O'Connor v. PCA Family Health Plan

• Decision Date: 18 January 2000
• Docket Number: Nos. 97-5879,s. 97-5879
• Citation: 200 F.3d 1349
• Parties: (11th Cir. 2000) DEBRA LEE O'CONNOR, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PCA FAMILY HEALTH PLAN, INC., Defendant-Appellee. & 98-5121
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 1349

200 F.3d 1349 (11th Cir. 2000)

DEBRA LEE O'CONNOR, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PCA FAMILY HEALTH PLAN, INC., Defendant-Appellee.

Nos. 97-5879 & 98-5121

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

Jan. 18, 2000

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, D. C. Docket Nos. 96-CV-8502-WJZ & 97-CV-8883-LCN

Before COX, Circuit Judge, KRAVITCH, Senior Circuit Judge, and PROPST^*, Senior District Judge.

KRAVITCH, Senior Circuit Judge:

The primary issue these consolidated appeals present, and one of first impression in this circuit, is the scope of employment protection afforded by the Family Medical and Leave Act of 1993 (the "FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. 2601 - 54; specifically, we address the circumstances under which an employer may terminate an employee on FMLA leave. Plaintiff-Appellant Debra O'Connor brought suit against PCA Family Health Plan, Inc. ("PCA"), her former employer, claiming PCA violated the FMLA by terminating her employment and attendant benefits while she was exercising her statutory right to FMLA leave. The district court found no such violation. We agree and therefore AFFIRM.

I. BACKGROUND

In March 1995, O'Connor entered the employ of PCA as an Account Executive in PCA's Boca Raton, Florida, office. O'Connor learned she was pregnant in August of that year and notified PCA of her intention to take maternity leave for the birth and post-natal care of her child. Under the terms of PCA's employee benefits policy, O'Connor had several leave options, including FMLA leave, sick and vacation leave, short-term disability leave, and leave without pay. She discussed these options with her supervisors in PCA's Boca Raton office and requested a period of FMLA leave commencing April 22, 1996, and ending August 1, 1996. PCA's regional Human Resources Department (the "HRD") for the state of Florida, housed in PCA's Miami office, instead approved a leave package commencing on April 18, 1996, the day after O'Connor's last scheduled day of work,¹ and ending on July 10, 1996. O'Connor's child was born on May 2.

In June 1996, economic losses experienced during the previous two years compelled PCA to undergo a reduction in force ("RIF"). PCA implemented the RIF in multiple phases, the first occurring on July 1, 1996, with the termination of 190 employees. PCA's HRD selected these employees from lists submitted by the supervisors of various departments throughout PCA's Florida offices. O'Connor's name was one of those submitted. While compiling the final roster of employees to be terminated in the first phase of the RIF, the HRD reviewed the submitted lists for employees who, as of the date of the first phase of the RIF, would be on leave. The HRD flagged two employees and removed them from the final roster, opting to reassess their employment statuses after they returned from leave. The HRD, however, failed to flag O'Connor's name; consequently, PCA terminated O'Connor as part of the first phase of its RIF.

On or about July 11, 1996, O'Connor learned of her termination and contacted her former supervisor in the Boca Raton office to inquire as to the reason. The supervisor notified the HRD that an employee on leave had been terminated. Odalys Torres, who at the time was PCA's Director of Human Resources for Florida, investigated and concluded that the HRD in fact should have removed O'Connor's name from the RIF roster, as it did with the other two employees then on leave. On or about August 15, PCA orally offered to reinstate O'Connor to her former position, but she declined.

On July 23, 1996, O'Connor filed a complaint with the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, alleging PCA violated the FMLA by terminating her while she was on FMLA leave (Case No. 97-5879, the "FMLA suit"). On or about October 1, 1996, she also filed charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the "EEOC") and the Florida Commission on Human Relations, alleging discrimination based on her gender, age, and pregnancy status in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2000e; the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (the "ADEA"), as amended, 29 U.S.C. 621-634; and the Florida Civil Rights Act, Fla. Stat. ch. 760.01-.854. The EEOC took no action on O'Connor's complaint, and on August 18, 1997, O'Connor requested and received her Notice of Right to Sue.

O'Connor's FMLA suit was adjudicated in a bench trial before the district court on August 25, 1997. The district court announced its judgment on September 24, 1997, holding that PCA had not violated the FMLA by terminating O'Connor while she was on FMLA leave.

On November 17, 1997, O'Connor exercised her "right to sue" by filing a second suit against PCA, alleging the various charges of discrimination included in her EEOC complaint (Case No. 98-5121, the "employment discrimination suit"). PCA immediately moved for summary judgment on the ground that the prior adjudication of O'Connor's FMLA suit has res judicata effect on all claims included in her second suit. The district court agreed and granted PCA's motion for summary judgment on June 30, 1998.

II. ANALYSIS

A. CASE NO. 97-5879: THE FMLA SUIT

The FMLA provides that an "eligible employee"² is entitled to a maximum of twelve weeks of leave³ during which her employment status is protected.⁴ The FMLA recognizes two types of claims for alleged violations of these provisions: interference claims,⁵ in which employers burden or outright deny substantive statutory rights to which their employees are entitled, see 29 U.S.C. 2615(a)(1) (1999), and retaliation claims,⁶ in which employers discharge employees for exercising their FMLA right to leave, see id. 2615(a)(2). O'Connor's complaint did not specifically characterize her FMLA claim as either, but rather asserted some nonspecific violation of the FMLA. In its resolution of the claim, however, the district court construed O'Connor's complaint to allege only a retaliatory discharge. O'Connor appeals this as error, contending she also properly presented an interference claim to the district court.

We must first resolve the character of the FMLA claim O'Connor submitted to the district court, a question of law we review de novo. See Massaro v. Mainlands Section 1 & 2 Civic Ass'n, 3 F.3d 1472, 1475 (11th Cir. 1993). After reviewing the record, we are satisfied O'Connor presented sufficient evidence at trial in support of both cognizable causes of action. The testimony and documentary evidence elicited at trial reveal O'Connor's attempt to establish that PCA denied her statutory right to reinstatement upon return from leave, as provided by 29 U.S.C. 2614(a)(1).⁷

In opposition to our conclusion, PCA directs our attention to the Joint Pretrial Stipulation, in which the parties framed O'Connor's allegation of improper termination as being "in response to her having requested pregnancy leave."⁸ Although this phrasing may suggest O'Connor believed her termination was retaliatory, we note that this statement was included in the Stipulation's Statement of the Case, rather than as an Issue of Law for the Court; the actual issue presented to the district court was simply, "Whether PCA violated the FMLA?"⁹ We are not satisfied that the language to which PCA points precluded O'Connor from also arguing an interference claim at trial. We therefore conclude the district court erred in not considering both types of FMLA claims in deciding whether PCA violated the statute. Moreover, because we find the factual record to be well-developed, we choose to resolve the interference claim ourselves,¹⁰ rather than remand the case to the district court.¹¹

The standard for establishing an interference claim under the FMLA is an issue of first impression in this circuit, but other courts have addressed it. See Diaz v. Fort Wayne Foundry Corp., 131 F.3d 711, 712-14 (7th Cir. 1997); see also Hubbard v. Blue Cross Blue Shield Assoc., 1 F. Supp. 2d 867, 874-75 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (applying Diaz); Kaylor v. Fannin Reg'l Hosp., Inc., 946 F. Supp. 988, 996-97 (N.D. Ga. 1996); cf. Hodgens v. General Dynamics Corp., 144 F.3d 151, 159-60 (1st Cir. 1998) (recognizing interference claims and citing Diaz). In Diaz, the Seventh Circuit held that if an employee proves by a preponderance of the evidence she is entitled to the benefit she claims and that her employer interfered with or denied that benefit, the employer violated the FMLA. See 131 F.3d at 713. O'Connor argues 29 U.S.C. 2614(a)(1) provides that an employee returning from leave is entitled to reinstatement, yet PCA denied her that benefit by terminating her before her leave expired,¹² thus proving her claim. Essentially, O'Connor, relying on Diaz, asserts that all FMLA rights, including reinstatement, are absolute.

Although we find no fault with the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of the FMLA, it is not completely apposite to this case. The Diaz plaintiff requested but was denied his twelve weeks of leave for an alleged medical condition as authorized by 29 U.S.C. 2612(a)(1)(D), and the Seventh Circuit held the FMLA does not permit employers to deny such a request, provided the employee follows proper procedure.¹³ See 131 F.3d at 713. Unlike the right to commence leave, an employer can deny the right to reinstatement in certain circumstances, see Ilhardt v. Sara Lee Corp., 118 F.3d 1151, 1157 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding an employer may terminate an employee on FMLA leave as part of a RIF), because United States Department of Labor regulation qualifies the right.

An employee has no greater right to reinstatement or to other benefits and conditions of employment than if the employee had been continuously employed during the FMLA leave period. An employer must be able to show that an employee would not otherwise have been employed at the time reinstatement is requested in order to deny restoration to employment. For...