Connecticut Chiropody Soc., Inc. v. Murray

• Decision Date: 07 July 1959
• Citation: 146 Conn. 613,153 A.2d 412
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: CONNECTICUT CHIROPODY SOCIETY, INC., et al. v. Alan E. MURRAY et al. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut

Page 412

153 A.2d 412

146 Conn. 613

CONNECTICUT CHIROPODY SOCIETY, INC., et al. v. Alan E. MURRAY et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

July 7, 1959.

Charles G. Albom, New Haven, with whom, on the brief, were Leon M. Gabriel, West Haven, and Edward M. Reynolds, New Haven, for appellants (plaintiffs).

Gregory C. Willis, Bridgeport, with whom, on the brief, were Allan R. Johnson, Bridgeport, and Howard W. Benedict, Fairfield, for appellees (defendants).

Before DALY, C. J., and BALDWIN, KING, MURPHY and MELLITZ, JJ.

KING, Associate Justice.

The named plaintiff is a corporation without capital stock, and all its members, seven of whom joined as individual parties plaintiff, are duly licensed active practitioners of chiropody under what is now chapter 375 of the Revision of 1958. Since there have been no statutory changes material to the decision of this case since its institution, for convenience statutory references will be made to that revision. The basic claim of the plaintiffs is that the defendant Murray Space Shoe Corporation and four individual defendants who are stockholders or agents of that corporation are carrying on a business at least some of the activities of which constitute the practice of chiropody. The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment defining the activities complained of as the practice of chiropody and injunctive relief against their continuance. See cases such as Sage-Allen Co. v. Wheeler, 119 Conn. 667, 673, 179 A. 195, 98 A.L.R. 897. The defendants make no claim that they are licensed chiropodists or entitled to practice chiropody. Thus the real issue is whether their activities constitute the practice of chiropody within the definition of § 20-50 of the 1958 Revision. ¹ The court found that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that the activities of the defendants complained of constituted the practice of chiropody, and from this judgment the plaintiffs have appealed. Besides denying the allegations of the complaint, the defendants, in a special defense, alleged that their activities came expressly within the first proviso of § 20-65. ²

The material facts as we view the case are simple. The defendant corporation, hereinafter referred to as the defendant, manufactured and sold custom shoes. A plaster cast of each of the customer's feet would be made; from this a model or last of each foot would be obtained; and a shoe would then be fashioned over that model or last. The result, at least theoretically, would be an almost perfectly fitted custom shoe for each foot. The defendant required that the model either be made in its own plant or by a designated representative, usually a chiropodist, who had had instructions in the making of models. These instructions were given by the defendant in a booklet which it issued. The basic claim of the defendant was that it was nothing more nor less than a maker of custom shoes; that these shoes were custom fitted over models which were cast as hereinbefore described, instead of over wooden lasts made from minute measurements of the customer's feet, the usual method of making custom shoes; and that the shoes have no palliative or corrective effect except to the extent that such an effect would necessarily flow from a custom shoe of practically perfect fit.

Since the defendant made lasts which in effect were models of the feet, at first blush it would appear, as the plaintiffs claim, that it was engaged in the practice of chiropody as defined in § 20-50. If, however, the statute were given such a construction it would, if constitutional, prohibit all true custom shoemaking unless the shoemaker employed a chiropodist who was able to, and would, make a last of each of a customer's feet. Whether a custom last is made of wood from precise measurements of the customer's feet or from an impression of each foot taken under the defendant's process, such a last would necessarily be a model of a foot within the literal meaning of the phrase in the statute. In Connecticut, the practice of chiropody was open to anyone prior to the enactment of chapter 229 of the Public Acts of 1915. While § 1 of that chapter required a license for the practice of chiropody after January 1, 1916, § 6 provided that no examination would be required for the licensing of any person actually engaged in the practice of chiropody prior to January 1, 1915. The practice of chiropody by unlicensed persons was prohibited by § 14 of the 1915 act; by § 2970 of the Revision of 1918; and by § 2880 of the Revision of 1930. But no attempt was made to define the vital phrase, practice of chiropody, until the enactment of § 1188c of the 1935 Cumulative Supplement. That section is similar in its language to the present § 20-50 except that 'plaster' preceded and modified the word 'models' and the clause 'as taught and practiced in the schools of chiropody recognized by the examining board' modified the phrase respecting treatment. This limiting language was omitted in § 1023e of the 1939 Cumulative Supplement, which was in essence the same as the present statute.

A statute which restricts the conduct of an occupation which was lawful at common law should be construed with reasonable strictness. People v. Dr. Scholl's Foot Comfort Shops, Inc., 277 N.Y. 151, 13 N.E.2d 750; Hart v. Board of Examiners of Embalmers, 129 Conn. 128, 132, 26 A.2d 780. 'In the interpretation of the language of a legislative enactment, the question is as to the expressed intention, that is, the intention of the legislative body 'as found from the words employed to make it manifest." Park...