Connor v. Black

Decision Date21 January 1896
Citation33 S.W. 783,132 Mo. 150
PartiesConnor et al., Appellants, v. Black, Appellant
CourtMissouri Supreme Court

Appeal from Clark Circuit Court. -- Hon. B. E. Turner, Judge.

Affirmed.

John D Smoot and McKee & Jayne for Black, appellant.

The court erred in refusing declaration of law number 1, offered by the appellant, for if respondent and appellant did not intend any oats was to be delivered on contract of sale, it was a gambling contract, and if money was paid thereon, by appellant, to respondent, within three months next before the beginning of this suit appellant was entitled to recover it back. McGrew v. City Produce Exchange, 4 S.W. 38; Floyd v. Patterson, 10 S.W. 526; Irwin v Williar, 110 U.S. 499; Watterman v. Buckland, 1 Mo.App. 45; Crawford v. Spencer, 92 Mo. 498; Cockrell v. Thompson, 85 Mo. 510; Lyon v Culbertson, 83 Ill. 33; Pickering v. Case, 79 Ill. 328; Rourkey v. Short, 34 Eng. L. & E. 219; Bigelow v. Benedict, 70 N.Y. 202; Story v. Solomon, 71 N.Y. 420; Schreiner, Flack & Co. v. Orr, 55 Mo.App. 406; Jones v. Shale, 34 Mo.App. 302; Taylor v. Penquite, 35 Mo.App. 389; R. S., secs. 5209, 5207, 3931, 3932, 3933, 3934, 3936, 3834, 3835, 3836, 3837, 3839; Laws 1887, p. 172; Laws 1889, p. 98; Law of the Produce Exchange, secs. 189, 190, 199, 206 and 210; Turnbull v. Watkins, 2 Mo.App. 235; Connor v. Black, 119 Mo. 126.

Given Campbell, R. D. Cramer, and Edward Higbee for Connor et al., appellants.

(1) The court below erred in refusing to give the fourth instruction offered by plaintiffs, and in rendering judgment against plaintiffs, on their cause of action. Schreiner, Flack & Co. v. Orr, 55 Mo.App. 406; Mulford v. Caesar, 53 Mo.App. 274; Cockrell v. Thompson, 85 Mo. 510; Crawford v. Spencer, 92 Mo. 498; Irwin v. Williar, 110 U.S. 499; Roundtree v. Smith, 108 U.S. 269. First. This court has the right upon the presentation of this case the second time upon the same pleadings and facts, to render such judgment as comports with the law and the facts. City v. Foxworthy, 41 C. L. J. 189. Second. This court in its opinion (119 Mo. 126) erred in its construction of section 3931, Revised Statutes Missouri, 1889. (2) The court committed no error in its rulings complained of in the first, second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth points of the brief of appellant George Black. (3) The court committed no error in giving the second declaration of law requested by plaintiff and in refusing the first declaration of law requested by defendant George Black. First. If the court should take the view that this was an illegal transaction, the law is clear that where both parties intended an illegal act in an executed transaction, neither can recover. See authorities cited under point 1 of this brief. In such case the maxim ex turpi causa actio non oritur applies -- unless the statute covers -- and the lower court did not err in holding that this counterclaim of defendant was not within the statute. Sec. 5209, R. S. 1889. See Williamson v. Bailey, 78 Mo. 636; State v. Bryant, 90 Mo. 537; State v. Gilmore, 98 Mo. 206; St. Louis, etc., Association v. Delano, 108 Mo. 221; State v. Dinnisse, 109 Mo. 434; Sprague v. Rooney, 104 Mo. 349. Second. Even were it within the statute, it is barred by the limitation of the statute. (4) This case was voluntarily submitted to the court (jury being waived) on the evidence presented in the bill of exceptions on the former trial. If there were any errors in the admission or exclusion of evidence on the former trial, they are waived. The evidence was received by agreement; no objections were made on the last trial.

Gantt, P. J. Sherwood and Burgess, JJ., concur.

OPINION

Gantt, P. J.

This is the second appeal in this cause. The first is reported in Connor v. Black, 119 Mo. 126, 24 S.W. 184.

The case was submitted to the court without the intervention of a jury upon the evidence taken at the former trial. All objections to evidence on either side were formally waived. The plaintiffs' appeal will be first considered.

I. Among other declarations of law prayed for by the plaintiffs was the following:

"4. The court declares the law to be that if it appears from the evidence that plaintiffs, as agents for defendant, George Black, on July 17, 1890, sold in good faith for him to various persons for delivery in the city of St. Louis during the month of September, 1890, one hundred thousand bushels of oats, and that at the time of said sales, both plaintiffs and the purchasers of said oats respectively intended an actual delivery and receipt of the grain so contracted to be sold, and that plaintiffs believed that defendant intended an actual sale and delivery of said grain under said contracts, then, though the court may find from the evidence that defendant did not intend an actual delivery, but intended to speculate in the rise and fall of the market price of said grain, yet such intention can not affect plaintiffs' rights to recover the balance that may appear to be due them, unless such intention of defendant was disclosed to plaintiffs, or they had notice thereof from the circumstances in evidence before or at the time plaintiffs contracted for the sale of said grain."

This instruction the circuit court refused, and this is the sole error of which the plaintiffs complain here. In refusing this declaration the circuit court conformed to the decision of this court on the former appeal. At the earnest request of counsel we have carefully reconsidered that opinion and find no reason for changing the views then expressed. It follows that the court did not err in refusing the fourth declaration of law as prayed by plaintiffs and the judgment on plaintiffs' appeal is affirmed.

II. As to the defendant's counterclaim for the margins advanced by him the circuit court gave a declaration that under the pleadings and evidence he was not entitled to recover the same. In so holding the court correctly ruled. Unless defendant could sue for and recover this money by virtue of section 5209 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri, 1889, the maxim, "ex turpi causa non oritur" would unquestionably apply. Both in his pleadings and his evidence he admitted that it was a gambling transaction in grain on his part.

While at common law he might have declared his dissent to the wager and demanded and recovered his money before the event upon which his wager was staked had happened, having waited until he lost by the happening of the event, to wit, the rise in oats, he could not rescind the contract after the event. Hickerson v. Benson, 8 Mo. 8; Humphreys v Magee, 13 Mo. 435...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT