Connell v. Sledge

Decision Date16 January 1975
Docket NumberNo. W--102,W--102
Citation306 So.2d 194
PartiesGrady Scott CONNELL, Appellant, v. James S. SLEDGE and United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company, a Maryland Corporation, Appellees.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

John D. Buchanan, Jr., of Henderson, Richardson, Henry, Buchanan, Munroe & Rodman, Tallahassee, for appellant.

W. K. Whitfield, Tallahassee, Henry C. Hamilton, Monticello, and M. D. Lamb, Jr., Tallahassee, for appellee.

BOYER, Acting Chief Judge.

By this appeal we are asked to reverse a summary final judgment entered by the trial court in favor of appellees.

Appellant filed a complaint alleging that he employed appellee Sledge, a licensed dentist, to remove a tooth which had bothered him for several days. It is further alleged that the dentist, in extracting said tooth and in performing the dental work, failed to exercise the ordinary care and degree of skill generally exercised by dentists in like cases and that the dentist carelessly, recklessly and negligently, either by hypodermic needle or with the use of the extracting equipment, caused a nerve or nerves to be cut or damaged in the lower left jaw of the appellant, resulting in appellant suffering loss of feeling in his jaw, causing his mouth to droop and rendering him unable to pronounce words correctly. The dentist admitted treating appellant but denied that he did so recklessly, carelessly or negligently and denied that a nerve or nerves were allowed or caused to be cut or damaged in appellant's jaw. Depositions of appellant and the dentist were taken and filed with the court. In his deposition the dentist stated that appellant returned to his office the day following the extraction at which time the dentist examined and treated appellant for his complaint and requested appellant to return for further treatment if he had any further difficulty. At that visit X-rays were taken and a small piece of the root of the tooth was found to be lodged in the gum. The dentist explained to appellant that in his opinion the end of the root remaining in the gum would cause no problem, but appellant was told that if there was any problem the dentist would refer appellant to an oral surgeon. A third visit to the dentist's office was made by appellant approximately one week later at which time it appeared that some of the numbness had cleared up but some was yet experienced in the left jaw and in the lip. The dentist again informed appellant that he would send appellant to an oral surgeon for examination and treatment if there was any difficulty. Apparently appellant never returned.

Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment. No counter affidavits or other evidence were filed by appellant opposing that motion. A final summary judgment was thereupon entered by the trial judge in favor of the appellees, the dentist and his insurance carrier. In his judgment, the trial judge noted that appellant had failed to file any opposing affidavits as he was entitled to do under Rule 1.510(e) RCP.

Summary judgments are governed by the provisions of Rule 1.510 RCP. Summary judgment proceedings may not be used as a substitute for a trial. (Farrey v Bettendorf, Sup.Ct.Fla.1957, 96 So.2d 889) A summary judgment proceeding is not a trial by affidavit or deposition. (Weinstein v. General Accident Fire & Life Assur. Co., Fla.App.1st 1962, 141 So.2d 318) A summary judgment may be granted only in cases where there is no issue of material fact. (Williams v. City of Lake City, Sup.Ct.Fla.1953, 62 So.2d 732) The allegations of the complaint (when the defendant moves for summary judgment) must be accepted, for the purposes of the motion, as true. (White v. Pinellas County, Sup.Ct.Fla.1966, 185 So.2d 468) The burden is upon the party moving for summary judgment to establish that there is no issue of material fact and that he is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. (Hughes v. Jemco, Inc., Fla.App.1st 1967, 201 So.2d 565) If the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, affidavits and other evidence in the file raise the slightest doubt...

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62 cases
  • Van Dusen v. Southeast First Nat. Bank of Miami
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • October 29, 1985
    ...and which, therefore, must be accepted as true, see, e.g., White v. Pinellas County, 185 So.2d 468, 471 (Fla.1966); Connell v. Sledge, 306 So.2d 194, 196 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975), cert. dismissed, 336 So.2d 105 (Fla.1976), that the manuscript prepared by William Van Dusen was delivered, with the......
  • Unijax, Inc. v. Factory Ins. Ass'n
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • March 1, 1976
    ...in the file raise the slightest doubt upon any issue of material fact then a summary judgment may not be entered. (Connell v. Sledge, Fla.App.1st 1975, 306 So.2d 194) We must, therefore, in order to resolve the issues presented by this appeal, examine the uncontroverted evidence in the ligh......
  • Hatcher v. Roberts
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • August 20, 1985
    ...of proving the complete lack of any genuine issues of material fact. The pertinent principles are well stated in Connell v. Sledge, 306 So.2d 194, 196 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975): Summary judgments are governed by the provisions of Rule 1.510 RCP. Summary judgment proceedings may not be used as a s......
  • Chelton v. Tallahassee-Leon County Civic Center Authority, TALLAHASSEE-LEON
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • May 12, 1988
    ...will not be able to prove his case at trial, see Food Fair Stores of Florida, Inc. v. Patty, 109 So.2d 5 (Fla.1959); Connell v. Sledge, 306 So.2d 194 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975), cert. dismissed, 336 So.2d 105 (Fla.1976), a review of the record does not conclusively show that appellant will be unab......
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