State v. Conn

• Decision Date: 07 December 1979
• Docket Number: No. 19,19
• Citation: 286 Md. 406,408 A.2d 700
• Parties: STATE of Maryland v. John Francis CONN.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 406

286 Md. 406

408 A.2d 700

STATE of Maryland v. John Francis CONN.

No. 19.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Dec. 7, 1979.

Kathleen M. Sweeney, Asst. Atty. Gen., Baltimore (Stephen H. Sachs, Atty. Gen., Baltimore, on the brief), for appellant.

Bradford C. Peabody, Asst. Public Defender, Baltimore (Alan H. Murrell, Public Defender, Baltimore, on the brief), for appellee.

Argued before MURPHY, C. J., and SMITH, DIGGES, ELDRIDGE, ORTH and COLE, JJ.

SMITH, Judge.

We hold that in this case the Court of Special Appeals erred in concluding that the testimony here in controversy constituted an opinion by a lay witness on the ultimate issue of sanity. Consequently, we shall reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals in Conn v. State, 41 Md.App. 238, 396 A.2d 323 (1979).

We here conclude that under proper circumstances when an accused claims under Maryland Code (1957, 1972 Repl.Vol.) Art. 59, § 25(a) that he is not guilty by reason of insanity at the time of the commission of an alleged crime, a layman, based upon his observations, may express his conclusion or impression that an individual seemed to be mentally normal or abnormal. This is so because as it was put in Carter v. United States, 102 U.S.App.D.C. 227, 237, 252 F.2d 608, 618 (D.C. Cir. 1957), "Normal conduct and abnormal conduct are matters of common knowledge, and so lay persons may conclude from observation that certain observed conduct is abnormal." Such testimony is relevant to the issue raised by the defense of the accused under § 25(a). Accordingly, the Court of Special Appeals erred when it said that "the rule in Watts (v. State 99 Md. 30, 57 A. 542 (1904),) is no longer viable." (Id.41 Md.App. at 249, 396 A.2d at 31.)

For the purpose of the case here the facts are not in dispute. John Francis Conn was 16 and the victim 19 years old at the time of her death. They were co-workers who apparently had found pleasure in each other's company for some months prior to the incident in question. Conn was admitted to the victim's home at approximately 7:30 p. m. on the evening of her death. Shortly thereafter screams were heard from the decedent's bedroom. The victim ultimately was found lying in a pool of blood. She had been fatally stabbed 19 times. Conn was taken into custody at approximately 8:00 p. m. on the same night and charged with murder. He entered pleas of not guilty by reason of insanity and not guilty. A Baltimore County jury convicted him of murder in the first degree.

At trial the following witnesses were called in the following order: the victim's mother, her sister, her father, the police officer who went to the victim's home at approximately 7:50 p. m. in response to directions received by radio, the medical examiner, a second police officer who arrived at the victim's home at approximately 8:00 p. m., and Officer Joseph Thompson. The second officer identified Conn as one of the people he saw when he entered the victim's residence. He testified that at that time Conn was crying, having his face in a towel. The record then reflects:

Q What, if anything, did the Defendant say when you entered the home?

A When the Defendant saw I was a police officer he stood up in the chair and said: "Is she dead?"

Q Now, Officer, would you describe for the ladies and gentlemen of the Jury what the appearance and the actions of the Defendant were when you saw him that evening?

A Yes, sir. The Defendant was, as I mentioned, was crying. He was sitting there with his face into a towel and was crying.

Q What did you do after the Defendant made the statement to you?

A At that point I walked up the remaining stairs and took the subject into custody, handcuffed him.

The officer was then asked if he transferred custody to anyone else. He replied that he did, to Officer Joseph Thompson.

The next witness was Officer Thompson. He said that he reached the victim's home at approximately 8:00 p. m. His purpose was "in search of a possible stabbing suspect (who) was supposedly at that location." On arrival he saw Conn in custody. After Officer Thompson's identification of Conn as the person then on trial, the record is:

Q Can you describe to the ladies and gentlemen of the Jury what the Defendant Mr. Conn's demeanor was, how he was acting? What was his appearance?

A He was obviously crying. He was somewhat griefstricken. He seemed to be fit of mind. There wasn't any situation where he seemed to be suffering from any kind of illness. It seemed to be primarily grief.

MR. GEDE: I object.

A He was aware of what was going on when we talked to him.

MR. GEDE: I object and ask that it be stricken, that he didn't seem to have any illness.

THE COURT: That he observed. Overruled. Continue.

Officer Thompson then testified as to his search of Conn, and that while he was "patt(ing Conn) down (Conn) advised: 'I am not armed, I have thrown the weapon away, or I have thrown the knife away.' " The Court of Special Appeals said that this testimony by Officer Thompson was "that the appellant was not mentally ill." Id. 41 Md.App. at 239, 396 A.2d at 324.

The State framed the following three questions to us in its request for the writ of certiorari:

1. Did the Court of Special Appeals erroneously conclude that the testimony of police officer Thompson constituted an opinion by a lay witness on an ultimate issue regarding the sanity of Respondent?

2. Assuming, Arguendo, that the testimony of Officer Thompson was inadmissible, was its admission under the circumstances of this case harmless error?

3. Did the Court of Special Appeals err in holding that the decision of this Honorable Court in Watts v. State, 99 Md. 30, 57 A. 542 (1904) is no longer viable?

I The Watts Rule

We shall first consider the viability of the rule enunciated in Watts and the circumstances under which a lay opinion as to mental capacity may be expressed.

In Watts the trial court had sustained the objection of the State to the testimony of three fellow policemen of the accused. Judge Pearce said for the Court:

Ever since the case of Townshend v. Townshend, 7 Gill, 10 ((1848)), it has been settled law in this State, in cases where mental sanity is in issue, that a non-expert witness may give his opinion in evidence, in connection with his personal observation of the facts upon which it is founded, and as derived from them. It must appear that the witness had adequate opportunity for forming a rational conclusion, since the mere opinions of witnesses are entitled to little or no regard unless they are founded on facts which warrant them in the opinion of the jury. "If the reasons are frivolous or inconclusive, the opinions of the witness are worth nothing." The weight to be given to such an opinion is for the jury, subject of course to the qualification that where the facts stated are such as would not, in the judgment of the Court, enable any rational mind to draw any conclusion therefrom, the opinion proposed to be given may be properly excluded. In Conn. Ins. Co. v. Lathrop, 111 U.S. (612,) 620, 4 S.Ct. 533, 28 L.Ed 536 (1884), Mr. Justice Harlan said, "Where a cause fairly depends upon the effect or weight of testimony, it is one for the consideration and determination of the jury. * * * It should never be withdrawn from them unless the testimony be of such a conclusive character as to compel the Court, in the exercise of a sound legal discretion, to set aside a verdict returned in opposition to it * * *. The natural and ordinary operations of the human intellect, and the appearance and conduct of insane persons as contrasted with the appearance and conduct of persons of sound mind, are more or less understood and recognized by every one of ordinary intelligence who comes in contact with his species. The extent to which such opinions should control or influence the Court or jury, must depend upon the intelligence of the witness as manifested by his examination, and upon his opportunities to ascertain all the circumstances that should properly affect any conclusion reached." (Id. 99 Md. at 36-37, 57 A. at 545.)

The Court then proceeded to consider the testimony of each of those individuals. One officer testified he had known the accused for 15 years during which time they were in frequent communication with each other; that the accused was a man of eccentric ways; that he would tell how if he had money he would turn it and make millions; that he had many imaginary ideas; that he would frequently "fuss with his wife"; and that sometimes when he met that particular witness he would greet him by his first name and at other times used "Mr." and his last name. The Court said it was of the opinion that these facts were "not such as that any rational conclusion as to the mental soundness of the accused c(ould) be deduced from them." However, it held that the trial court had erred in denying the admission of the testimony of two other officers. The point is illustrated by reference to what the Court said as to one of them:

Officer May testified that he had seen much of the defendant since August, 1900, and met him four or five times a day till he was dismissed from the force, and had frequently noticed his strange and peculiar conversation; that whenever they would meet, and would enter into any conversation, Watts would leave him and start up the road, and then call to him that he would be back in ten minutes; that when he returned witness would ask him what took him off, and he would reply he just wanted to go up the road; that he could not talk continuously upon any subject; that he held his head down while talking, and sometimes you could see his eyes rolling; and that he had seen him while on duty playing with the children, crawling on his hands and knees, "bending the crab," and sometimes "sitting down in the sand pile, patting sand and water, the same as the children." (Id. at 38, 57 A. at 545.)

No reversible error was found in Baldwin v. State, 226 Md. 409, 174 A.2d 57...