Conners v. State

• Decision Date: 30 November 2001
• Citation: 837 So.2d 319
• Parties: Charles E. CONNERS v. STATE of Alabama.
• Court: Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

837 So.2d 319

Charles E. CONNERS v. STATE of Alabama.

CR-00-1074.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

November 30, 2001.

Rehearing Denied January 25, 2002.

Charles E. Conners, pro se.

Andrew W. Redd, general counsel, and William F. Addison, asst. gen. counsel, Department of Corrections, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

On October 5, 2000, Charles E. Conners filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, in which he alleged that he was denied due process when he was removed from work release and reclassified as a "heinous offender" based on a change in the criteria of the Department of Corrections for determining which inmates are eligible for work release. After receiving a response from the State, the circuit court summarily denied Conners's petition on January 2, 2001.

I.

Citing Ex parte Berry, 794 So.2d 307 (Ala.2000), Conners contends that the circuit court erred in summarily denying his habeas corpus petition because, he says, he had a liberty interest in remaining on work release. Specifically, Conners maintains that the work-release contract he signed when he was first placed on work release created a liberty interest in remaining on work release because, he says, the contract contained the following language: "If I am removed from work release, I will receive a due process hearing." (C. Supp. 9.) In addition, although Conners concedes that he was given a reclassification hearing, he argues that the reclassification hearing was held after he had already been removed from work release and, therefore, that the hearing did not satisfy the requirements of due process.

In Ex parte Berry, the Alabama Supreme Court held that the circuit court had erred in summarily denying Berry's petition for a writ of habeas corpus because, it said, Berry's petition had created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he had a liberty interest in remaining on work release. Specifically, the Court stated:

"Similarly in this present case Berry argues that the procedures set out in the [Department of Corrections'] Classification Manual require a due-process hearing before an inmates participation in the work-release program can be terminated. Berry has provided this Court with the portion of the Department of Corrections' Classification Manual that contains the language stating that `[n]o due process hearing is required for transfers among institutions other than removal from full work release status including free world employment, PDL, or SIR.' Berry also alleges that it has been the practice of the Department of Corrections to remove inmates from the work-release program only after the inmate commits some infraction of an administrative rule or regulation. The language in the Classification Manual prevents the Department of Corrections from arbitrarily removing an inmate from the work-release program, and, by doing so, creates a liberty interest in an inmate's continued participation in the work-release program. Therefore, the circuit court erred in summarily dismissing Berry's petition for the writ of habeas corpus. Berry's petition creates a genuine issue of material fact as to the applicability of the regulation to his work-release status."

794 So.2d at 309.

In this case, Conners maintains that his work-release contract, not the Department of Corrections Classification Manual, created a liberty interest in his remaining on work release. However, unlike the appellant in Ex parte Berry, Conners did not provide this Court with a copy of his work-release contract showing that the contract did, in fact, contain the language he alleged it did. In fact, Conners failed to attach any documentation to his petition to support his claim that he had not been afforded due process before he was removed from work release.

Section 15-21-4, Ala.Code 1975, provides:

"Application for a writ of habeas corpus must be made by petition, signed either by the party himself for whose benefit it is intended or by some other person on his behalf, must be verified by the oath of the applicant to the effect that the statements therein contained are true to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, and must state, in substance, the name of the person on whose behalf the application is made, that he is imprisoned or restrained of his liberty in the county, the place of such imprisonment, if known, the name of the officer or person by whom he is so imprisoned and the cause or pretense of such imprisonment; and, if the imprisonment is by virtue of any warrant, writ or other process, a copy thereof must be annexed to the petition or the petition must allege that a copy thereof has been demanded and refused or must show some sufficient excuse for the failure to demand a copy."

(Emphasis added.) The record reflects that Conners did not attach to his petition any documents supporting his claim that he had a liberty interest in remaining on work release or that he was removed from work release without due process; he did not allege that he had demanded a copy of any such documents and was refused; and he offered no excuse for his failure to comply with § 15-21-4. See, e.g., Young v. State, 712 So.2d 1121 (Ala.Crim.App. 1998); and Williams v. State, 651 So.2d 1153 (Ala.Crim.App.1994). Although Conners filed a motion for discovery of documents some 29 days after the circuit court summarily denied his petition, this belated request for documents was not sufficient to comply with § 15-21-4. In addition, although the Alabama Supreme Court's holding in Ex parte Berry shows that inmates may, in fact, have a liberty interest in remaining on work release, that holding does not relieve inmates of their burden under § 15-21-4 either to attach copies of the records of their removal from work release or to demand those records in a timely fashion.

Moreover, even assuming that Conners's work-release contract created a liberty interest in remaining on work release and notwithstanding Conners's failure to comply with § 15-21-4, Conners's claim that his reclassification hearing was held after he had been removed from work release—and, therefore, that the hearing did not comport with due process—is refuted by the record. The State attached to its motion to dismiss Conners's petition copies of the following three documents: (1) the advance written notice to Conners of the reclassification hearing; (2) a memorandum of the procedure used during the hearing; and (3) the progress-review form indicating the evidence presented at the reclassification hearing and the reasons that Conners had been reclassified as a "heinous offender." Two of these documents refute Conners's claim that he was removed from work release before his reclassification hearing, and the third document is, at best, ambiguous as to the timing of the hearing. Furthermore, these documents reflect that Conners's reclassification hearing complied with the due-process requirements of Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974). Based on the record before us, it appears that Conners received all the due process to which he was entitled.¹

Because Conners failed to comply with the statutory pleading requirements of § 15-21-4; because, even assuming that Conners had a liberty interest in remaining on work release, the record refutes Conners's claim that his reclassification hearing was held after he had been removed from work release; and because the record reflects that Conners was afforded due process during the reclassification hearing, the circuit court's summary denial of Conners's petition for a writ of habeas corpus was proper, even in light of the Alabama Supreme Court's holding in Ex parte Berry.

II.

Conners contends that the circuit court erred in denying his motion for discovery, filed on January 31, 2001, 29 days after the circuit court had denied his petition. However, the record reflects that, contrary to Conners's contention, the circuit court never ruled on Conners's discovery motion. In addition, Conners never objected to the circuit court's failure to rule on the motion. Because Conners suffered no adverse ruling from the circuit court, this issue is not properly before this Court for review. See, e.g., Allen v. State, 825 So.2d 264 (Ala.Crim.App.2001); and Woods v. State, 790 So.2d 1014 (Ala.Crim. App.2000).

III.

Finally, Conners contends that the circuit court erred in ordering the Department of Corrections to withhold 25% of the deposits to his prison account until the court costs for filing his habeas corpus petition were paid because, he says, he was granted indigency status and an indigent defendant is not required to pay filing fees. In addition, Conners contends that the circuit court erred in ordering him to pay $187 in court costs when, he says, the statutory maximum filing fee is $140.² Conners presented both of these claims in his motion to vacate the circuit court's order denying his habeas corpus petition; therefore, they are properly before this Court for review.

Section 12-19-70(b), Ala.Code 1975, provides, in pertinent part, that "[t]he docket fee may be waived initially and taxed as costs at the conclusion of the case if the court finds that payment of the fee will constitute a substantial hardship." See also Fincher v. State, 724 So.2d 87, 90 (Ala.Crim.App.1998) ("Section 12-19-70(b), Ala.Code 1975, provides that, as was done in the present case, the docket fee of an indigent petitioner may be waived initially and then taxed as costs at the conclusion of the case."); and Cofield v. State, 682 So.2d 493, 494 (Ala.Crim.App.1996) ("[T]he docket fee of an indigent petitioner may be waived initially and then may be taxed as costs at the conclusion of the case."). The circuit court properly ordered Conners to pay the court costs of his habeas corpus petition.

In addition, we find no error in the circuit court's imposition of $187 in court costs. Although § 12-19-71, Ala.Code 1975, provides a filing fee in civil cases of $145 for...