the State of South Carolina and its Attorney General ("the State") challenge the constitutionality of the "Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994" ("the DPPA"), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-25, which regulates the dissemination and use of certain information contained in State motor vehicle records, on the grounds that it violates the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments to the United States Constitution.¹ The State seeks a permanent injunction prohibiting enforcement of the DPPA. The United States of America and its Attorney General ("the United States") have filed a motion to dismiss based on their contention that (1) the Court lacks jurisdiction over these claims because of the justiciability concepts of ripeness and standing and, alternatively, (2) these claims fail on their merits because the DPPA was lawfully enacted pursuant to Congress' powers under both the Commerce Clause and § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In turn, the State has moved for summary judgment in its favor.² After carefully reviewing this matter, the Court concludes that the DPPA is unconstitutional. Accordingly, the Court will deny the United States' motion to dismiss, grant the State's motion for summary judgment, and permanently enjoin the enforcement of he DPPA in the State of South Carolina.³

I

Congress enacted the DPPA in 1994 in an effort to remedy what it perceived to be a problem of national concern: i.e., the active commerce in, and consequent easy availability of, personal information contained in State motor vehicle records. Testimony before Congress established that as many as 34 States allowed easy access to personal information contained in motor vehicle records and that criminals had used such information to locate victims and commit crimes.⁴ Congress also found that many States sell or otherwise permit the use of information contained in motor vehicle records for direct marketing purposes.

The DPPA, which is scheduled to become effective on September 13, 1997, generally prohibits "a State department of motor vehicles, and any officer, employee, or contractor, thereof, [from] knowingly disclos[ing] or otherwise mak[ing] available to any person or entity personal information about any individual obtained by the department in connection with a motor vehicle record." 18 U.S.C. § 2721(a).⁵ The DPPA specifies a list of exceptions when personal information contained in a State motor vehicle record may be obtained and used. See 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b).⁶ Additionally, the DPPA permits State motor vehicle departments to:

[E]stablish and carry out procedures under which the department or its agents, upon receiving a request for personal information that does not fall within one of the exceptions in [§ 2721(b)], may mail a copy of the request to the individual about whom the information was requested, informing such individual of the request, together with a statement to the effect that the information will not be released unless the individual waives such individual's right to privacy under [§ 2721].

18 U.S.C. § 2721(d).⁷ The DPPA also prohibits "any person [from] knowingly ... obtain[ing] or disclos[ing] personal information, from a motor vehicle record, for any use not permitted under section 2721(b)," 18 U.S.C. § 2722(a), and from "mak[ing] false representation to obtain any personal information from an individual's motor vehicle record." 18 U.S.C. § 2722(b).

The DPPA provides that "[a]ny State department of motor vehicles that has a policy or practice of substantial noncompliance ... shall be subject to a civil penalty imposed by the Attorney General of not more than $5,000 a day for each day of substantial noncompliance." 18 U.S.C. § 2723(b). The DPPA also creates a criminal fine, 18 U.S.C. § 2723(a), and a civil cause of action against a "person"⁸ who knowingly violates it. 18 U.S.C. § 2724(a).⁹

South Carolina currently has its own statutory provisions regarding the disclosure and use of its motor vehicle records, and South Carolina's scheme differs significantly from the DPPA. See S.C. Code Ann. §§ 56-3-510 to -540. Under South Carolina law a person who requests information contained in South Carolina's motor vehicle records must submit the request on a form provided by the State Department of Public Safety ("the Department")¹⁰ and must specify, inter alia, his or her name and the reason for the request, and must certify that the information will not be used for the purpose of telephone marketing or solicitation. S.C. Code Ann. § 56-3-510. The Department must retain all requests for motor vehicle record information for five years and must release a copy of all requests relating to a person upon that person's written request. S.C. Code Ann. § 56-3-520. The Department is authorized to charge a fee for releasing motor vehicle record information, and is required to promulgate certain procedural regulations relating to the release of motor vehicle record information, S.C. Code Ann. § 56-3-530, and to implement procedures to ensure that persons may "opt-out" and prohibit the use of motor vehicle record information about them for various commercial activities. S.C. Code Ann. § 56-3-540. The undisputed evidence submitted¹¹ establishes that implementation of the DPPA would impose substantial costs and effort on the part of the Department in order for it to achieve compliance.¹²

II

"Judging the constitutionality of an Act of Congress is properly considered `the gravest and most delicate duty that [a federal court] is called upon to perform.'" Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 319, 105 S.Ct. 3180, 3188, 87 L.Ed.2d 220 (1985) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The DPPA, like all Acts of Congress, "is to be presumed to be a constitutional exercise of legislative power until the contrary is clearly established," Close v. Glenwood Cemetery, 107 U.S. 466, 475, 2 S.Ct. 267, 274, 27 L.Ed. 408 (1883); see also I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 2780-81, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983) ("We begin, of course, with the presumption that the challenged statute is valid"), and whether the Court considers the DPPA to be a wise law is immaterial to the matter at hand. See id. at 944, 103 S.Ct. at 2780-81 (challenged law's "wisdom is not the concern of the courts"). The Court's function is thus limited:

It is sometimes said that the court assumes a power to overrule or control the action of the people's representatives. This is a misconception. The Constitution is the supreme law of the land ordained and established by the people. All legislation must conform to the principles it lays down. When an act of Congress is appropriately challenged in the courts as not conforming to the constitutional mandate, the judicial branch of the government has only one duty; to lay the article of the Constitution which is invoked beside the statute which is challenged and to decide whether the latter squares with the former. All the court does, or can do, is to announce its considered judgment upon the question. The only power it has, if such it may be called, is the power of judgment. [The] court neither approves nor condemns any legislative policy. Its delicate and difficult office is to ascertain and declare whether the legislation is in accordance with, or in contravention of, the provisions of the Constitution; and, having done that, its duty ends.

United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62-63, 56 S.Ct. 312, 318, 80 L.Ed. 477 (1936).¹³

A.

The United States first contends that the DPPA is constitutional because Congress enacted it pursuant to its power to regulate interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause.¹⁴ The State, while not conceding that there is a sufficient commerce nexus present with respect to State motor vehicle records,¹⁵ nonetheless argues that Congress exceeded its constitutional power and infringed on the sovereignty of the States in enacting the DPPA, thereby violating the Tenth Amendment,¹⁶ because Congress has directed the States to enforce the federal policy embodied in the DPPA by regulating their motor vehicle records. The State relies principally upon two opinions of the Supreme Court — New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992), and Printz v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 2365, 138 L.Ed.2d 914 (1997) — both of which struck down congressional legislation. Although the United States maintains that these cases are inapplicable, the Court finds them to be controlling with respect to this issue.¹⁷

(1)

In New York, the State of New York and two of its counties ("New York") challenged, on Tenth Amendment grounds, federal legislation which required, inter alia, the States under certain conditions to take title to low-level radioactive waste generated within their borders. While recognizing that Congress...