Conley v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Authority

• Decision Date: 15 June 1989
• Citation: 539 N.E.2d 1024,405 Mass. 168
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 1024

539 N.E.2d 1024

405 Mass. 168

Deborah CONLEY v. MASSACHUSETTS BAY TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY et al.¹ Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Suffolk.

Argued Feb. 7, 1989.

Decided June 15, 1989.

Bruce N. Cameron, Springfield, Virginia, for plaintiff.

Douglas Taylor, Washington, D.C. of the District of Columbia, (John F. McMahon, Boston, with him), for Local 589, Amalgamated Transit Union.

Gregory C. Flynn, Waltham, (Carol A. Buckley, Boston, with him), for Massachusetts Bay Transp. Authority.

Before WILKINS, LIACOS, ABRAMS, NOLAN and LYNCH, JJ.

LYNCH, Justice.

On January 4, 1985, the plaintiff, Deborah Conley, filed a complaint for declaratory relief and damages against her employer, the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA), and Local 589, Amalgamated Transit Union (union), the union which represented the collective bargaining unit of which she was a member, and against various officials of both the MBTA and the union. The complaint alleged that the defendants' actions in indefinitely suspending the plaintiff violated 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 (1982), and G.L. c. 12, § 11I (1986 ed.), and sought declaratory and injunctive relief, back pay and damages. ²

In November, 1986, a judge of the Superior Court denied the union's motion for summary judgment ruling that exhaustion of grievance procedures outlined in G.L. c. 161A, § 19, was not a prerequisite to an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and that material facts remained in dispute. In February, 1988, the plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment against the MBTA. The MBTA filed a cross motion for summary judgment arguing that (1) it did not have an obligation to provide its employees with an agency fee option or to ensure that the union complied with constitutional provisions governing the payment of agency service fees, and (2) the plaintiff had failed to exhaust her statutory remedies under G.L. c. 161A. The union filed a memorandum in opposition to the plaintiff's motion, asserting that material facts remained in dispute. A second judge, without making any rulings and without declaring the rights of the parties, granted the MBTA's motion, denied the plaintiff's motion, and dismissed the complaint against the union and its officials. ³ The plaintiff appealed, and we granted her application for direct appellate review. We reverse the judgment against the plaintiff and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

On appeal, the plaintiff challenges the entry of summary judgment against her, and argues that the defendants' actions in indefinitely suspending her violated her rights secured by both the Federal and State Constitutions. Specifically, the plaintiff argues that (1) the defendants cannot constitutionally require her to become a formal member of the union and (2) the defendants violated her constitutional rights by suspending her for not joining the union without putting in place constitutionally mandated procedures for protecting the rights of nonunion employees. ⁴

From the plaintiff's deposition and the parties' affidavits, the following facts appear. In June, 1983, the plaintiff went to work for the MBTA as a part-time surface operator, a position within the collective bargaining unit represented by the union. The collective bargaining agreement required all members of the collective bargaining unit to "become and remain members of the [union]," and "[a]ny employee who fails to maintain membership in the [union] to the extent of paying regular membership dues and assessments shall not be retained in the employ of the Authority...."

When the plaintiff began her employment at the MBTA, she believed that the union was hostile to part-time employees. ⁵ At the end of her probationary period, the union notified the plaintiff of her obligation to join the union and requested that she pay the initiation fee and dues. In response to her questions regarding that notice and the union's membership requirement, an employee of the MBTA's labor relations office directed the plaintiff to discuss the matter with the union.

The plaintiff then went to the union office and was told that she must become a member of the union. She received negative responses to her questions regarding whether, as an alternative to membership, she could pay union fees to a charity or start her own union for part-time employees.

While at the union office, the plaintiff requested a copy of the collective bargaining agreement. She was told that she "would not be allowed to even read the contract ... unless [she] signed a union card." While at the union office the plaintiff tendered a check for $100, one-third of the initiation fee required for union membership, and signed (1) a dues deduction authorization form, (2) a voluntary deduction form for political contributions, and (3) a pledge to pay dues and abide by union rules. ⁶ She signed these forms only to receive a copy of the collective bargaining agreement and understood that she would not become a formal member until she paid the full initiation fee. The plaintiff never became a formal union member.

In April, 1984, the union notified the plaintiff that she was in violation of the agreement's membership requirement and that her name had been sent to the MBTA for discharge. In May she sent a letter to the union's president objecting to becoming a formal union member; to paying the same fees as union members; and to the union's use of members' dues for political and ideological activities unrelated to collective bargaining.

In June, 1984, the MBTA informed the plaintiff that, if she did not become a member of the union, she would be discharged. At an interview pursuant to MBTA procedures, the plaintiff told an MBTA supervisor that there were "a lot of reasons [why she did not] want to join the union," one of which was the inadequacy of the union's representation of part-time employees.

It is undisputed that prior to her discharge the MBTA had received a letter from the plaintiff's counsel stating that she objected to being a formal union member. It is also undisputed that the MBTA forwarded a copy of this letter and a copy of the plaintiff's prior letter to the union president, asking for the union's position regarding the plaintiff's objection to formal union membership. ⁷ In July, 1984, before receiving the union's response, the MBTA indefinitely suspended the plaintiff. The plaintiff has yet to be discharged, but remains indefinitely suspended.

While the union president disputes that he ever received the plaintiff's letter which voiced her objections to formal union membership, the union does not dispute that it ultimately received notice of the plaintiff's objections via the MBTA inquiry. However, the union argues that this notice, which came after the plaintiff had been suspended, was too late to be effective. The union and the MBTA also argue that, since the plaintiff's deposition reveals that her only objection to becoming a member of the union was that she believed the union was hostile to part-time employees, her objection was not a constitutionally protected objection which would entitle the plaintiff to forgo formal membership and only pay a fair share or agency fee alternative. ⁸

1. Standard for summary judgment. When presented with a motion for summary judgment, the judge must consider "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any" to determine whether summary judgment is appropriate. Mass.R.Civ.P. 56(c), 365 Mass. 824 (1974). Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue of any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Id. In ruling on the motion the judge should consider the evidence "with an indulgence in the [opposing party's] favor." Anthony's Pier Four, Inc. v. Crandall Dry Dock Eng'rs, Inc., 396 Mass. 818, 822, 489 N.E.2d 172 (1986), quoting National Ass'n of Gov't Employees, Inc. v. Central Broadcasting Corp., 379 Mass. 220, 231, 396 N.E.2d 996 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 935 (1980). Also, rule 56 allows summary judgment to be entered against the moving party in appropriate circumstances. Mass.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

a. Summary judgment in favor of the union. Circumstances can exist that would warrant the granting of summary judgment on reconsideration by one judge after summary judgment had been denied by another. See King v. Globe Newspaper Co., 400 Mass. 705, 707-708, 512 N.E.2d 241 (1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 940, 108 S.Ct. 1121, 1227, 99 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988). However, it was not appropriate in this case where reconsideration had not been requested, the issues had not been reargued and no notice had been given that the union's motion for summary judgment was being reconsidered. This is especially so where there were no rulings, and where the party benefiting from summary judgment conceded that a dispute of material fact existed.

In addition, material facts remain in dispute. The disputed matters include (1) whether the union ever received the plaintiff's May 17, 1984, letter in which she objected to joining the union, and (2) the content of the conversation that occurred at the union office. The union alleges that, during her visit to the union office, the plaintiff signed union documents because she wanted to become a union member and did not voice any objection to formal membership. At her deposition the plaintiff testified that she signed the union documents only because she understood it to be the only way to obtain a copy of the collective bargaining agreement, and also that she questioned the union official regarding alternatives to union membership. In these circumstances, where material facts are clearly in dispute and the parties' intentions are crucial to a determination of liability, summary judgment is inappropriate. ⁹ Quincy Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Abernathy, 393 Mass. 81, 86, 469 N.E.2d 797 (1984). On...