Home Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Moon, 4571

• Decision Date: 11 March 1940
• Docket Number: 4572.,No. 4571,4571
• Citation: 110 F.2d 184
• Parties: HOME LIFE INS. CO. OF NEW YORK v. MOON. MUTUAL BENEFIT HEALTH & ACCIDENT ASS'N v. SAME.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

110 F.2d 184 (1940)

HOME LIFE INS. CO. OF NEW YORK v. MOON.

MUTUAL BENEFIT HEALTH & ACCIDENT ASS'N v. SAME.

Nos. 4571, 4572.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

March 11, 1940.

Before SOPER and DOBIE, Circuit Judges, and H. H. WATKINS, District Judge.

Wilbert H. Norton, of Huntington, W. Va., for appellant Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n.

Harry Scherr, of Huntington, W. Va., for appellant Home Life Ins. Co. of New York.

Thomas W. Peyton, of Huntington, W. Va. (Ernest E. Winters, Jr., of Huntington, W. Va., on the brief), for appellee.

DOBIE, Circuit Judge.

This case involves two civil actions which, as they both involved the same single question, were, by agreement of counsel and with the consent of the court, tried together in the District Court and were by us heard together on appeal. Harriet Moon, wife of the insured as well as beneficiary under all of the insurance policies in question and plaintiff in both actions, is for convenience hereinafter called the appellee; Charles Moon (her husband), whose life was insured under these policies, is called the insured; while the defendant-insurers, the Home Life Insurance Company and the Mutual Health and Accident Association, are called the appellants.

The first action was that of Harriet Moon against the Home Life Insurance Company upon two life insurance policies, each in the face amount of five thousand dollars, insuring the life of Charles Moon. Each of these policies carried what is known as a double indemnity provision, providing that the company would pay to Harriet Moon, wife of the insured, an additional sum of five thousand dollars upon each policy in case death resulted solely from bodily injury caused by external means of an accidental and violent nature. The Home Life Insurance Company has made full settlement of the face amount of each of these policies, but has denied additional liability under the accidental death provisions. This action is to collect the accidental death benefits of these two policies, a total of ten thousand dollars, from the Home Life Insurance Company.

The second action was by Harriet Moon against the Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Association upon a straight accident insurance policy, in which that company agreed to pay her the sum of five thousand dollars in the event of the death of the insured, Charles Moon, resulting directly and independently of all other causes from bodily injuries sustained through purely accidental means.

All three insurance policies involved in the two civil actions contained a provision to the effect that there should be no liability upon the insurer in case the death of the insured resulted from self destruction or suicide, whether the insured was sane or insane.

After the appellee had introduced all her evidence and rested her case, and again after all of the evidence was in and all parties had rested, the appellants moved the trial judge to direct the jury to return a verdict in their favor. The jury having returned a verdict in favor of the appellee and against both of the appellants for the full amount sued for, appellants moved the court to enter judgment in their favor notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial. All of these motions were by the trial court overruled, and exceptions were by the appellants duly taken.

There is very little dispute as to the evidence in this case, though there is wide divergence of opinion as to the proper inferences, both great and small, to be drawn from this evidence. About many features of the case there seems to be no controversy, and for the purposes of this case, we may take as true the statements contained in the remainder of this paragraph. The policies sued on were in full force and effect at the time of insured's death, early in the morning of Monday, July 11, 1938, in the lily pool of his residence. Drowning was the immediate cause of insured's death; there was nothing whatever that might even suggest poison or murder.

"The only issue for you to determine", so the jury was instructed by the trial judge, "from the evidence is whether the insured, Charles C. Moon, came to his death by accident or suicide." The jury duly found that this death was due to accident, and judgment was entered in favor of plaintiff-appellee and against defendants-appellants. We are called on to decide, then, a single question: whether there was substantial evidence to justify the trial judge in submitting this question to the jury and to sustain the jury's verdict that the death of insured was due to accident, which would warrant the judgment for appellee, and not to suicide, which would call for judgment in favor of appellants.

Counsel for both sides appear to agree that the insurance policies herein sued upon were West Virginia contracts and that (under Erie Railway Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188, 114 A.L.R. 1487) the substantive law of West Virginia should govern. Many cases are cited as to the burden of proof, or the duty of going forward with the evidence, or presumptions, as to death by accident or suicide. See particularly the West Virginia cases, Martin v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 106 W.Va. 533, 146 S.E. 53; Goodbar v. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co., 89 W.Va. 221, 108 S.E. 896; Beckley Nat. Exch. Bank v. Provident Life & Acc. Co., W.Va. 2 S.E.2d 256; McDaniel v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 119 W.Va. 650, 195 S.E. 597; Beard v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 65 W.Va. 283, 64 S.E. 119. And see (all decided by this Circuit Court of Appeals): Tabor v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 13 F.2d 765; Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Clemmer, 79 F.2d 724; Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Plymouth B. & P. Co., 99 F.2d 218; American Nat. Ins. Co. v. Belch, 100 F.2d 48. Under these cases, and under Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c, when we believe that the evidence justifies only one reasonable inference — that the insured's death was due to suicide, then we should remand the case to the District Court with directions to set aside the judgments in favor of the plaintiff-appellee and to enter judgment (in each civil action) in favor of the defendant-appellant. We do so believe, and we do so direct.

At least a brief review of the events leading up to the tragedy, together with some comment on the circumstances shown in connection with the finding of the body of the insured in the lily pool, would seem to be in order. When these are pieced together and dispassionately analyzed, in the light of their background, only one hypothesis — that insured met death by suicide — seems to square with the sane dictates of reason.

For some months previous to his death, insured had been in a rather desperate financial condition which, apparently, had been steadily growing worse. Insured for about ten years had been employed by the Koppers Coal Company at a salary of $450 per month (reduced during his last year with the company to $405 per month), from which he was discharged due to the depression and his "increasing inattention to duties" as of February 28, 1938, though his salary for March and April, 1938, was paid. He had borrowed all he could on his insurance policies. Only a few days before his death, insured's application for a loan had been denied by his former employer. On the day of his death, his bank balance was four cents. Many checks of insured, cashed for him by his friends, had been returned by the bank, unpaid for lack of sufficient funds. There was evidence that insured had secured some kind of agency to sell dictaphones and some type of income certificates; yet the record is silent as to the receipt of any income by him, since his discharge by the Koppers Company, from these sources.

Insured's relations with his wife had certainly been strained for some time. On Saturday evening (insured died early Monday morning), insured and his wife had a serious quarrel, when the wife belittled him to others, and insured over his wife's protest left the house angry, though she followed him "clear out to the street" for the purpose of getting "him out of the mood he was in". He remained away from home, spending part of the time in a gambling-house, until early on the fateful morning of his death. About five o'clock Monday morning, insured returned to his home. He found the door locked by a chain; so he had to use the knocker and was admitted by his eleven year old son, Jackie. They did not speak. Jackie returned to the bedroom occupied by him and his mother (wife of insured). Alone, insured went up to this bed-room and, though both Jackie and Mrs. Moon were awake and though insured took...