Cones v. Ward

• Court: Missouri Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: BLISS
• Citation: Cones v. Ward, 47 Mo. 289 (Mo. 1871)
• Decision Date: 31 January 1871
• Parties: SAMUEL CONES, Appellant, v. EDWARD G. WARD, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF GEORGE E. WARD, DECEASED, Respondent.

47 Mo. 289

SAMUEL CONES, Appellant,

v.EDWARD G. WARD, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF GEORGE E. WARD, DECEASED, Respondent.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

January Term, 1871.

Appeal from Third District Court.

Samuel Cones brought suit in the Circuit Court of Barton county against the administrator of the estate of George E. Ward, deceased, the predecessor of the present administrator, for work and labor done and materials furnished to decedent in his lifetime. The petition is in the usual form. Service was had upon the administratrix, and she appeared and demurred to the petition, assigning as ground that the court had no jurisdiction. The court held that it had no jurisdiction, and entered judgment on the demurrer in favor of the defendant, and dismissed the suit. Cones then sued out a writ of error from the Third District Court, where the judgment of the Circuit Court being affirmed, he brings the case here by appeal.

J. F. Hardin and T. A. Sherwood, with N. Bray, for appellant.

Section 23 of the act of March 19, 1866, declares that “all laws in relation to wills, the administration of estates, guardianship, and curatorship, shall be applicable and in force in the Probate Court hereby established.” By the laws then in force relating to the administration of estates (R. C. 1855, p. 153, § 8; id. 157, § 30), to which express reference is thus made, a claimant was permitted to establish his demand “by the judgment or decree of some court of record in the ordinary cours of proceeding.” And without resorting to the general law respecting the administration of estates, there were no means provided for the allowance of a demand in the Probate Court of Barton county. (Cooley on Const. Lim. 186.) But aside from the declaration in the twenty-third section, the well-settled rule of construction requires that in construing the meaning of an act all statutes in pari materia should be considered in connection with the act in question. (Hayes v. Hansom, 13 N. H. 384; Wakefield v. Phelps, 37 N. H. 295, and cases cited; Board of Commissioners v. Cutler, 6 Iowa, 354; Turner v. Wilton, 36 Ill. 385; Burr v. Dana, 22 Cal. 11; Manuel v. Manuel, 13 Ohio, 458; Desban v. Pickett, 16 La. Ann. 350; Mitchell v. Duncan, 7 Fla. 13; Merrill v. Gorham, 6 Cal. 41; United States v. Collier, 3 Blatchf. C. C. 325; United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch, 358; 9 Bac. Abr. 243 i, and cases cited; Sm. Com. 622, § 470.)

John S. Phelps, for respondent, cited Sess. Acts 1865-6, pp. 85-6.

BLISS, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court.

This suit was instituted in the Barton County Circuit Court, and defendant demurred for want of jurisdiction. The demurrer was sustained, and judgment was rendered for defendant, which was affirmed in the District Court.

Barton is among the counties enumerated in the act of March 19, 1866 (Sess. Acts 1865-6, pp. 83-8), in which Probate Courts were created to which, by section 6, “exclusive jurisdiction” was given “to hear and determine all suits and other proceedings instituted against executors and administrators, upon any demand against the estate of their testator or intestate.” No language can be plainer than that of the statute, and it does not admit of construction. In Gray's Adm'r v....