Conner v. Skaggs

• Decision Date: 03 July 1908
• Citation: 111 S.W. 1132,213 Mo. 334
• Parties: CONNER v. SKAGGS et al.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

111 S.W. 1132

213 Mo. 334

CONNER v. SKAGGS et al.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 1.

July 3, 1908.

1. WILLS—UNDUE INFLUENCE — EVIDENCE — SUFFICIENCY.

Where on a will contest, contestant's own evidence showed the will to be peculiarly that of testator, and that contestant was disinherited of his set purpose, and it sufficiently appeared that the draughtsman had nothing to do with that purpose, the court was justified in taking the case from the jury on the issue of undue influence.

2. SAME—TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY — PLEADING —SUFFICIENCY.

The allegation in a petition in a will contest, that testator was of unsound mind, and had not sufficient understanding to comprehend the business he was then engaged in, or who were the natural objects of his bounty, or what property he had, or the disposition he was making of it, was broad enough to admit proof showing senile dementia.

3. SAME—EVIDENCE.

Faulty reasoning now and then by a testator is not evidence of general mental derangement.

4. SAME—"INSANE DELUSION."

An insane delusion is an unreasoning and incorrigible belief in the existence of facts which are either impossible absolutely, or at least impossible under the circumstances of the individual. It is never the result of reasoning and reflection; it is not generated by them and cannot be dispelled by them; and hence it is not to be confounded with an opinion, however fantastic the latter may be.

5. SAME.

Evidence held not to show an insane delusion leading to the execution of either testator's will or codicil, whereby he disinherited his daughter because she had married against his wishes.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Platte County; Alonzo D. Burnes, Judge.

Proceeding to contest a will by Thurza Conner against Joseph E. Skaggs and others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Geo. W. Day, Anderson & Carmack, and Roland Hughes, for appellant. Wilson & Wilson, for respondents.

LAMM, J.

In a statutory proceeding contesting the will of Joseph Skaggs, deceased, wherein the issue was devisavit vel non, the trial court gave a demurrer to the evidence in the nature of an instruction at the close of plaintiff's case. Refusing to set aside the verdict so coerced, the court rendered judgment probating the will in solemn form. Thereat, plaintiff appeals.

The will bears date of February 28, 1895. Its seventh item runs: "To my daughter Thurza, wife of Wm. Conner, I give only one dollar, she having married contrary to my expressed wishes, I wish to discriminate against her." The eleventh item nominates his wife, Harriet E., as executrix without bond. She having died, he executed a codicil on the 18th of June, 1897, whereby he changed the eleventh item by appointing his son, Joseph Edward, executor, and ratified the will in all other respects. Following that, he died on the 11th day of March, 1903. Thereupon, his will and codicil were probated in common form; and thereafter, on January 8th, 1904, contest proceedings were begun by the disinherited, married daughter against the beneficiaries, to wit, testator's children and certain grandchildren. The cause was tried on an amended petition, charging in effect (1) that at the several times of signing the will and codicil the testator did not have testamentary capacity; and (2) that the will was the product of the undue influence of one Edwin Thatcher—in short, was his will and not testator's. Of these in reverse order.

1. Of undue influence: It appears that said Thatcher was cashier of a bank at Smithville, a near-by town in Platte county at which testator did business, and he drew, witnessed and kept both will and codicil in the vault of his bank until produced for probating. Plaintiff's counsel submit the case on the theory that, because of the strength of their position on the issue of testamentary incapacity, they hesitate to discuss the issue of undue influence. Conceding that so, yet counsel might well have gone one step further and put the point on the theory as well there was no substantive evidence to sustain the averment. The record shows that there fell a time when Thatcher was notified by testator that he would need his services in drafting a will. Sometime later he came into the bank in pursuance of that notification. It appears that Thatcher had no interest or wish of his own to subserve, had no bias in favor of one heir or against another. The truth is, he had to deal with a self-willed, masterful, pragmatical old man who, in and of himself, knew what he wanted, and who, with no uncertain hand, chalked down the line he was to follow, by giving him directions and memoranda upon which the will was to be drafted. Whereupon, using a form in a book or some old will as a model, he drafted the will in the counting room of the bank during business hours, as directed. Under substantially like circumstances he drafted the codicil.

It is sought to support the theory of undue influence by an ingenious argument, doing credit to the forensic skill of counsel. But on this record it has not an iota of substantive testimony to stand on. To the contrary on plaintiff's own proof, the will is conclusively shown to be in all its provisions peculiarly the will of testator. Not only did he preside over its genesis, but he told others before it was made that he intended to make it as it was made. He told others after it was made that he had made it as it turned out to be. And after the codicil, he told others he had changed his will as it turned out to be changed. Plaintiff's evidence, then, putting the fact beyond question that the will assailed is her father's will, that she was disinherited of his set purpose formed eight years before his death, and it sufficiently appearing that Thatcher had nothing to do with originating or nursing that purpose, the issue of undue influence is clearly not within the case made on the facts. Accordingly, the court was justified in taking the case from the jury on that issue.

2. Of testamentary capacity: (a) In determining the point, it is well at the outset to define the issue as sharply as the record will permit. The charge in the petition is general, to wit, that "He, the said Joseph Skaggs, was of unsound mind, and had not sufficient understanding to comprehend the business he was then engaged in, nor who were the natural objects of his bounty, nor what property he had, nor the disposition he was making of it by said paper writing." That general charge was broad and flexible enough to admit proof (if any) showing senile dementia—i. e., the recurrence of second childhood by mere coincident decay of bodily and mental powers. But nothing of the sort is within the scope of the proof educed, nor is it in the line of argument advanced by learned counsel. Neither is there claim or substantial evidence of general derangement of mind. There was a solitary incident put in evidence that (if it had been fortified by a course of conduct) might have a little tendency that way. Shortly before his death in 1902, it seems some one had endeavored to persuade his grandchild of tender years to join the Baptist church. Mr. Skaggs was opposed to that and, in a talk with a minister, told him that he (Skaggs) had never sworn an oath until he had joined the church, when about 18 years of age. The testimony is very brief and we gather from it that the old gentleman was of opinion that his joining the church had a bad effect on him— lowered his moral tone and stamina. His language was, "I got to be one of the most profane men after that that you ever saw." The doctrine of "falling from grace" (using the term reverentially) is stoutly maintained by one school of polemics and as stoutly doubted by another, who maintain the dogma: Once in grace, always in grace. But no school of theologians or doctrine of the law known to me assert the proposition that falling from grace is, in and of itself, evidence of entire mental unsoundness. If a man to-day pious, mild, and kindly, a just man of discreet walk and conversation, alive to the duties and amenities of life, becomes tomorrow a sot, incontinent, impious, unjust, cruel, profane—in effect, a degenerate —such a radical revolution has been judicially commented on as evidence tending to show impairment of mind to a degree which may affect his capacity to make a valid will unnaturally disposing of his property; but the testimony here has no tendency to prove such condition. The incident under review may be dismissed with the observation that the conclusion drawn by Mr. Skaggs was quite faulty on the proposition under discussion with the good minister, but it would be an alarming proposition to assert that faulty reasoning now and then was evidence of general mental aberration. Such an arrow, shot at a venture, would hit unexpected marks. Counsel make no claim that such was the fact. To the contrary their proof was directed to establishing a form of monomania, viz., a derangement of Mr. Skaggs' mind in regard to a single subject only—an alleged insane delusion, hereinafter considered. Contestant put upon the stand an array of witnesses who knew the father long and well. Each and all of them testified to his general soundness of mind. He was shown to be a frugal, hard-working, capable. honest man, 60 odd years old when the will was written, owning and managing a small farm in Platte county. No one impugns his ability to attend to his business affairs with vigor and circumspection, and he did attend to them without the aid of any supervision to the day of his death. The evidence allows room for no inference that he did not have his children in mind, know the nature and extent of his property and exactly what he wanted to do with it by will—unless plaintiff's theory of an insane delusion, operating in the execution of the will and codicil, finds such support in the proof as would carry the case to the jury. On that sole question, the case h...