Conley v. State

Decision Date23 March 2022
Docket NumberSupreme Court Case No. 21S-PC-256
Parties Andrew CONLEY, Appellant-Petitioner, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Respondent.
CourtIndiana Supreme Court

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: Deidre R. Eltzroth, Steven H. Schutte, Deputy Public Defenders, Amy E. Karozos, Public Defender of Indiana, Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR AMICUS CURIAE, INDIANA PUBLIC DEFENDER COUNCIL: Bernice A. Corley, Indiana Public Defender Council, Indianapolis, Indiana, Joel C. Wieneke, Indiana Public Defender Council, Wieneke Law Office, LLC, Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: Theodore E. Rokita, Attorney General of Indiana, Ellen H. Meilaender, Supervising Deputy Attorney, General Indianapolis, Indiana

On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 19A-PC-3085

David, Justice.

Seventeen-year-old Andrew Conley was sentenced to life in prison without parole (LWOP) for the brutal murder of his ten-year old brother. We affirmed his sentence on direct appeal. At issue now is whether trial counsel's failure to present evidence of Conley's age and juvenile brain development, to call or examine certain witnesses and expert witnesses, to challenge the State's mental health experts, and failure to conduct further investigation constituted ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing. We hold Conley did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel and affirm the post-conviction court.

Facts and Procedural History

As this Court explained in Conley v. State , 972 N.E.2d 864, 869–70 (Ind. 2012) (" Conley I "):

Conley was [a] seventeen-and-a-half-year-old when he murdered his ten-year-old brother, Conner. The murder took place between 8:30 p.m. and 10:00 p.m. His mother and adoptive father were at work that evening until the early morning hours. As was not uncommon, Conley was responsible for watching Conner that evening. Conley's mother told him he would have to find a babysitter for Conner if he wished to go out with his friends.
Conley wanted to go out that evening, so Conley drove Conner to their grandmother's house in Rising Sun, Indiana, but she was not home. He next asked his uncle to watch Conner but was told no. After they returned home, Conley and Conner began wrestling.
At some point, Conley got behind his brother and choked him in a headlock with his arm until Conner passed out. Conner was bleeding from the nose and mouth. Conner was still breathing. Conley drug Conner into the kitchen, retrieved a pair of gloves, and continued to choke Conner from the front, around his throat. Conley choked Conner for approximately twenty minutes total.
Conley next got a plastic bag from a drawer in the kitchen and placed it over Conner's head. Conley used black electrical tape to secure the bag by wrapping the tape around Conner's head. Conner was still alive. In fact, Conner's last words were "Andrew stop."
Conley then drug Conner's body to the steps that lead to the basement, drug him down the steps by his feet, across the floor, and outside the home. Conley slammed Conner's head on the concrete multiple times to ensure Conner was dead and then placed his body in the trunk of his car. Conley cleaned himself up and put on new clothes. He put the bloody clothes in his closet and hid the bloody gloves in a chair.
Conley next drove to his girlfriend's house. While there they watched a movie, and he gave her a "promise ring." Conley's girlfriend testified at the sentencing hearing that Conley was "[h]appier than I'd seen him in a long time." Conley spent two hours at his girlfriend's house, while Conner's body remained in the trunk of the car. After leaving his girlfriend's house, Conley drove to an area behind the Rising Sun Middle School. Conley decided to drag Conner's body into the woods and covered the body with sticks and vegetation.
Conley returned home during the early morning hours on Sunday the 29th when no one was home. He cleaned up the blood in the house. When his father returned home around 2:30 a.m., Conley was acting normal. Conley said that Conner was at his grandmother's house and Conley also asked his father for some condoms.
Conley's mother arrived home around 5:45 a.m., and Conley and his mother had popcorn, watched a movie together, and cracked jokes back and forth. His mother fell asleep. On two occasions that early morning, Conley went into his father's bedroom and stood over him with a knife. Conley said he had the intent to kill his father, but he decided not to.
Later that same Sunday, Conley watched football with his father. Following football, Conley left home and drove to the park in Rising Sun where Conner's body had been discarded, but he never went to the actual location. Instead, Conley spoke to two friends and told [them] that he had killed Conner. Thereafter, around 8:00 p.m., Conley drove his car to the Rising Sun Police Department and voluntarily reported he "accidentally killed his brother" or that he "believed" he had killed his brother.
The police contacted Conley's parents, and after consulting with his parents and waiving his right to counsel, Conley confessed to intentionally killing his ten-year-old brother. Conley was charged with murder and ultimately pleaded guilty, without a plea agreement. The penalty phase of the trial was conducted from September 15 to 21. Following the sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Conley to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.

This Court affirmed Conley's sentence on direct appeal. Thereafter, Conley sought post-conviction relief, alleging, among other things, that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing. Our Court of Appeals reversed the post-conviction court on this issue (affirming on the other issues), finding that Conley received ineffective assistance of counsel. Conley v. State , 164 N.E.3d 787 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), vacated. The State sought transfer, which we granted, vacating the Court of Appeals’ opinion. See Ind. App. R. 58(A).

Standard of Review

Because Conley failed to carry his burden of proving his claims by a preponderance of evidence in the post-conviction court, he appeals from a negative judgment. As such, Conley must show that "the evidence as a whole leads unerringly and unmistakably to a decision opposite that reached by the postconviction court." Timberlake v. State , 753 N.E.2d 591, 597 (Ind. 2001) (citation omitted). For factual matters, we examine only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences that support the postconviction court's determination and do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Taylor v. State , 717 N.E.2d 90, 92 (Ind. 1999). The post-conviction court's decision will be disturbed "only if the evidence is without conflict and leads only to a conclusion contrary to the result of the postconviction court." Timberlake , 753 N.E.2d at 597. When a defendant fails to meet this "rigorous standard of review," this Court will affirm the post-conviction court's denial of relief. Wilson v. State , 157 N.E.3d 1163, 1170 (Ind. 2020) (cleaned up).

Discussion and Decision

Conley alleges that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel at sentencing. That is, he raises several evidentiary issues, and argues counsel was deficient in the handling of records, lay witnesses, and expert witnesses.1 Although not raised by Conley, our Court of Appeals sua sponte found that counsel was ineffective for not presenting evidence of juvenile brain development under United States Supreme Court precedent and found that there was cumulative prejudice necessitating a new sentencing hearing. For the reasons discussed herein, we hold that Conley did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing and accordingly, we affirm the post-conviction court in full.

Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are evaluated under the well-known, two-part test articulated in Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). To prevail, Conley must show that: (1) counsel's performance was deficient based on prevailing professional norms; and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Ward v. State , 969 N.E.2d 46, 51 (Ind. 2012) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052 ). "Failure to satisfy either prong will cause the claim to fail." French v. State , 778 N.E.2d 816, 824 (Ind. 2002).

In analyzing whether counsel's performance was deficient, the Court first asks whether, " ‘considering all the circumstances,’ counsel's actions were ‘reasonable[ ] under prevailing professional norms.’ " Wilkes v. State , 984 N.E.2d 1236, 1240 (Ind. 2013) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 ). Counsel is afforded considerable discretion in choosing strategy and tactics, and judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance is highly deferential. Id.

There is a strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment. Stevens v. State , 770 N.E.2d 739, 746 (Ind. 2002). Counsel is afforded considerable discretion in choosing strategy and tactics and these decisions are entitled to deferential review. Id. at 746–47 (citing Strickland , 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052 ). Furthermore, isolated mistakes, poor strategy, inexperience, and instances of bad judgment do not necessarily render representation ineffective. Id. at 747 (citations omitted).

To demonstrate prejudice, "the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052.

I. Counsel was not ineffective for failing to present evidence on Conley's age and juvenile brain development.

Our Court of Appeals reversed the post-conviction court on a ground Conley did not raise on appeal. It found counsel was deficient...

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