Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Lanahan

• Decision Date: 27 June 1940
• Docket Number: No. 8265.,8265.
• Citation: 112 F.2d 375
• Parties: CONNECTICUT MUT. LIFE INS. CO. v. LANAHAN.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

112 F.2d 375 (1940)

CONNECTICUT MUT. LIFE INS. CO. v. LANAHAN.

No. 8265.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

June 4, 1940.

Mandate Amended June 27, 1940.

W. J. Shaw and W. J. Weipert, both of Detroit, Mich. (Miller, Canfield, Paddock & Stone, of Detroit, Mich., on the brief), for appellant.

James R. Thomas, of Detroit, Mich. (James R. Thomas and Marshall F. Troester, both of Detroit, Mich., on the brief), for appellee.

Before HICKS, SIMONS, and ARANT, Circuit Judges.

Mandate Amended June 27, 1940. See 113 F.2d 935.

SIMONS, Circuit Judge.

The appellant, an insurer, challenges a judgment entered against it upon a jury's verdict of liability under an insurance policy issued on the life of William C. Lanahan, deceased husband of the appellee. The defense was suicide, the defendant counting upon a provision of the policy that if the insured died by self-destruction within two years from the date of its issuance, it was liable only for the premiums paid. The bases for the challenge are alleged errors of the court in its instructions to the jury, exclusion of evidence, and failure to direct a verdict for the appellant on the ground that the only reasonable hypothesis for the death of the insured was self-destruction.

The deceased had succumbed to poisoning from illuminating gas. We find no error in the court's withdrawal from the evidence of a coroner's certificate and that of a physician reciting that suicide was the cause of death. While the certificates had been furnished to the appellant, in pursuance of appellee's obligation to file proofs of death, they were accompanied by a letter denying the correctness of the statements therein as to the cause of death, with the express assertion that the conclusions reached in the documents were based on hearsay and not in anyway binding upon the claimant who expressly denied that death was the result of suicide. A Michigan Statute (2 C.L. '15, § 5607), making a coroner's certificate prima facie proof of death, was repealed in 1925 by Act 343, Public Acts 1925 (2 C.L.1929, § 6594). While it has been held that a verified proof of death furnished by the beneficiary is competent evidence as an admission of the cause of death, Kudla v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 272 Mich. 555, 262 N.W. 407, yet where in transmitting such proofs the plaintiff distinctly denies their correctness as to the cause of death therein stated, such proofs are not admissible to prove the cause of death. Shiovitz v. New York Life Ins. Co., 281 Mich. 382, 387, 275 N.W. 181; Powers v. Loyal Protective Ins. Co., 266 Mich. 153, 253 N.W. 250; Bishop v. Shurly, 237 Mich. 76, 211 N.W. 75. Nor are such records admissible as made in the regular course of business under Act No. 15, Public Acts 1935, since the statements therein constitute pure hearsay and have no evidentiary force. Gile v. Hudnutt, 279 Mich. 358, 272 N.W. 706.

The errors alleged to have been made in the instructions of the court, and asserted to be prejudicial, include several statements of the District Judge to the effect that the presumption against suicide is one that may not be overcome. It is manifest that these were but slips of the tongue, corrected before the jury finally retired to consider its verdict. More important is the clear implication in the court's instructions that a burden rests upon the defendant to overcome the presumption against suicide by a preponderance of the evidence. It is conceded that the general rule in respect to the presumption against suicide, is applicable in Michigan, and that the presumption is not to be treated as evidence and disappears when testimony is offered to rebut it. Stuckum v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 283 Mich. 297, 277 N.W. 891; Shiovitz v. New York Life Ins. Co., supra; Abbott v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 282 Mich. 433, 439, 276 N.W. 506. Compare New York Life Ins. Co. v. Ross, 6 Cir., 30 F.2d 80; Harrison v. New York Life Ins. Co., 6 Cir., 78 F.2d 421. In view, however, of the colloquy between court and counsel in the presence of the jury, which followed this direction in which the court conceded that, upon production of evidence supporting the defendant's case, the presumption against suicide is overcome and vanishes, it would be difficult to say that the error was not effectively cured, although in view of the conclusion we reach upon the denial of a directed verdict we find it unnecessary so to decide.

The principal ground for the appellant's grievance is, as indicated, the failure of the court to grant the motion for peremptory instructions made in its behalf. It is its contention that the only permissible inference to be drawn from the undisputed facts is that the insured committed suicide. This requires consideration of the circumstances under which death occurred. While courts are reluctant to withdraw from the jury an issue as to the cause of death where suicide is the defense, in view of the presumption that love of life is natural and the impulse to self-destruction rare, and will refuse to do so where the facts and circumstances permit a reasonable inference to be drawn that death was the result of some other cause, yet where they exclude inferences other than that the deceased intentionally destroyed himself, it becomes the duty of the court to direct a verdict for the defendant. American Nat. Bank v. Continental Casualty Co., 6 Cir., 70 F.2d 97; Home Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Moon, 4 Cir., 110 F.2d 184; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 7 Cir., 65 F. 2d 967; Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Gregg, 6 Cir., 32 F.2d 567. The Michigan court is in accord with the general rule in this respect. Abbott v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., supra.

So far as the evidence in the case is undisputed, it appears that the appellee and the insured spent the day of death with guests in their home. The deceased retired sometime after one o'clock in the morning, but a half hour or so thereafter he was heard to arise, inquire for his slippers, and leave the room. Sometime later, her sleep being disturbed, the appellee arose, and upon reaching the upper hallway detected the odor of gas and heard two "thuds." Upon arrival at the door connecting kitchen and dining room on the floor below, she was unable to open it but determined that the kitchen was filled with gas. After returning to the bedroom above to make sure that the door leading to it was closed to prevent the entrance of gas, she telephoned the police and a neighbor. The neighbor arrived first and entry was effected to the kitchen by breaking the lock of the outer door. Lanahan was found on a runner rug on the floor, lying in a sleeping position with his head resting on...