De Coningh v. City of Daytona Beach, A-269

• Decision Date: 22 May 1958
• Docket Number: No. A-269,A-269
• Citation: 103 So.2d 233
• Parties: Peter C. DE CONINGH, Petitioner, v. CITY OF DAYTONA BEACH, a Municipal Corporation, Respondent.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 233

103 So.2d 233

Peter C. DE CONINGH, Petitioner, v. CITY OF DAYTONA BEACH, a Municipal Corporation, Respondent.

No. A-269.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

May 22, 1958.

Millard B. Conklin, Daytona Beach, for petitioner.

W. Warren Cole, Jr., Daytona Beach, for respondent.

WIGGINTON, Judge.

We are here petitioned for certiorari to review an order of the Circuit Court of Volusia County dismissing petitioner's appeal from three judgments of conviction and sentence entered by the Municipal Court of the City of Daytona Beach.

Petitioner was convicted in the municipal court on separate affidavits charging him with speeding, reckless driving, and disobeying the instruction of a traffic control signal, respectively. Fines were imposed on each conviction and petitioner's driver's license was suspended for a period of thirty days. Appeal was taken to the Circuit Court and the Municipal Court was moved to grant supersedeas and set the conditions and amount of petitioner's bond in accordance with F.S. § 932.52, F.S.A. The trial court's judgments of conviction, and its order granting supersedeas only as to the fines imposed were subsequently affirmed.

Petitioner here asserts error by the appellate circuit court in affirming the municipal court's judgment in that (1) the affidavits failed to charge any offense under the ordinances of the city; (2) the sentence suspending his driver's license in addition to the imposition of a fine was without authority of law; and (3) it was error to grant supersedeas only as to the fines, but to deny it as to that portion of the sentence suspending petitioner's driver's license. We have carefully considered the first two points, but find them to be without merit. Our consideration is therefore confined to petitioner's third point dealing with the trial court's order granting supersedeas only as to a part of the judgment and sentence from which appeal was taken. The appeals herein, having been perfected prior to July 1, 1957, are unaffected by the present Appellate Rules governing criminal appeals.

While we are fully aware of the merit in respondent's contention that the question of the suspension itself has become moot, we nevertheless feel that it is of sufficient importance to warrant consideration.

In its order granting partial supersedeas the municipal court reasoned that 'even on the municipal level admission to bail, after conviction, is not a matter of right but rests in the sound judicial discretion of the trial court.' In support of this position the court cited Section 9 of the Declaration of Rights, Florida Constitution, F.S.A. and F.S. § 903.01 F.S.A. The cited constitutional section provides merely that all persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties except for capital offenses where the proof is evident or the presumption great, and has no application to a defendant's right to bail after the entry of a judgment of conviction. ¹ Section 903.01, F.S., F.S.A., is a general procedural statute, enacted subsequent to F.S. § 932.52, F.S.A., which permits a reasonable discretion by trial courts in the matter of granting supersedeas or bail pending an appeal. Such discretion is to be exercised in accordance with the criteria established by our Supreme Court in Younghans v. State. ² If F.S. § 903.01, F.S.A., is to be given the effect of repealing F.S. § 932.52, F.S.A., then the ruling of the municipal court would be correct. Such, we believe, is not the case.

While it is a 'well settled rule of construction that the last expression of the legislative will is the law in cases of conflicting provisions in the same statute or in different statutes the last in point of time or order of arrangement prevails;' ³ it is equally well established that 'repeals by implication are disfavored and in order to declare that one statute repeals another by implication it must appear that there is positive repugnancy between the two, or that the latter was clearly intended to prescribe the only rule which should govern the case to which it is applicable, or that it revises the subject-matter of the former.' ⁴ Also, 'the legal presumption is that the legislature did not intend to keep really contradictory enactments in the statute book, or to effect so important a measure as the repeal of a law without expressing an intent do do so.' ⁵ Since there appears to be no direct conflict or absolute repugnancy between the two statutes here in question, the specific (F.S. § 932.52, F.S.A.) must be held to control supersedeas on appeal from municipal courts, rather than the general statute (F.S. § 903.01, F.S.A.), which is applicable to trial courts of record. Therefore, the sole remaining question concerns whether the specific statute controlling appeals from the municipal courts of this state vests discretion in such courts as to supersedeas.

Section 932.52, F.S.A., provides that:

'(1) Any person convicted of any offense in any municipal court of this state may appeal from the judgment of such court * * *

'(16) Appellant shall enter into a bond in double amount of the fine and costs assessed or if the judgment be one of...