Conley v. Aldi
| Decision Date | 23 March 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:18-cv-824 (VAB),3:18-cv-824 (VAB) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
| Parties | JOHN L. CONLEY, Plaintiff, v. JOHN ALDI, et al., Defendants. |
John Conley ("Plaintiff"), currently incarcerated at Carl Robinson Correctional Institution, filed a lawsuit while incarcerated at Corrigan-Radgowski Correctional Institute in Montville, Connecticut, against Security Risk Group Coordinator Aldi ("SRG Coordinator Aldi") and Warden Faucher in their individual and official capacities. Compl., ECF No. 1 (May 16, 2018).
Mr. Conley asserts claims under the Eighth and First Amendments. Mr. Conley has also filed a motion for leave to amend the Complaint to add Lieutenant Tommarrow as a new defendant. Mot. to Amend Compl., ECF No. 12 (May 16, 2019)).
For the reasons set forth below, Mr. Conley's Complaint will be DISMISSED with prejudice in part and without prejudice in part, and his motion for leave to amend the Complaint to add Lieutenant Tommarrow as a new defendant is DENIED as moot.
Mr. Conley's claims for monetary relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Warden Faucher and SRG Coordinator Aldi in their official capacities are DISMISSED with prejudice, and all claims against Defendants for injunctive relief will be DISMISSED with prejudice.
If Mr. Conley chooses to file an amended complaint, he may only allege claims for monetary relief against the Defendants in their individual capacities.
Mr. Conley's claims under the First Amendment against Warden Faucher and SRG Coordinator Aldi are DISMISSED without prejudice.
Mr. Conley's claims under the Eighth Amendment against Warden Faucher and SRG Coordinator Aldi related to hygiene, unsanitary conditions, lack of exercise, and isolation are DISMISSED without prejudice.
On November 2, 2017, Mr. Conley allegedly arrived at the Security Risk Group ("SRG") program at Corrigan Correctional Institution ("Corrigan"). Compl. ¶ 6. Inmates at Corrigan who are assigned to the SRG program are housed in E-Pod Unit or B-Pod Unit. Id. ¶ 8. Mr. Faucher allegedly was the Warden during Mr. Conley's confinement at Corrigan. Id. ¶ 7.
As of February 8, 2018, Mr. Conley allegedly had not been involved in any gang activity, had not received a disciplinary report for over a year, and was scheduled to "graduate" from the phase program on March 28, 2018. Id. ¶ 10. On February 8, 2018, SRG Coordinator Aldi allegedly regressed Mr. Conley to a prior phase of the SRG program because he had been stockpiling his mental health medications. Id. ¶ 9. Mr. Conley claims that he allegedly was unaware that he could not stockpile his medications because upon his arrival at Corrigan, he did not receive a disciplinary report for bringing medications that he had stockpiled with him. Id. ¶¶ 9-10. Mr. Conley's phase regression allegedly meant that he was required to complete an additional six months in the SRG program. Id.
Mr. Conley claims that beginning on February 12, 2018, he experienced various conditions that deprived him of basic human needs. Id. ¶ 11. On that date, the toilet in his cell allegedly had a severe leak. Id. There allegedly was no cold water in his cell for a period of weeks. Id. As of May 9, 2018, the date of the filing of the Complaint, the sink in Mr. Conley's cell was allegedly clogged and the toilet reeked of urine and mold. Id. Prison officials allegedly issued several work orders to fix the toilet, but the maintenance department neglected to make the necessary repairs. Id. The leaking toilet allegedly caused potentially slippery conditions in Mr. Conley's cell. Id.
From February 22, 2018, until February 27, 2018 and from March 2, 2018, until March 23, 2018, prison officials allegedly restricted Mr. Conley's opportunities to exercise or recreate outside of his cell. Id. ¶¶ 13, 19. He contends that the time periods when he was permitted to exercise varied from day to day and at times there were gaps of twenty-nine to thirty hours between exercise periods. Id. ¶ 19. During one four-day period and during one three-day period, Mr. Conley alleges he was unable to "practice" personal hygiene. Id. ¶¶ 3, 19.
Before his confinement in the SRG program at Corrigan, Mr. Conley allegedly suffered from a traumatic brain injury and post-traumatic stress disorder. Id. ¶ 22. For twelve days during April 2018 and five days during May 2018, prison officials allegedly isolated Mr. Conley in his cell. Id. ¶¶ 3, 19. The isolated nature of his confinement in the SRG program allegedly "reactivated" his post-traumatic stress disorder and caused him to experience anxiety attacks, explosive anger disorders, racing thoughts, and migraine headaches. Id. ¶ 22. Medical staff at Corrigan allegedly prescribed medications to treat Mr. Conley's symptoms, and medical and mental health conditions. Id. He also met with a counselor twice a week for therapy sessions. Id.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), district courts must review prisoners' civil complaints against governmental actors and sua sponte "dismiss . . . any portion of [a] complaint [that] is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted," or that "seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also Liner v. Goord, 196 F.3d 132, 134 n.1 (2d Cir. 1999) (); Tapia-Ortiz v. Winter, 185 F.3d 8, 11 (2d Cir. 1999) .
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a plaintiff plead only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), to provide the defendant "fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests," Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
A plaintiff's "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level" and assert a cause of action with enough heft to show entitlement to relief and "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570. A claim is facially plausible if "the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require "detailed factual allegations," a complaint must offer more than "labels and conclusions," "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action," or "naked assertion[s]" devoid of "further factual enhancement." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-57. Plausibility at the pleading stage is nonetheless distinct from probability, and "a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of [the claim] is improbable, and . . . recovery is very remote and unlikely." Id. at 556 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Complaints filed by pro se plaintiffs, however, "must be construed liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest." Sykes v. Bank of Am., 723 F.3d 399, 403 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F. 3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F. 3d 90, 101-02 (2d Cir. 2010) ().
Mr. Conley claims that Warden Faucher and SRG Coordinator Aldi subjected him to unsanitary conditions, periods of isolation, and limited opportunities to exercise or recreate, during his confinement at Corrigan from February 2018 to May 2018. He seeks declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief.
The Court construes Mr. Conley's claims as claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a "remedy to parties deprived of constitutional rights, privileges and immunities by an official's abuse of his position." Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 27 (1991) (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961)).
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that the defendant, a person acting under color of state law, deprived him of a federally protected right. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 930 (1982).
Mr. Conley has sued Warden Faucher and SRG Coordinator Aldi in their official and individual capacities for declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief under § 1983.
In suits for monetary relief, "neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are 'persons' under § 1983." Hafer, 502 U.S. at 27 (quoting Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)). In suits for injunctive relief against a state agency under § 1983, a plaintiff must "follow the requirement, established in Ex Parte Young," to "name as defendant a state official rather than the state or a state agency directly." Santiago v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. Servs., 945 F.2d 25, 32 (2d Cir. 1991) () (citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)); see also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 756 (1999) (); Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 360 (2006) ().
A plaintiff may bring a claim for monetary damages against state officers in their personal capacities under § 1983. Hafer, 502 U.S. at 27 (citing Will, 491 U.S. at...
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