O'Connor v. Gertgens
| Decision Date | 04 April 1902 |
| Docket Number | 12,757 - (124) |
| Citation | 89 N.W. 866,85 Minn. 481 |
| Parties | JOHN P. O'CONNOR v. JACOB GERTGENS |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Action in ejectment in the district court for Traverse county. The case was tried upon an agreed statement of facts. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, entered pursuant to the order of Webber, J., defendant appealed. Affirmed.
Public Land -- Withdrawal from Sale.
The secretary of the interior possesses full power to withdraw public lands from settlement and market at will, and when he acts in this respect it is deemed an act of the president. It seems to be quite immaterial what may be the basis of the order of withdrawal, or what public land it affects.
Land Grant -- Repealing Act -- Executive Order.
By the congressional land grant act of March 3, 1865 (13 Stat. 526) it was made the duty of the secretary of the interior (section 7) to withdraw lands in aid of the grant therein provided for. Subsequently, by section 5 of the act of congress of September 29, 1890 (26 Stat. 496), section 7 was repealed. Held, that this repeal did not revoke or annul an executive order previously made whereby certain lands had been withdrawn from the public domain for the benefit of the grant.
Purchase of Land not in Grant -- Perfecting Title in Purchaser.
By the fifth section of an act of March 3, 1887 (24 Stat. 556), it was provided that when railroad companies had sold lands, as parts of their grants, coterminous with their constructed lines of road, to citizens, or to persons who had declared their intention to become citizens, but for some reason these lands were excepted from the operation of the grants, and could not be conveyed to the companies, these citizens or persons, if "bona fide purchasers," should have the right to buy of the government, and should thereupon be entitled to patents. Held, that this section must be construed liberally, with a design to effectuate its object and that citizenship, or declaration of intention to become a citizen, and a bona fide purchase, are the essentials required by its terms. Held, further, that the right of one who purchased land from a railroad company, prior to the passage of the act of March 3, 1887, to perfect title under section 5 of that act, is superior to the settlement right of another person, acquired after the passage of said act.
Uniform Construction of Statute.
Where there has been a long and uniform course in construing a statute in a tribunal charged with the duty of executing it, such construction is always entitled to the most respectful consideration by the courts, and ought not to be overruled without cogent reasons.
Bona Fide Purchaser.
The expression "bona fide purchaser" is oftentimes used ambiguously, and is construed in various ways. The context must be examined, and the expression considered with reference to its use and the connection in which it is found. It may mean without fraud or deception. It may mean without notice of others' rights. It sometimes signifies honesty of purpose as distinguished from bad faith. To be a bona fide purchaser may under some circumstances require the payment of the consideration or purchase price, but not always. In the statute in question the term "bona fide" was used as the opposite of "mala fide." Held, in the case at bar, following the rulings of the appropriate officers of the land department, that the plaintiff's grantor, to whom the patent was issued, was a bona fide purchaser of the land in dispute, within the meaning of said section 5.
Jurisdiction of Land Department -- Decision Conclusive.
It is well settled that authority to hear and determine all questions of fact arising in the land department of the general government is exclusively within the control of the appropriate officers of that department. The jurisdiction thus conferred is judicial in its nature, and the decisions of the department officers, when acting within their jurisdiction, are final and conclusive, in the absence of fraud or imposition or mistake.
Jurisdiction of Land Department.
The same rule applies where the question presented to the department officials is one of mixed law and fact. Their decision is equally as conclusive as to the fact involved.
F. W. Murphy, Thomas Kneeland, L. C. Spooner and Stockslager & Heard, for appellant.
E. T. Young and Stevens, O'Brien, Cole & Albrecht, for respondent.
This is an action in ejectment to recover possession, under a claim of ownership, of one hundred sixty acres of land in Traverse county; the complaint being in the ordinary form. The answer admitted that plaintiff had paper title derived from the grantee named in the United States patent, but, in the form of a cross bill, set up equitable matter upon which defendant claims he should have received the patent from the government, and demands that the title be decreed to be held in trust for his use and benefit, and that plaintiff be required to convey the land to him.
The tract involved was originally included within the indemnity limits of the grant of lands in aid of the main line of the St. Paul, Minneapolis & Manitoba Railway, of March 3, 1857 (11 Stat. 195), and March 3, 1865 (13 Stat. 526). Soon after the filing of the company's map of definite location by commissioner's letter dated May 25, 1869, received at the local land office June 3, 1869, the lands within said indemnity limits, including this tract, were duly withdrawn from settlement and market, for the benefit of the grant. April 22, 1885, all the lands within said indemnity limits were selected by the company on account of asserted losses along its main line; and thereafter, in August, 1891, the selection list was amended, by consent of the land officers, by a withdrawal of the specification of losses as first filed, and substituting therefor a specification of losses arising in the grant for the "St. Vincent Extension" of said railway. By act of congress approved September 29, 1890 (26 Stat. 496), section 7 of the act of March 3, 1865, making it the duty of the secretary of the interior to withdraw the lands from market, was repealed.
May 22, 1891, the secretary gave direction to the commissioner of the general land office that, after due notice, all lands theretofore withdrawn for indemnity purposes under the land grants in question should be restored to the public domain for settlement and entry; but, of itself, this direction did not affect the previous order of withdrawal. Counsel for defendant are in error when asserting that the secretary's action revoked the order. On May 28 of the same year the commissioner directed the register and receiver of the St. Cloud district, in which this land was situated, to restore to the public domain, and open to settlement and entry, all lands in the district theretofore withdrawn, situated within the indemnity limits of the grant, "not embraced in selections heretofore made or applied for by said company." This order, as will be seen, expressly reserved from its operation all lands which had been selected or applied for by the company, and among them was this particular tract of land. It expressly directed that there be opened to settlement and entry all indemnity lands not selected or applied for, but in no manner did it revoke the previous order of withdrawal, in so far as that order and the subsequent selection affected and withdrew from the public domain the one hundred sixty acres in dispute.
March 21, 1894, the secretary issued an order to the commissioner wherein he considered said last-mentioned selection, and, after holding that the company had attempted to make selections for losses on its main line to the amount of two hundred thousand acres in excess thereof, directed that action be suspended in respect to selections on account of the St. Vincent Extension until further advices from his department. This order of suspension was revoked October 1, 1895, with directions to the commissioner to adjust the grants. January 13, 1896, the commissioner ordered the company to show cause why the suspension upon indemnity selections made by the St. Vincent Extension should not be revoked, "and the applications of settlers to make homestead entries for said lands be taken up and considered in connection with said selections." July 17 of the same year the commissioner rendered a decision relative to indemnity selections as to lands in the St. Cloud district, and held the same for cancellation, subject to appeal. October 23, 1896, no appeal having been taken by the company, the commissioner rendered a decision finally cancelling all indemnity selections in the St. Cloud land district; but in this order, as well as in the decision of July 17th, was this significant paragraph:
From this it will be noticed that the order whereby indemnity lands were restored to the public domain expressly excluded from its operation certain tracts which had previously been applied for, and that its effect was to restore a part only of the lands which had previously been withdrawn from public entry. As to the remainder there was no revocation of the withdrawal order, and among these was the particular tract in controversy. As to it the original order of withdrawal remained in full force, because at that time the tract was claimed by two parties, -- one, the Right Reverend John Ireland, who asserted a claim and right under the act...
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