Connelly v. Carnegie Dock & Fuel Company

• Decision Date: 11 March 1921
• Docket Number: 22,186
• Citation: 181 N.W. 857,148 Minn. 333
• Parties: PATRICK CONNELLY v. CARNEGIE DOCK & FUEL COMPANY
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

181 N.W. 857

148 Minn. 333

PATRICK CONNELLY v. CARNEGIE DOCK & FUEL COMPANY

No. 22,186

Supreme Court of Minnesota

March 11, 1921

Upon the relation of Carnegie Dock & Fuel Company the supreme court granted its writ of certiorari directed to the district court of Ramsey county and the Honorable Charles C. Haupt one of the judges thereof, to review proceedings in that court brought under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Patrick Connelly, employee, against relator, employer. Reversed.

SYLLABUS

Workmen's Compensation Act -- amendment of judgment because of judicial error.

1. The judgment in a compensation case cannot be amended by the district court because of judicial error in it after the time for review in the supreme court has passed.

Workmen's Compensation Act.

2. The Compensation Act, G.S. 1913, § 8222, providing for the modification of a judgment on the ground of "increase or decrease of incapacity," does not authorize a modification because of judicial error in determining the amount of the award.

L. N Foster and Dille, Hoke, Krause & Faegre, for relator.

George G. Chapin and P. D. Scannell, for respondent.

OPINION

DIBELL, J.

On motion of the plaintiff the court amended a judgment awarding him compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The judgment was entered on December 9, 1918. The amended judgment was entered on September 23, 1920. The defendant brings certiorari.

1. On December 9, 1918, judgment was entered in a proceeding under the compensation act in favor of the plaintiff for $1,800, payable in installments. The amount was contested. The plaintiff claimed more. The trial court was of the opinion that the case was governed by State v. District Court of Cass County, 129 Minn. 156, 151 N.W. 910. The amount of the award was based on the authority of that case. On August 8. 1919, Zinken v. Melrose Granite Co. 143 Minn. 397, 173 N.W. 857, was decided. It is conceded that under the rule there announced plaintiff was entitled to $3,600, payable in installments. On July 27, 1920, the plaintiff made the application which resulted in the amended judgment of September 23, 1920. The amended judgment changed the award to conform to the rule of the Zinken case.

The judgment was amended because of judicial error. There was no mistake in its entry. It was entered just as the court wanted it entered. It determined the rights of the plaintiff and the defendant just as the court thought they were. The plaintiff did not care to contest its correctness by a review in this court.

There must come a time when a judgment is final against judicial error correctable by the court rendering it. The common law fixed the expiration of the term of court as the time. Under our holdings a judgment cannot be corrected by the court rendering it, because of judicial error, when it stands unchallenged until the time for review by this court has passed. This subject is discussed at length in Gallagher v. Irish-American Bank, 79 Minn. 226, 81 N.W. 1057. The rule is directly held in other cases. Smith v. Minneapolis St. Ry. Co. 134 Minn. 292, 157 N.W. 499, 159 N.W. 623; Tomlinson v. Phelps, 93 Minn. 350, 101 N. W. 496. The cases holding that clerical errors may be corrected after the time of review has passed, so as to give effect to the actual determination of the trial court, are in recognition of the limitation upon the power to correct judicial error after the right of review is gone. Schloss v. Lennon, 123 Minn. 420, 144 N.W. 148; Northwestern Mut. Inv. Co. v. Aylmer, 138 Minn. 140, 164 N.W. 661; National Council of K. & L. of S. v. Silver, 138 Minn. 330, 164 N.W. 1015, and cases cited.

In Gallagher v. Irish-American Bank, 79 Minn. 226, 81 N.W. 1057, the court discussed the statute, now G.S. 1913, § 7786. relieving a party from his mistakes or neglect within one year and the general rule relative to the correction of judicial error by the trial court. In referring to a judgment which it was sought to modify on motion by changing the amounts to be distributed in a sequestration proceeding to different creditors, the court said "that such judgment, as against a motion for the same purpose, became final and conclusive, and was res judicata of all questions that were or might have been urged against it before that time. * * * This inexorable but just rule is necessary to the authority of courts to declare the law, and vitalizes their judgments with the force that gives to them efficacy."

In Smith v. Minneapolis St. Ry. Co. 134 Minn. 292, 157 N.W. 499, 159 N.W. 623, it was said: "We are of the opinion that, when a judgment has become final by the expiration of the time within which an appeal may be taken, it should not be subject to attack upon a motion for a new trial for error or insufficiency of evidence. * * * The statute contemplates that an unreversed judgment shall be final at the expiration of the six months within which an appeal may be taken."

In Tomlinson v. Phelps, 93 Minn. 350, 101 N.W. 496, in referring to a probate decree, the court said: "If it appears that the original decree of distribution was deliberately entered into as the result of a judicial...