O'Connor v. Bd. of Pub. Util. Com'rs

• Decision Date: 11 February 1942
• Docket Number: No. 231.,231.
• Citation: 24 A.2d 411,128 N.J.L. 35
• Parties: O'CONNOR et al. v. BOARD OF PUBLIC UTILITY COM'RS et al.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

24 A.2d 411

128 N.J.L. 35

O'CONNOR et al.

v. BOARD OF PUBLIC UTILITY COM'RS et al.

No. 231.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Feb. 11, 1942.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. The Board of Public Utility Commissioners has power to discontinue a passenger service little used, when other means of transportation are available.

2. The public has no vested right to ride in trains for short distances, when busses operate in the same region and the train service is unduly costly and patronized by few people.

3. A railroad company is not obliged to waste materials and money on a service which serves no useful purpose.

4. Where the proofs support the findings of the Public Utility Commission, those findings cannot be disturbed in the Supreme Court.

Certorari proceeding by William H. O'Connor and others against the Board of Public Utility Commissioners and the Pennsylvania-Reading Seashore Lines.

Writ dismissed.

January term, 1942, before BODINE, PERSKIE, and PORTER, JJ.

Waddington & Tilton, of Camden, for prosecutors.

John A. Bernhard, of Newark, for Board of Public Utility Com'rs.

French, Richards & Bradley, Floyd H. Bradley, and Grace Heritage Smith, all of Camden, H. Merle Mulloy and Windsor F. Cousins, both of Philadelphia, Pa., for Pennsylvania-Reading Seashore Lines.

BODINE, Justice.

This case presents two questions for decision. The first question is the power of the Board of Public Utility Commissioners to authorize a railroad company operating in this state to discontinue all passenger service. The second question is the reasonableness of the action taken in this case. The railroad voluntarily continued the service until May 20th of this year so that we might review the same. If the situation as to the passenger operation changes by reason of the national defense necessity, the road may be taken over or the Utility Board will act as it may be then advised. Nevertheless, we think the questions raised should be decided so that the Board may know the extent of its power.

The general Railroad Act N.J.S.A. 48:12-99 requires every railroad to run trains for the transportation of persons and property. This obligation, however, must be measured by public necessity and convenience. The argument to the contrary seems to be that the railroad must run passenger trains at a terrific loss or abandon the franchise, even though the public may travel as easily and reasonably by other conveyances. There seems to be no reason why a railroad must supply transportation for a few passengers who are unwilling to ride in adequate buses paralleling the lines of operation.

Under date of July 23, 1941, Mr. Ralph Budd, Transportation Commissioner of the Council of National Defense, warned all railroads that troop transportation in 1942 would exceed that of 1941 by 40 to 100 percent; that unnecessary trains should be discontinued and that there would be no priorities for further passenger equipment. Again he warned, in August of 1941, that there must be elimination of unnecessary competitive services.

If the argument be sound that there is no way for a railroad to discontinue an unnecessary service, except to forfeit its charter, then planning for national defense becomes ineffective and our efforts must be slowed down because of a few wilful people who like to ride short distances in railroad trains.

This court cannot attribute such meaning to the pertinent legislative enactments. Vice Chancellor Garrison in Jacquelin v. Erie R. R. Co., 69 N.J.Eq. 432, at page 440, 61 A. 18, at page 21, said: "The Supreme Court of the United States has suggested that this subject of the regulation of the operation of carriers in the matter of stations, frequency of trains, and the like is one for legislation and administration, and that the courts should not originate provisions with respect thereto, but should confine themselves to interpreting and applying them. (Northern Pacific Railroad Co. v. Washington ex rel. Dustin, 142 U.S. 492, 12 S.Ct. 283, 35 L.Ed. 1092); and similar reasoning will be found in the case of Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad Co. v. Central Stockyard, etc., Co., 1889, 45 N.J.Eq. 50 , 17 A. 146, 6 L.R.A. 855 et seq. (Van Fleet Vice Chancellor); Id., on appeal, 46 N.J.Eq. 280 [1 Dick. 280], 19 A. 185." And again at page 441 of 69 N.J.Eq., at page 22 of 61 A.: "In this state, where we have no such administrative body, and where the hardships and injuries which may ensue to citizens and property if railroads are allowed unrestrainedly to conduct their operations in a way to injure the citizen and his property, it is natural that applications should be made to courts of equity to restrain such invasions of what the citizen esteems to be his rights." The determination was that the court of chancery could not regulate the business of a common carrier and determine at what time trains should be run and at what stations such trains should be stopped.

The solution of similar questions is to be determined by a balancing of the proofs as to the requirements of the public and the exercise of sound business judgment. To solve such problems, the legislature created the Board of Public...