O'Connor v. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp.
| Decision Date | 29 July 2009 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 3:09CV00022. |
| Citation | 643 F.Supp.2d 799 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia |
| Parties | James & Nina O'CONNOR, Plaintiffs, v. COLUMBIA GAS TRANSMISSION CORP., Defendant. |
Henry Evans Howell, III, Waldo & Lyle, P.C., Norfolk, VA, for Plaintiffs.
Michael S. Dingman, Reed Smith, Falls Church, VA, for Defendant.
This matter is before the Court on Columbia Gas Transmission Corporation's Motion to Dismiss (docket no. 3) the O'Connors' suit against it for the alleged breach of a 1950 Right of Way Agreement and private nuisance (docket no. 1). For the reasons set forth below, Columbia's Motion will be granted.
Although this suit was filed by the O'Connors in March of this year, the history relevant to the resolution of this matter dates back to June 2007, when Columbia originally filed an action in this Court to condemn, among other things, the right to install a pig launcher and a new natural gas pipeline across the O'Connors' property in Louisa County (Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. Walker, et al., Civil No. 3:07CV00028-NKM, docket no. 1). On November 13, 2007, the O'Connors filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment in the condemnation action, contesting Columbia's authority to install the pig launcher on their property as a violation of a 1950 Right of Way Agreement between both parties' predecessors-in-interest (3:07CV28, docket no. 86). The matter was later resolved by an Agreed Order between the parties (3:07CV28, docket no. 90), which recognized Columbia's right and authority to condemn the pig launcher and other above-ground appurtenances on the O'Connors' property, as well as the O'Connors' right to just compensation for the condemnation. The Order stated in pertinent part:
IT APPEARING to the Court that Plaintiff, Columbia Gas Transmission Corporation, and Defendants, James and Nina O'Connor, agree that Columbia Gas Transmission Corporation has the right and authority to condemn a pig launcher/receiver, and other appurtenances, on the O'Connors' property at issue in this case and that the placement of a pig launcher/receiver, and other above-ground appurtenances, is a taking for which the O'Connors are entitled to just compensation; it is
ORDERED that Plaintiff, Columbia Gas Transmission Corporation, has the right and the authority to condemn an easement for the placement of a pig launcher/receiver, and other above-ground appurtenances, on the property of the O'Connors at issue in this case, that the placement of a pig launcher/receiver, or any other above-ground appurtenance on the O'Connors' property shall be a taking for which the O'Connors are entitled to just compensation and that the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed by the O'Connors is resolved by the foregoing agreement of the parties.
Columbia proceeded to install the pig launcher, other above-ground appurtenances, and the new natural gas transmission pipeline (Line VM-109) on the O'Connors' property. Because Columbia and the O'Connors could not agree on the amount of just compensation owed for the condemnation, a jury trial on the issue of just compensation was eventually set for May 20, 2009.
On March 6, 2009, just over two months before the jury trial, the O'Connors filed this action in Louisa County Circuit Court, alleging breach of the 1950 Right of Way Agreement and private nuisance. Columbia timely removed the suit to this Court and filed the instant Motion to Dismiss (docket no. 3).1 On April 21, 2009, Columbia filed an amended complaint (3:07CV28, docket no. 114) in the condemnation action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 71.1(f), which permits a plaintiff to amend its complaint at any time before trial without leave of court if certain conditions are met.2 The amended complaint contained two significant differences from the complaint that was originally filed in the condemnation action: (1) it permitted the construction of roads over the newly-installed pipeline, so long as construction complied with Columbia's "Minimum Guidelines" (the original complaint prohibited the construction of roads over the pipeline), and (2) it removed from the areas to be condemned the portion of Line VM-109 running "approximately parallel" to two other existing pipelines on the O'Connors' property. Columbia claimed that the second amendment reflected the parties' mutual understanding that Columbia already had the right to install additional pipelines "approximately parallel" to the two existing pipelines pursuant to the 1950 Right of Way Agreement and thus did not need to condemn for that right.
Just prior to the start of the jury trial, the parties submitted a proposed Integrated Pretrial Order (3:07CV28, docket no. 140) identifying, among other things, the contested issues of law that required a ruling from the Court. After a pre-trial hearing, I issued an order on May 19, 2009 that clearly settled the contested legal issues so that the parties could properly frame their strategies and arguments concerning just compensation prior to the start of the jury trial (3:07CV28, docket no. 143). The May 19, 2009 Order established, among other things, that:
1. The relevant date of the taking of the O'Connors' property was June 4, 2007;
2. The 1950 Right of Way Agreement was binding on the O'Connors and Columbia;
3. The area of the newly-installed pipeline that crossed under the pre-existing pipelines on the O'Connors' property was "approximately parallel" to the pre-existing lines, as defined in the 1950 Right of Way Agreement; and
4. Under the 1950 Right of Way Agreement, the O'Connors could not assert a claim for compensation in excess of $275.00 for the installation of the new pipeline (excluding the installation of the pig receiver) but were entitled to any damages that arose from the construction, maintenance, operation, and removal of the new pipeline.
After a two-day trial during which both parties presented evidence concerning the amount of just compensation owed to the O'Connors for the partial taking of their property, the jury rendered a verdict awarding the O'Connors $24,400.00 (3:07CV28, docket no. 154). The verdict included $1,600.00 for the condemnation of any temporary easements, $2,800.00 for the condemnation of any permanent easements, and $20,000.00 for the damage to the value of the remainder of the O'Connors' property.
Despite the resolution of the condemnation action and the jury's award of compensation, the O'Connors persist in seeking damages in this action for the alleged breach of the 1950 Right of Way Agreement and private nuisance. The Right of Way Agreement grants Columbia "the right to lay, maintain, operate and remove a pipe line or pipe lines, for the transportation of gas . . ." across the O'Connors' property, and "the right at any time to lay additional lines of pipe approximately parallel to the first line herein provided," upon the payment of $275.00. Under the terms of the Agreement, Columbia is required to "pay for any damages that may arise from the construction, maintenance, operation and removal of said lines." Specifically, the O'Connors' complaint alleges that Columbia breached the Right of Way Agreement by: (1) constructing the pig receiver and other above-ground appurtenances on their property; (2) installing Line VM-109 in a manner that was not "approximately parallel" to the preexisting pipelines; (3) failing to pay $275 for the installation of Line VM-109; and (4) failing to pay damages for the construction, maintenance, operation, and removal of Line VM-109. The O'Connors further claim that Columbia's breach of the Right of Way Agreement constitutes a private nuisance under Virginia Code § 55-50.1.3 Columbia primarily argues that the O'Connors' suit should be dismissed because it is preempted by the jury's award of just compensation in the condemnation action and because it fails to state plausible claims for breach of contract and private nuisance under Virginia law.
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint to determine whether the plaintiff has properly stated a claim; "it does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses." Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir.1992). Although a complaint "does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the `grounds' of his entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (internal citations omitted). A court need not "accept the legal conclusions drawn from the facts" or "accept as true unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments." Eastern Shore Markets, Inc. v. J.D. Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 213 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir.2000). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level," Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, with all allegations in the complaint taken as true and all reasonable inferences drawn in the plaintiffs favor. Chao v. Rivendell Woods, Inc., 415 F.3d 342, 346 (4th Cir.2005). Rule 12(b)(6) does "not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Consequently, "only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1950, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).
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