Conners Bros. Co. v. Sullivan
| Decision Date | 02 April 1915 |
| Citation | 108 N.E. 503,220 Mass. 600 |
| Parties | CONNERS BROS. CO. v. SULLIVAN et al. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Qua, Howard & Rogers, Stanley E. Qua, and Francis M. Qua, all of Lowell, for plaintiffs.
H. N Allin, of Boston, for defendants.
The makers and indorser of the notes having been joined as defendants, it is conceded that as to the makers, who have been defaulted, the plaintiff is a holder for value; and it would not avail the indorser, who alone defends, that with the plaintiff's knowledge he became bound for their accommodation. R. L. c. 73, § 46; Neal v. Wilson, 213 Mass. 336, 337, 100 N.E. 544, and cases cited.
While it was unquestioned that, with the accompanying mortgages the notes were taken by the plaintiff in payment for the transfer of certain personal property to the makers and mortgagors, the evidence as to their business relations and dealings with the indorser, hereinafter referred to as the defendant, both before and after the transactions, is irreconcilable. The testimony of the plaintiff's president and of its counsel, who prepared the papers and at whose office they were executed, tended to show that the defendant had in some form a pecuniary interest in the property or that the property had been transferred to the makers at the defendant's request and he had indorsed to secure the transfer. The jury, if they believed this evidence, would have been warranted in finding a valuable consideration, sufficient to support the defendant's promise. Hubbard v. Coolidge, 1 Metc. 84; Warren v. Durfee, 126 Mass. 338.
But the defendant testified that at the solicitation of the plaintiff's president, and wholly for its convenience and accommodation, he consented to the use of his name as a mere conduit to pass title to the plaintiff of the notes as well as to the property named in the mortgages, with the distinct understanding and agreement that he should incur no personal liability.
'As to third parties the rights and liabilities of an accommodation party are in general the same as those of a party receiving valuable consideration for his signature, but between the accommodation party and the person accommodated there is no such liability, and one who draws or indorses commercial paper for the accommodation of another is not liable on it to him, whatever their apparent relation on the paper may be.' 3 R. C. L. § 336, and cases cited; Bird v. Daggett, 97 Mass. 494.
The credibility of the witnesses was for the jury. If they believed the defendant's evidence, or if they found the evidence evenly balanced, there was no consideration shown for his promise and he was entitled to a verdict. Lockwood v. Twitchell, 146 Mass. 623, 16 N.E. 728; Warren v. Durfee, 126 Mass. 338, 341; Corlies v. Howe, 11 Gray, 125, 71 Am. Dec. 693.
The plaintiff's first, third and fourth requests could not have been given as formulated. The jury were to determine the actual transaction and a verdict for the plaintiff could not have been ordered. The validity of the notes as enforceable contracts against the defendant depended upon proof of a valuable consideration, the absence of which could be shown by parol evidence, with the burden of proof upon the plaintiff to satisfy the jury that the defendant could be held. Hill v. Whidden, 158 Mass. 267, 33 N.E. 526; Delano v. Bartlett, 6 Cush. 364. The first clause of the fifth request, that the notes, mortgages and assignments were part of the same transaction, is sufficiently covered by the instructions; and the remainder of the request, that a consideration moving either to the makers or to the indorser would support the obligation of each, rests upon the plaintiff's theory that the defendant was liable because at his request the plaintiff had transferred title to the horses and wagons, as the parties understood, to the makers and the defendant, even if the defendant's name did not appear in the bill of sale, or that he had indorsed for their benefit. It could not have been given without directing the attention of the jury to this qualification, and the judge carefully and accurately pointed out the distinction.
The exception taken at the close to so much of the charge as failed to make clear to the jury that a valid consideration may have existed, which would bind the indorser without the transfer of any property or of any beneficial interest in property to him, 'because it makes no difference whether he got any property or * * * any beneficial interest, if the transaction was done at his request,' are not well taken. The charge repeatedly directed the attention of the jury to the respective claims of the parties. They were plainly told that, if the defendant indorsed at the makers' request he was liable as well as if the plaintiff transferred the property to the makers at his request, or he had a beneficial interest in the property, and what the plaintiff must prove to hold the...
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McLellan v. Fuller
...on which the negligence of the superintendent rested, and no enlargement of the employer's liability appears. Connors Bros. Co. v. Sullivan, 220 Mass. 607, 108 N. E. 503. If the question to the witness was leading, and for this reason might have been excluded, its admission was within the d......
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McLellan v. Fuller
... ... enlargement of the employer's liability appears ... Conners Brothers Co. v. Sullivan, 220 Mass. 600, ... 607. If the question to the witness was leading, and ... ...