Conner, In re
Decision Date | 18 January 1967 |
Citation | 226 A.2d 126,43 Del.Ch. 310 |
Parties | In the Matter of Winfield S. CONNER, Sr., an Aged and Mentally Infirm Person. |
Court | Court of Chancery of Delaware |
Robert B. Walls, Jr., Wilmington, for petitioner, Anne Conner biddle.
Joseph A. Julian, Jr., Wilmington, for Winfield S. Conner, Sr.
DUFFY, Chancellor:
This is the decision after final hearing on the petition for appointment of a guardian for Winfield S. Conner, Sr., under 12 Del.C. § 3914. The petition was filed by Anne Conner Biddle, daughter of Mr. Conner, on the grounds that her father is unable, because of advanced age or mental infirmity, to properly manage and care for his property. Mr. Conner appeared and opposed the petition.
Mr. Conner is 83 years of age and apparently in good physical condition. He is neat in appearance, courteous in manner, cheerful in disposition, and responsive to questioning. He seems serene, alert and attentive. At trial he testified in detail as to his personal and professional life with excellent recall of both distant and recent events; on at least two occasions he was called upon to make computations and in the process moved ahead of the questioner.
As a younger man Mr. Conner was involved with several different business enterprises but eventually spent most of his professional life engaged in some phase of bookkeeping or accounting. He is now the owner of assets worth more than $80,000, some of which derive from land inherited about thirty years ago.
Two transactions involving land sales provide the principal evidence in support of the petition. These and medical testimony are the substantive evidence offered to show that age or mental infirmity has put Mr. Conner in a position where he is unable to care for his estate.
Both transactions involved deals with John G. Woolfolk, whom Mr. Conner has known since May or June of 1966. The lands are part of the inherited tract of more than two hundred acres which Mr. Conner owned at or near the southwest corner of the intersection of Routes 40 and 896, New Castle County (Glasgow). Mr. Conner lives on this tract, and out of it from time to time he has conveyed parcels, large and small, to his several children, sometimes for less than fair market value. In June 1966 he still owned about 100 acres of the land.
About June 7, 1966 Mr. Conner entered into two written agreements with Mr. Woolfolk to sell a total of 54.801 acres out of the tract for $21,925, or $400 per acre. A deed conveying this tract was signed on July 6 and recorded the next day.
On August 5, 1966 Mr. Conner made another written contract with Mr. Woolfolk, this time agreeing to sell him about 42 acres at $600 an acre, a total of $25,453. An interim guardian was appointed on September 9, and settlement has not yet been held on this sale.
At trial Robert E. Hickman, a real estate appraiser, testified that on July 7 the 54-acre tract had a fair market value of $82,000, or about $1,500 as against the $400 per acre for which Mr. Conner sold it. As to the second tract, Mr. Hickman testified that on August 5 it had a fair market value of $55,000, or about $1,300 per acre as against the $600-per-acre price under the Conner-Woolfolk agreement.
Mr. Woolfolk testified as to the availability of land in the Glasgow area at a much lower price per acre. His testimony in general was directed toward showing that the prices he agreed to pay Mr. Conner were close to current market values.
Land values in the Glasgow area have risen generally since April 19, 1966 when it was publicly announced that the E. I. duPont de Nemours & Company had agreed to buy about 600 acres of land at Glasgow. The duPont Company took title to the land in July for a price of about $3,100 per acre. Prior thereto rumor in the community put the price at $2,500 an acre.
As to the two tracts in question, there is a difference of approximately $90,000 between the prices for which Mr. Conner contracted to sell and the fair market values to which Mr. Hickman testified. I am satisfied from the evidence that Mr. Conner knew of the duPont plan to purchase shortly after it became public information and before he contracted to sell the first parcel to Mr. Woolfolk.
The problem is complicated because of a philosophy of life by which Mr. Conner has lived for many years and apparently still follows. According to Dr. Mesrop A. Tarumianz who testified for the petitioner,
'Q As I understood it, his philosophy, you said, is that he has in his mind what he considers to be a proper value and which may not agree with the present market value, and he wants to disregard the market value and substitute his own judgment?
'A This is what he told me, definitely; that he doesn't need any more than what he is charging, and he likes to see other people get benefit of his estate; that he has provided sufficiently for his children, and he doesn't need any more than what he is receiving.'
Dr. James Flaherty testified on behalf of Mr. Conner as follows:
'Q Do you think that if he believes that a piece of real estate which cost him nothing and should be sold at a price below the market value, knowing that the buyer would make a profit on it, he would--
'A Knowing that--
'Q That the buyer would make a profit on it, do you think that he would sell that real estate at less than market value?
'A That's the $1,500 an acre versus $400 an acre?
'Q Yes.
'A Yes.
Mr. Conner's approach to money matters is indicated by his reaction at the time of his retirement from active business in 1961. After a number of years of service, his employer gave him an opportunity to fix his own pension at a monthly figure in the range of $300 to $350. Mr. Conner would take no more than $100 a month because he believed that that sum, coupled with Social Security income, was sufficient to enable him to live comfortably.
The problem before the Court is not to determine whether Mr. Conner entered into unwise, unrealistic or improvident real estate transactions. And the Court is not to scrutinize those transactions for the purpose of determining whether either or both of them may be rescinded for any legal or equitable reason. The Court's duty is to determine whether the transactions and the evidence as a whole call for application of the statute authorizing appointment of a guardian. In considering this, the question arises as to whether the transactions fit into the norm of Mr. Conner's life and his approach to money matters, or whether they are the consequence of age or mental infirmity.
Preliminarily, I should note that an improvident business transaction, standing alone, does not warrant the appointment of a guardian. Nor does mere generosity in the disposition of one's property; if it did, the foundation on which much of our community life is based would be substantially shaken.
12 Del.C. § 3914(a) provides:
'Whenever any person not mentally ill, a resident in this State, by reason of advanced age or mental infirmity or physical incapacity is unable properly to manage and care for his property, and in consequence thereof is in danger of dissipating or losing such property, or of becoming the victim of designing persons, such person, his mother, father, brother, sister, husband, wife, child, next of kin, creditor, debtor, any public agency or, in the absence of such person, or persons, or public agency, or their refusal or inability to act, any other person, may file in the Court of Chancery of the county in which such aged, mentally infirm or physically incapacitated person resides, his petition, under oath, setting forth the facts, praying the Court to adjudge that such person is unable properly to manage and care for his property, and requesting the appointment of a guardian of the property of such person.'
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