Connecticut Bank and Trust Co. v. Coffin

• Decision Date: 22 August 1989
• Docket Number: Nos. 13390,s. 13390
• Citation: 212 Conn. 678,563 A.2d 1323
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: CONNECTICUT BANK AND TRUST COMPANY v. Dexter D. COFFIN IV et al. CONNECTICUT BANK AND TRUST COMPANY et al. v. Dexter D. COFFIN, Jr., et al. to 13400.

Page 1323

563 A.2d 1323

212 Conn. 678

CONNECTICUT BANK AND TRUST COMPANY v. Dexter D. COFFIN IV et al.

CONNECTICUT BANK AND TRUST COMPANY et al. v. Dexter D. COFFIN, Jr., et al.

Nos. 13390 to 13400.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued June 13, 1989.

Decided Aug. 22, 1989.

Joseph F. Skelley, Jr., Hartford, with whom, on the briefs, were Mary Margaret Pitt, Stamford, C. Thomas Furniss, James F. Aspell, Thomas F. Parker and Brenda M. Bergeron, Hartford, for defendants Dexter D. Coffin, Jr., Mary K. Coffin, Windsor D. Coffin, Dexter D. Coffin IV and Gavin T. Coffin.

Joseph B. Burns, with whom were Austin J. McGuigan and, on the briefs, Bruce G. MacDermid, Hartford, for defendants Thomas M. Fogerty Coffin, Tavis H. Fogerty Coffin, Ryan K. Fogerty Coffin and Sean Van Schoonmaker Coffin.

Robert A. Horowitz, with whom was Mark S. Gregory, for defendants Neil Elliott, Bruce W. Elliott, Merrilee Elliott O'Neil, R. Brian Elliott, Glenaan Mary Elliott and Walter J. Elliott IV.

John L. Bonee III, with whom was Jacob D. Zeldes, Frank J. Silvestri, Jr., David P. Atkins, David P. Friedman and, on the briefs, Elga R. Wasserman and Glenn E. Coe, for defendants Kathryn Blaire Greenhalgh, Joyce C. Coffin, Martha E. Coffin Thomas, Laura E. Coffin, Edward M. Coffin and Dexter D. Coffin III.

Stephen B. Goddard, with whom was Cynthia A. Blair, for defendant Lance J. Coffin.

George C. Hastings, with whom, on the brief, was Timothy H. Fisher, for plaintiff Connecticut Bank and Trust Co.

Jacob D. Zeldes and Paul J. McQuillan, with whom were Frank J. Silvestri, Jr., David P. Atkins, David P. Friedman, and, on the briefs, Glenn E. Coe, Elga R. Wasserman, John L. Bonee III, Joseph F. Skelley, Jr., and Mary Margaret Pitt, for defendants Joyce C. Coffin, Dexter D. Coffin III, Edward M. Coffin, Martha E. Coffin Thomas, Laura E. Coffin, Kathryn Blaire Greenhalgh, Lance J. Coffin, Sean Van Schoonmaker Coffin, Gavin T. Coffin, Dexter D. Coffin IV, Sean J. Thomas, Jr., unknown and unborn issue of Dexter D. Coffin, Jr., Dexter D. Coffin, Jr., Mary K. Coffin and Windsor D. Coffin.

George C. Hastings, with whom, on the brief, were Timothy S. Fisher and Linda J. McDowell for plaintiffs Connecticut Bank and Trust Co. and James E. Morgan, Jr.

Before PETERS, C.J., and SHEA, CALLAHAN, GLASS and MENT, JJ.

SHEA, Associate Justice.

In the first action the Connecticut Bank and Trust Company, N.A. (CBT) sought a declaratory judgment to determine which of the defendants are "issue" of Dexter D. Coffin, Jr., and thus beneficiaries of an inter vivos trust created by his father, Dexter D. Coffin, by an indenture dated April 30, 1957, ¹ of which the plaintiff bank is a cotrustee. The trial court held that the term "issue" should be construed to include all the blood descendants of Dexter D. Coffin, Jr., but not those persons adopted by him or his descendants. ² Accordingly, blood descendants of Dexter D. Coffin, Jr., who have been adopted out of the Coffin family were declared to be beneficiaries unless expressly excluded by the trust instrument.

In the second action, which was consolidated for trial with the first, the plaintiff CBT and its cotrustee, James E. Morgan, Jr., sought approval of the trust account for the period April 30, 1957, to May 2, 1984. They also requested approval of an agreement modifying the terms of the trust and settling various claims relating thereto that are the subject of litigation in the federal district court for this state. ³ The trial court approved the account but rejected the settlement agreement because the trust modifications were deemed not to be in the best interests of minor and unascertained beneficiaries nor consistent with the intentions of the settlor.

Appeals have been taken from both judgments by various beneficiaries and claimed beneficiaries.

I

The first case presents the issues of whether the trial court erred: (1) in construing the term "issue" as used in the trust indenture to include only the blood descendants of Dexter D. Coffin, Jr., thus excluding those adopted by him or his descendants; (2) in construing a provision of the trust stating that the term issue "is not intended to include adopted persons and their issue" not to apply to Kathryn Blaire Greenhalgh, a child of Dexter D. Coffin III, after she had been adopted by her mother's second husband; and (3) in denying an allowance for attorney's fees incurred by claimed beneficiaries who had intervened in the proceedings.

Most of the facts relied upon by the trial court are contained in a written stipulation of the parties. By an instrument dated April 30, 1957, Dexter D. Coffin, who died in 1966, created a trust with CBT and James M. Carlisle as trustees for the benefit of "[his] son, Dexter D. Coffin, Jr. the grantor's daughter-in-law, Joyce C. Coffin or issue of the grantor's son Dexter D. Coffin, Jr." The trust contains spendthrift provisions authorizing the trustees to apply "so much of the net income or principal of the trust fund as [CBT] shall in its absolute and sole discretion determine to or to the use of such one or more of the [designated beneficiaries] as may from time to time be living, as the corporate trustee shall in its absolute and sole discretion from time to time select, without requirement upon the corporate trustee to maintain any equality in the amounts paid to or applied to the use of the person or persons so selected by it." ⁴ See General Statutes § 52-231. Upon termination of the trust, the principal and any undistributed income are to be delivered "in equal shares to the issue of the grantor's son Dexter D. Coffin, Jr. then living, per stirpes, or in default of such issue to the issue of the grantor's son David L. Coffin then living, per stirpes, or in default thereof" to the grantor's heirs in accordance with the intestacy laws of this state, "excluding, however, the grantor's grandson Robert L. Olmstead (formerly Robert Linwood Coffin) and any issue of said grandson." ⁵

Another paragraph of the trust indenture provides as follows: "SECOND: Wherever in this trust indenture reference is made to the 'issue' of the grantor's son Dexter D. Coffin, Jr., the term 'issue' shall be deemed not to include the grantor's said grandson Robert L. Olmstead or any issue of said grandson, and no part of the net income or principal of the trust fund shall be paid to the grantor's said grandson Robert L. Olmstead or to any issue of said grandson. The term 'issue' as used in this trust indenture is not intended to include adopted persons and their issue."

A

Those defendants who have been adopted into the Coffin family by Dexter D. Coffin, Jr., or by his genetic descendants attack the conclusion of the trial court that the term "issue" as used in the trust instrument does not include any person adopted into the family. They advance four arguments: (1) since the term "adopted persons" is used in the sentence following the specific declaration that the term "issue" shall not include the settlor's grandson, Robert L. Olmstead, who had been adopted out of the Coffin family, the exclusion of "adopted persons" must refer to those who, like Robert, have been adopted out of and not into the family; (2) since the settlor has provided for a distribution of the corpus of the trust to his heirs at law upon termination of the trust and in default of surviving issue of his sons, he must have contemplated that in some circumstances adopted-in persons, who are entitled to inherit equally with natural children, may become beneficiaries of the trust; (3) the inclusion as a named beneficiary of Joyce K. Coffin, the wife of Dexter D. Coffin, Jr., at the time the trust was created, indicates that the settlor was not concerned exclusively with the welfare of his blood descendants; and (4) it is a well established rule of construction that "heirs at law are not to be disinherited unless the intent to do so is clear and strong." Ansonia National Bank v. Kunkel, 105 Conn. 744, 752, 136 A. 588 (1927).

Before addressing these arguments, it is well to consider whether persons adopted into the Coffin family would have been included in the class of "issue" of Dexter D. Coffin, Jr., apart from the provision excluding "adopted persons" from that class. "In construing the word 'issue,' we have often noted that, in its primary meaning, 'issue' connotes lineal relationship by blood." Schapira v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 204 Conn. 450, 455, 528 A.2d 367 (1987). The word "will be so construed unless it clearly appears that [it was] used in a more extended sense." Connecticut Bank & Trust Co. v. Hills, 157 Conn. 375, 378, 254 A.2d 453 (1969). " '[I]ssue' ... will not be construed to include adopted children unless the circumstances clearly indicate that the testator so intended." Bankers Trust Co. v. Pearson, 140 Conn. 332, 356, 99 A.2d 224 (1953).

These rules of construction create certain presumptions of intent based upon "considerations which experience has shown are apt to be in the minds of [settlors], to be given such weight in a particular case as its circumstances justify; they are merely aids to construction which cannot prevail over an intent fairly deducible from the terms of the [trust] read in the light of the surrounding circumstances." Trowbridge v. Trowbridge, 127 Conn. 469, 474, 17 A.2d 517 (1941). "We have held on several occasions that language ordinarily indicating a preference for ancestral blood can be shown to include adoptees." Schapira v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., supra, 204 Conn. at 456, 528 A.2d 367.

In 1959, the legislature enacted the predecessor to General Statutes § 45-64a (4), ⁶ which reversed the common law presumption that adopted children are not included in the term "issue," but restricted the application of this statute to any will or trust instrument executed after October 1, 1959. 1959 Public Acts, No. 106. The statute provides that in documents executed after that date the word "issue," as well as...