Conner v. Fettkether, 63993
| Citation | 294 N.W.2d 61 |
| Decision Date | 16 July 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 63993,63993 |
| Parties | Jeanne Marie CONNER, Appellant, v. Lorri L. FETTKETHER, Pattison Brothers Mississippi River Terminal, Inc., James E. Pattison and Joyce Pattison, Herbert H. Humiston, and Lori Cushion, Appellees. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Iowa |
James L. Beeghly, of Antes, Beeghly & Allbee, West Union, for appellant.
James E. Gritzner, of Mosier, Thomas, Beatty, Dutton, Braun & Staack, and George Lindeman, of Lindeman & Yagla, Waterloo, for appellees.
Considered by REES, P. J., and UHLENHOPP, HARRIS, ALLBEE, and McGIVERIN, JJ.
This appeal challenges, on equal protection grounds, an Iowa statute which allows a person reaching majority a one-year period in which to bring suit on tort claims which arose during minority. This provision is said to contrast with our two-year statute of limitations for personal injury suits. The trial court found nothing in our statutory scheme which offended the guarantees of equal protection and neither do we.
Plaintiff's petition alleges that her injuries occurred April 30, 1976. She attained majority June 2, 1977, and filed this suit on May 8, 1979. Summary judgment was entered by the trial court on the basis of the statute of limitations. The trial court cited sections 614.1(2) and 614.8, The Code 1979. Section 614.1(2) provides:
Actions may be brought within the times herein limited, respectively, after their causes accrue, and not afterwards, except when otherwise specially declared:
2. . . . Those founded on injuries to the person or reputation, including injuries to relative rights, whether based on contract or tort, or for a statute penalty, within two years.
Section 614.8 provides:
The times limited for actions herein, except those brought for penalties and forfeitures, shall be extended in favor of minors and mentally ill persons, so that they shall have one year from and after the termination of such disability within which to commence said action.
Plaintiff argues that, in order to pass constitutional muster under the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution, Amend. XIV, § 1, as well as Iowa's own equal protection clause of the Iowa Constitution, art. I, § 6, a person attaining majority should be accorded a two-year period in which to bring tort suits. The theory is that the period for such tort suits should match the two-year statute of limitations for personal injury suits brought by persons of majority age.
The parties agree that we are not involved with either a fundamental right or suspect classification. Statutes of limitations go to matters of remedy which are not fundamental rights. State ex rel. Krupke v. Witkowski, 256 N.W.2d 216, 224 (Iowa 1977). We described the process by which the rational basis test is applied in Redmond v. Carter, 247 N.W.2d 268, 271-72 (Iowa 1977).
In order to prevail in her challenge plaintiff would have to establish two things. First, she would be required to show the existence of the classification, the division by effect of the statute into two groups. Upon showing such a classification, plaintiff would then need to show that it lacked a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. Redmond, 247 N.W.2d at 271. Plaintiff's challenge fails on both counts.
It would be inaccurate to label section 614.8 a statute of limitations. Tort actions can be brought with little difficulty for a minor within the two years provided by section 614.1(2). Iowa R.Civ.P. 12 provides that suits of a minor "shall be brought by his guardian if he have one; otherwise the minor may sue by a next friend . . . ." Section 614.8 is an extension, given as a matter of grace by the legislature, over and above the two-year period of limitations.
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