Conn v. State

• Decision Date: 16 January 1979
• Docket Number: No. 15,15
• Citation: 41 Md.App. 238,396 A.2d 323
• Parties: John Francis CONN v. STATE of Maryland.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Page 238

41 Md.App. 238

396 A.2d 323

John Francis CONN v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 15.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

Jan. 16, 1979.

Bradford C. Peabody, Asst. Public Defender, with whom was Alan H. Murrell, Public Defender, on the brief, for appellant.

Alexander L. Cummings, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom were Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen., Sandra A. O'Connor, State's Atty. for Baltimore County and Gary P. Jordan, Asst. State's Atty. for Baltimore County, on the brief, for appellee.

Argued before GILBERT, C. J., and MOYLAN and DAVIDSON, JJ.

DAVIDSON, Judge.

On 10 July 1977, John Francis Conn, the appellant, was charged with murder. He entered pleas of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. On 16 December 1977, in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, a jury found that the appellant was sane at the time of the commission of the crime and convicted him of murder in the first degree. We shall reverse.

The evidence shows that on 10 July 1977, at approximately 7:30 p. m., Iris Appel was found murdered. Her father saw the appellant running from the scene of the crime. At 8:00 p. m. that same night, the appellant was arrested by two Baltimore County police officers.

At trial one of the arresting officers, a lay witness, expressed an opinion, based upon his observations of the appellant shortly after the commission of the crime, that the appellant was not mentally ill. The appellant objected and moved to strike. The record shows that the following exchange took place:

"Q. (State's Attorney) Can you describe to the ladies and gentlemen of the Jury what the Defendant Mr. Conn's demeanor was, how he was acting? What was his appearance?

"A. (Arresting Officer) He was obviously crying. He was somewhat grief-stricken. He seemed to be fit of mind. There wasn't any situation where he seemed to be suffering from any kind of illness. It seemed to be primarily grief.

"MR. GEDE: (Defendant's Attorney) I object.

"A. He was aware of what was going on when we talked to him.

"MR. GEDE: I object and ask that it be stricken, that he didn't seem to have any illness.

"THE COURT: That he observed. Overruled. Continue."

The only other testimony relating to the appellant's sanity was offered by psychiatrists, qualified as expert witnesses. Two psychiatrists on the staff of Clifton T. Perkins Hospital testified for the State. One said that at the time he examined him, the appellant did not have a "paranoid or explosive personality," had no "symptoms of chronic undifferentiated schizophrenia," was not "psychotic," had no "organic brain damage," and had "good contact with reality." The other, in response to questions, stated that the appellant was always coherent, did not exhibit either definite psychotic symptoms or reactions, or bizarre or delusional thinking, and did not suffer from any focal disturbance, epilepsy or brain pathology. He offered an opinion upon the ultimate question of the appellant's sanity at the time of the commission of the crime. His opinion was based upon his examination and available background material, including police reports which indicated that shortly after the commission of the crime the appellant showed signs of remorse. In addition he relied upon witnesses' statements and psychiatric, psychological and other non-psychiatric medical reports. He concluded that the appellant "never suffered from a mental disorder." He explained that this was the unanimous opinion of the three psychiatrists on the staff of Clifton T. Perkins Hospital who had participated in the evaluation of the appellant.

One psychiatrist testified for the defense. He stated that at the time of the crime the appellant "was a chronic undifferentiated schizophrenic, and he was psychotic." He concluded by offering his opinion that at the time of the crime the appellant was suffering from a mental disorder or illness and was insane under Maryland law.

The narrow question here presented is whether, in a criminal case in which insanity is asserted as a defense, it is error to admit a lay witness' opinion on the ultimate question of an accused's mental illness or sanity. Although this Court has previously indicated, in dicta, that the opinion of a lay witness on the ultimate question of an accused's sanity is inadmissible, it has never so held. ¹

In Maryland the principles governing the admissibility of opinions offered by lay witnesses on the question of a person's mental condition were first considered in civil cases. ² In Townshend v. Townshend, ³ a case involving the validity of a will, the Court of Appeals considered the question whether a person other than an attesting witness could offer an opinion that a testator had the mental capacity to execute a will. There the Court said:

"It is stated by the elementary writers upon this subject, that the attesting witnesses are considered in the law as placed round the testator, to protect him against fraud in the execution of his will, and to judge of his capacity; that the testator is intrusted to their care; and it is their duty to inform themselves of his capacity, before they attest his will; and it is on this ground, that these witnesses are permitted to testify as to the opinions they formed of the testator's capacity, at the time of executing his will. And it is equally true, as a general proposition, that the mere naked opinions of other persons, not occupying the position of medical men, are inadmissible in reference to the mental capacity of a testator, whose will may be controverted.

"But the testimony proposed to be submitted by the caveatees, to the jury as illustrative of the mental condition of the testator, was not the mere naked, isolated, unsupported opinion of the witness. The impression made upon the mind of the witness by the conduct, manner, bearing, conversation, appearance, and acts of the testator in various business transactions, for a long series of years, is not mere opinion, it is knowledge, and strictly analogous to the cases of personal identity, and hand-writing, which are constantly established in the law Courts, by the opinion and judgment of persons who have enjoyed the opportunity of observing the person, or hand-writing sought to (be) identified, or proved.

"We think, therefore, that the caveatees were entitled to the opinion of this witness, with respect to the capacity of the testator, in connection with the facts upon which it was founded, and that the County Court were wrong in rejecting this testimony." ⁴

Thus the Court established that, under appropriate circumstances, the opinion of a lay witness on the question of a person's sanity is admissible in a civil case.

The question whether the same rule was applicable in a criminal case in which sanity was in issue was considered in Watts v. State. ⁵ There an accused murderer asserted that the trial court erred when it refused to admit into evidence lay opinions regarding his sanity. The Court agreed, stating:

"Ever since the case of Townshend v. Townshend, 7 Gill, 10, it has been settled law in this State, in cases where mental sanity is in issue, that a nonexpert witness may give his opinion in evidence, in connection with his personal observation of the facts upon which it is founded, and as derived from them. It must appear that the witness had adequate opportunity for forming a rational conclusion, since the mere opinions of witnesses are entitled to little or no regard unless they are founded on facts which warrant them in the opinion of the jury. 'If the reasons are frivolous or inconclusive, the opinions of the witness are worth nothing.' The weight to be given to such an opinion is for the jury, subject of course to the qualification that where the facts stated are such as would not, in the judgment of the Court, enable any rational mind to draw any conclusion therefrom, the opinion proposed to be given may be properly excluded. In Conn. Ins. Co. v. Lathrop, 111 U.S. 612, 620, 4 S.Ct. 533, 28 L.Ed. 536, Mr. Justice Harlan said, 'Where a cause fairly depends upon the effect or weight of testimony, it is one for the consideration and determination of the jury. * * * It should never be withdrawn from them unless the testimony be of such a conclusive character as to compel the Court, in the exercise of a sound legal discretion, to set aside a verdict returned in opposition to it * * *. The natural and ordinary operations of the human intellect, and the appearance and conduct of insane persons as contrasted with the appearance and conduct of persons of sound mind, are more or less understood and recognized by every one of ordinary intelligence who comes in contact with his species. The extent to (which) such opinions should control or influence the Court or jury, must depend upon the intelligence of the witness as manifested by his examination, and upon his opportunities to ascertain all the circumstances that should properly affect any conclusion reached.' " ⁶

Thus the Court established that, under appropriate circumstances, the opinion of a lay witness on the question of a person's sanity is admissible in criminal as well as in civil cases. ⁷

Although lay opinions regarding sanity continue to be admissible in civil cases, ⁸ recent legislative enactments now make it inappropriate to apply the same rule in a criminal case in which an accused has asserted an insanity defense. The first of these enactments involved a change in the test of insanity in a criminal action. When Watts was decided the test of insanity, earlier adopted by the Court of Appeals, was whether the offender, at the time of the commission of the offense, could distinguish between right and wrong and understand the nature and consequences of his act. ⁹ That standard remained the test ¹⁰ until the Legislature altered it by the enactment of Annotated Code of Maryland, article 59, section 9(a) (1968) effective 1 June 1967, which established a test based upon the Model Penal Code section 4.01(1) (1962). ...