Connizzo v. General Am. Life Ins. Co.

Decision Date04 March 1975
Docket NumberNo. 35604,35604
Citation520 S.W.2d 661
PartiesJohn CONNIZZO, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. GENERAL AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation, Defendant-Appellant. . Louis District, Division Three
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals

Kortenhof & Ely, Joel D. Monson, Frank E. Strzelec, St. Louis, for defendant-appellant.

Deeba, DeStefano, Sauter & Herd, James B. Herd, St. Louis, for plaintiff-respondent.

McMILLIAN, Judge.

Defendant appeals from a judgment entered by the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis upon a jury verdict that awarded plaintiff a $9500 recovery under a double indemnity provision contained in a group insurance contract, death allegedly occurring by virtue of an 'accident' within the policy terms.

We hold that the court erred in failing to sustain defendant's motion for a directed verdict at the close of all the evidence because plaintiff's evidence failed to make a submissible case; and, accordingly, reverse the judgment with instructions to the trial court to set aside the judgment and enter judgment for the defendant.

The deceased, John Phillip Connizzo, plaintiff's son, was insured under a group insurance policy issued by defendant to McDonnell-Douglas Corporation. The policy contained a standard double indemnity provision with an express limitation on recovery to the effect that:

'Benefits shall not be payable under the Accidental Death and Dismemberment Insurance provisions of this policy for any loss even though the proximate and precipitating cause of the loss is accidental bodily injury, which arises out of or is contributed to in any way by any of the following:

'5) participation in, or in consequence of having participated in, the commission of an assault or felony.'

The deceased married Rita Marie in 1965; however, in February, 1971, Rita Marie left John Phillip to live with her parents, Mr. and Mrs. Robert Zurbriggen. At the time Rita Marie left, their daughter Sherry, age 4, went with her. According to Rita Marie's testimony she left the deceased because he had a violent temper and had struck both her and Sherry on several occasions; that after the deceased threatened to hurt Sherry his visitation privileges were restricted to the Zurbriggen home and that subsequently she filed for a divorce.

On July 23, 1971, Rita testified that she heard a lot of hollering, some banging on the door, the door bell ringing, and some screaming; that she ran into the hallway and saw the deceased beating her father, Robert Zurbriggen, on the head with his fist; that the deceased ran toward her, grabbed her, put a knife point to her chest and said that he was going to kill both her and Sherry and that thereafter she heard shots.

Robert Zurbriggen testified that he, his wife, Dorothy; Rita Marie, his daughter; and Debby, his daughter-in-law, were eating supper when the door bell rang and that he heard a loud hammering at the door; that he did not know where Debby was at trial time, and that Dorothy, his wife had died prior to the trial; that he ran to the window and saw the deceased's green Mercury parked outside, and he took a .38 caliber pistol out of his dresser which he put into his hip pocket. He told Dorothy to call the police because two weeks before, the deceased and his brother had 'stood out on the front lawn of my house and said 'Come on out, you bunch of s_ _ of b_ _. We'll kill the whole g_ _ d_ _ family. '' When he opened the door, the deceased pounced upon him like a cat, struck him several times in the face, and that he also struck the deceased; that the deceased then ran past him into the hall at which time he saw him with a knife on Rita Marie, and deceased said, "I'm going to kill the whole g_ _ d_ _ bunch of you. " Thereafter, the deceased pushed Rita Marie into a hall out of his sight; that thereafter the witness ran through the living room to the end of the hall where he saw the deceased and Rita Marie; that he shot the deceased several times to protect his daughter's life.

Officer Thomas Burke testified that he was notified at 5:17 P.M. on July 23, 1971, of a family disturbance at the Zurbriggen home; that when he arrived at 5:20 P.M., he saw a knife lying in the hallway. The overall length of the knife was 10 3/4 inches, with a six-inch blade; and that the deceased's body was lying partly in a bedroom and in the hallway. He also said that he had previously advised a member of the Zurbriggen household to call the police if the deceased created any problem. Another officer testified that there was a swollen mark or knot over Zurbriggen's right eye.

At the trial, plaintiff introduced evidence of the existence of a current, valid policy and medical testimony that the deceased, John Phillip, died by violent means. Defendant argued, as an affirmative defense, that the death occurred while the deceased was in the act of committing an assault with a deadly weapon, thereby assuming the risk of being killed and precluding recovery under the policy. Plaintiff denied the commission of an assault or felony by the insured. At the close of defendant's evidence, plaintiff presented rebuttal evidence consisting of the testimony of a police officer as to the disposition of certain items found at the scene, the testimony of several co-workers of the deceased establishing that the deceased was never known by them to own a knife but was known by them to wear glasses and several photographs taken at the scene.

At two points during the trial, the defendant moved for a directed verdict on the grounds that the plaintiff had failed to make a submissible case. The first motion came at the conclusion of the plaintiff's case in chief; the second, at the close of all of the evidence. Both motions were denied and the case was sent to the jury which returned a verdict for plaintiff.

The proper procedural approach in a double indemnity action was thoroughly discussed by the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals in O'Brien v. Equitable Life Assur Soc. of United States, 212 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1954), wherein it was stated that in a double indemnity action, the law affords the plaintiff the use of a rebuttable presumption. Establishment of death by violent means raises a presumption of death by accident (O'Brien v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of United States, supra). See also Di Paoli v. Prudential Ins. Co., 384 S.W.2d 861 (Mo.App.1964) and Lindemann v. General American Life Ins. Co., 485 S.W.2d 477 (Mo.App.1972). In the present case when plaintiff proved the fact of the deceased's death by external, violent means by the medical testimony, the presumption arose that the deceased met his death by accidental means.

But the presumption of accidental death simply accomplishes the function of evidence insofar as plaintiff's initial burden of going forward with the evidence. The use of the presumption casts upon the defendant the burden of going forward with evidence to counter the presumption, O'Brien v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of United States, supra, 212 F.2d at 386; Ward v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 352 S.W.3d 413 (Mo.App.1961). The defendant's motion for a directed verdict at this point in the trial was, therefore, properly overruled because of the legal effect of the presumption.

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7 cases
  • Piva v. General American Life Ins. Co., WD
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • January 18, 1983
    ...v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 241 Mo.App. 521, 244 S.W.2d 607, 614[1-4] (Mo.App.1951); Connizzo v. General American Life Insurance Company, 520 S.W.2d 661, 664[3-5] (Mo.App.1975). Thus, by the very nature, the presumption of accidental death from the evidence of violent means is dispe......
  • Stogsdill v. General American Life Ins. Co., s. 37374
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • July 27, 1976
    ...only establish that the insured's death resulted from violent means to create a presumption of accident. Connizzo v. General American Life Ins. Co., 520 S.W.2d 661 (Mo.App.1975). This purely procedural and wholly rebuttable presumption has the effect of shifting the burden of going forward ......
  • American Mortg. Inv. Co. v. Hardin-Stockton Corp.
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • March 27, 1984
    ...differ. Stated yet another way, a directed verdict does not lie unless reasonable minds could not differ. Connizzo v. General American Life Insurance Co., 520 S.W.2d 661 (Mo.App.1975), McCarthy v. Wulff, 452 S.W.2d 164 (Mo.1970), Abel v. Campbell 66 Express, Inc., 378 S.W.2d 269 (Mo.App.196......
  • Cappo v. Allstate Life Ins. Co.
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    • Missouri Court of Appeals
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    ...burden of going forward with the evidence to Allstate and did not relieve appellant of her burden of proof. Connizzo v. General Am. Life Ins. Co., 520 S.W.2d 661, 665 (Mo.App.1975); see also Sanderson, 194 S.W.2d at 227-28. As the trier of fact, the trial court concluded from the evidence t......
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