Conklin v. State
| Decision Date | 25 March 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 14–0764.,14–0764. |
| Citation | 863 N.W.2d 301 (Table) |
| Parties | Kyle CONKLIN and A.C., a minor, by Kyle Conklin, her father, next friend and legal guardian, Applicant–Appellant, v. STATE of Iowa, Respondent–Appellee. |
| Court | Iowa Court of Appeals |
Jack B. Bjornstad of Bjornstad Law Office, Spirit Lake, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Jeffrey S. Thompson, Solicitor General of Iowa, and William R. Pearson, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee State.
Heard by VOGEL, P.J., McDONALD, J., and ZIMMER, S.J.*
Kyle Conklin along with his minor daughter A.C., (hereafter “Conklin”), appeal the district court's grant of the State's motion to dismiss. Conklin asserts there is a private cause of action for a violation of the Iowa Constitution, and the court erred in concluding the Iowa Tort Claims Act (ICTA) did not provide an avenue for relief. He further claims the court improperly found the State, as well as the individual actors, were entitled to immunity.
We decline to judicially imply a remedy for a violation of the Iowa Constitution. Therefore, Conklin cannot bring a private cause of action against the State for alleged violations of the Iowa Constitution. Furthermore, the ICTA does not provide an avenue for relief with regard to his claims. For these reasons we need not address the issue of the State's immunity, and we affirm the district court's order granting the State's motion to dismiss.
This matter is an appeal from the district court's dismissal of Conklin's civil suit against the State of Iowa, which alleged various constitutional violations. The suit stems from a warrant for Conklin's arrest, issued during the child-in-need-of-assistance (CINA) proceedings and the termination of Conklin's parental rights to his four sons.
The children—four boys1 —first came to the attention of the Iowa Department of Human services on June 28, 2010. The State petitioned for an ex parte removal order alleging the children should be removed from the mother's care; however, the children were located at the father's residence in Nebraska. They were removed and placed in foster care in Iowa. They were adjudicated children in need of assistance pursuant to an Iowa juvenile court order filed August 4, 2010.
On October 18, 2010, the State issued an arrest warrant for Conklin, alleging a misdemeanor tampering-with-witness charge relating to a witness in the children's CINA proceedings. The warrant provided “No Bail until seen by Magistrate.” Conklin made several attempts to resolve the bail issue but did not do so until January 9, 2012, one day prior to the termination hearing. On that date, the children's mother picked Conklin up from a bus station in Sioux City, Iowa, and drove him to the Cherokee County jail where he turned himself in. He was released the same day, and the outstanding warrant was resolved. Because of his efforts to resist the warrant and not enter Iowa, Conklin had no physical contact with the children between October 18, 2010, and January 2012.
In an order filed March 27, 2012, the juvenile court terminated Conklin's parental rights to his four sons; with respect to Conklin, it ordered termination pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(e) (2011), given he had not maintained consistent and meaningful contact with the children. The termination order was affirmed by our court, which agreed with the juvenile court that Conklin had not shown reasons that would excuse his absence from the children's lives. See In re G.C., No. 12–0709, 2012 WL 3590182, at *2 (Iowa Ct.App. Aug 22, 2012).2
Conklin filed the petition now at issue on December 17, 2013, alleging that, due to the State's actions in issuing a no-bail warrant during the pendency of the CINA proceeding, Conklin's parental rights were interfered with, then subsequently terminated. The petition stated:
The caption named the State of Iowa as the defendant, and alleged the following claims: (1) violation of the right to bail and access to surety, as guaranteed by article I, section 12 of the Iowa Constitution ; (2) violation of the right to be free from excessive bail, as guaranteed by article I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution and the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution; (3) violation of the right of the natural parent to the care, custody, and management of children and the right to liberty—with respect to Conklin Conklin—and the right to familial association—as to A.C.—as guaranteed by article I, section 1 of the Iowa Constitution and the Fourteenth and Ninth Amendments to the United States Constitution; and (4) violation of the right to be free from unreasonable seizure, with respect to Conklin, as guaranteed by article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
On January 21, 2014, the State filed a motion to dismiss, arguing there was no private cause of action for a violation of either the Federal or the Iowa Constitution. It claimed the Iowa Constitution itself prohibited a private cause of action against the State in the absence of enabling legislation, and furthermore, no legislation had been enacted that would allow such a suit. Thus, the proper avenue to plead Conklin's claims was to assert a cause of action under 42 United States Code section 1983 (2013). It also argued that, in the alternative, the State is entitled to either absolute judicial or absolute quasi-judicial immunity. On appeal, the State further asserts that the ITCA does not operate to waive the immunity.
A hearing was held on March 3, 2014. On April 15, 2014, the district court issued an order granting the State's motion to dismiss. Specifically, it agreed with the State that the ITCA did not waive the State's immunity. Because Conklin's claims were based on the issuance of the arrest warrant and the subsequent prevention of Conklin's ability to see his children, the court concluded no individual could issue or enforce a warrant and therefore no private individual could be sued for a violation of the constitution, unless acting under color of law. Thus, under the requirements of the ITCA, the State could not be sued civilly. The court also concluded the State (and its employees) enjoyed absolute and quasi-judicial immunity for its actions in issuing and enforcing the arrest warrant. Based on these findings, the court concluded no claims could be brought against the State for an asserted violation of the Iowa Constitution.3 Conklin appeals.
We review the district court's ruling on a motion to dismiss for correction of errors at law. Mueller v. Wellmark, Inc., 818 N.W .2d 244, 253 (Iowa 2012). To the extent we are reviewing constitutional claims, our review is de novo. State v. Kurth, 813 N.W.2d 270, 272 (Iowa 2012).
Whether a private cause of action exists for the State's alleged violation of the Iowa Constitution is a matter of first impression for our court.4 We further note this would need to be a judicially implied remedy, given both parties agree there has been no legislation creating a private cause of action.
When there is no express cause of action set forth in a statute, to judicially imply such a cause of action, the court must inquire whether: (1) the plaintiff is a member of the class for whose benefit the statute was enacted; (2) legislative intent, either explicit or implicit, exists to create or deny the remedy; (3) the cause of action is consistent with the underlying purpose of the statute; and (4) the private cause of action would intrude into an area over which the federal or state government holds exclusive jurisdiction. Meinders v. Duncan Cmty. Sch. Dist., 645 N.W.2d 632, 635 (Iowa 2002). Though the Iowa Constitution is not a statute, we nonetheless find these factors persuasive when analyzing whether a private cause of action exists for a violation of our state constitution.
Article XII, section 1 of the Iowa Constitution states in part: “The general assembly shall pass all laws necessary to carry this constitution into effect.” Implicit in this phrasing is that the constitution itself does not create a cause of action for a violation of its terms; rather, the legislature must pass laws in order for a remedy to exist. Consequently, the intent of our constitution is to rely on a legislative remedy rather than an implied judicial remedy for the existence of a private cause of action. Notably, no legislation has been passed providing for such a remedy. Therefore, the text of the constitution itself counsels that we should decline to judicially imply the existence of a private cause of action. See Meinders, 645 N.W.2d at 635–36 ().
Several of our sister states, whose constitutions have similar language to that found in article XII, have also declined to imply a private cause of action for a violation of their state constitutions. See Lewis v. State, 629 N.W.2d 868, 870 (Mich.2001) (); Bandoni v. State, 715 A.2d 580, 595 (R.I.1998) (...
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